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ABSTRACT 
This study explores remoteness of contractual damages in South African law. The 
manner in which South African contract law limits the extent of a plaintiff's recovery of 
damages caused by breach is controversial. Criticism has been expressed about, inter 
alia, the distinction between general and special damages, the convention 
requirement imposed for the recovery of special damages, and the approach of 
determining remoteness at the time of contracting and not of breach. It is expected 
that the current approach will be revised when the opportunity arises. In light of the 
debate around the current South African approach, and the need for its development, 
this study provides a detailed overview of the premise, purpose and operation of rules 
of remoteness.  
The study commences with a historical overview of the early civil and common law 
approaches to remoteness and their subsequent development in France, Germany 
and England. Against that background, the development of the South African 
approach is discussed and the various sources relied upon by South African courts 
placed in context. 
The study then considers three different theories of remoteness: the direct 
consequences theory, the adequate cause theory, and the foreseeability theory. The 
direct consequences theory is discussed in the context of English law. The discussion 
highlights the necessity for the remoteness inquiry to take account of the facts of a 
particular case. The adequate cause theory, in turn, is explored in the context of 
German law. The theory's development into a discretionary, policy-based approach to 
remoteness is discussed with reference to the adoption of the Schutzzwecklehre.  
The foreseeability theory is explored in two contexts: its application in English law and 
under the model instruments. The overview of English law shows that a distinction 
between general and special damages is often unhelpful and even detrimental to the 
remoteness inquiry. The recent move in English law toward an agreement-centred 
approach to remoteness is also evaluated with reference to the South African 
convention principle. Finally, foreseeability as applied in the model instruments is 
evaluated. It is concluded that the flexible approach to the foreseeability theory seen 
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in the model instruments addresses many of the identified limitations of traditional 
foreseeability tests.  
The study suggests that the remoteness inquiry should focus on a discovery of what 
parties could reasonably have taken into account when contracting. For this reason, it 
is recommended that remoteness be determined with reference to the time of contract 
conclusion; and that it should not depend upon the parties' intentions or agreement 
about liability for damages. Additionally, the study finds that the foreseeability inquiry 
cannot draw a rigid distinction between the nature and extent of a loss. Ultimately, it 
is suggested that a flexible approach to foreseeability would resolve many of the 
limitations of the current South African approach. Such an approach would align the 
remoteness inquiry to notions of fairness and economic efficiency, as well as the 
constitutional value of human dignity. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die begrensing van kontraktuele skadevergoeding in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Die wyse waarop die Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg 'n eiser se 
reg tot vergoeding vir skade veroorsaak deur kontrakbreuk beperk, is kontroversieël. 
Kritiek word uitgespreek teen, onder andere, die onderskeid tussen algemene en 
besonderse skadevergoeding, die sogenaamde konvensie-vereiste vir die 
verhaalbaarheid van besondere skade, asook die feit dat 
aanspreeklikheidsbegrensing bepaal word met verwysing na die oomblik van 
kontraksluiting eerder as kontrakbreuk. Daar word verwag dat die huidige posisie 
hersien sal word wanneer die geleentheid hom voordoen. In die lig van die debat 
rondom die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse benadering, en die behoefte aan die ontwikkeling 
van daardie benadering, bied hierdie werkstuk 'n gedetailleerde oorsig van die 
vertrekpunt, doel en werking van reëls van aanspreeklikheidsbegrensing in die 
kontraktereg. 
Die studie begin met 'n geskiedkundige oorsig oor die vroeë siviel- en gemeenregtelike 
reëls van aanspreeklikheidsbegrensing en die daaropvolgende ontwikkeling van 
hierdie reëls in Frankryk, Engeland en Duitsland. Teen dié agtergrond word die 
ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse benadering uiteengesit, en die verskillende 
bronne waarop Suid-Afrikaanse howe gesteun het in daardie ontwikkeling in konteks 
geplaas. 
Die studie oorweeg daarna drie verskillende teorieë oor die begrensing van 
kontraktuele skadevergoeding: die direkte gevolge-teorie, die adekwate 
veroorsakingsteorie, en die voorsienbaarheidsteorie. Die direkte gevolge-teorie word 
in die konteks van Engelse reg bespreek. Die bespreking van die teorie beklemtoon 
die noodsaaklikheid vir enige toets van aanspreeklikheidsbegrensing om die feite van 
elke spesifieke saak in ag te kan neem. Die adekwate veroorsakingsteorie word 
bespreek in die konteks van Duitse reg. Die teorie se ontwikkeling na 'n meer beleid-
georiënteerde, diskresionêre benadering word bespreek veral met verwysing na die 
aanvaarding van die Schutzzwecklehre. 
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Die voorsienbaarheidsteorie word in twee verskillende kontekste ondersoek, naamlik 
Engelse reg en die model-instrumente. Die oorsig oor Engelse reg dui daarop dat 'n 
onderskeid tussen algemene en besondere skadevergoeding onnodig en selfs nadelig 
vir die bepaling van aanspreeklikheidsbegrensing is. Die onlangse beweging in 
Engelse reg na 'n ooreenkoms-gefokusde toets word geëvalueer met die oog op die 
Suid-Afrikaanse konvensie-vereiste. Die voorsienbaarheidstoets soos toegepas deur 
model-instrumente word laastens ondersoek. Daar word gevind dat 'n buigsame 
benadering tot die voorsienbaarheidsteorie in staat is om heelwat van die beperkings 
van die tradisionele toets, soos geïdentifiseer in die navorsing, te vermy. 
Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die aanspreeklikheidsbegrensing-ondersoek 
behoort te fokus op watter gevolge van kontrakbreuk partye redelikerwys tydens 
kontraksluiting in ag kon neem. Gevolglik word aanbeveel dat die beperking van 
kontraktuele skadevergoeding moet plaasvind met verwysing na die oomblik van 
kontraksluiting eerder as kontrakbreuk, en dat partye se ooreenkoms oor 
aanspreeklikheid nie die fokus van die toets behoort te wees nie. Daar word ook 
bevind dat daar geen streng onderskeid tussen die tipe en omvang van skade getref 
kan word nie. Uiteindelik word daar voorgestel dat die voorsienbaarheidstoets op 'n 
buigsame manier in Suid Afrika toegepas moet word. So 'n benadering is in lyn met 
oorwegings van ekonomiese doeltreffendheid en regverdigheid, asook die 
grondwetlike waarde van menswaardigheid.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1  Problem identification 
Damages for contractual breach can be defined as compensation to a plaintiff for the 
damage, loss or injury suffered as a result of that breach.1 This compensation is 
awarded with the purpose of placing the plaintiff in the position he would have been in 
had proper performance taken place.2 However, to avoid inequitable results, the law 
of contract places certain limits on the extent to which a defendant would be liable for 
such damages. 
First, there must be a factual causal link or nexus between the defendant’s breach and 
the loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that breach.3 Secondly, the plaintiff is 
required to take all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss that he suffers, and failure to 
do so would render preventable losses non-recoverable.4 However, these first two 
limits on contractual damages, which fulfil undeniably important functions in the South 
African law of contract, fall beyond the scope of this study. Here, the inquiry will focus 
on the third limit on contractual damages: remoteness. 
In addition to factual causation and reasonable mitigation of losses by the plaintiff, 
contract law imposes a further limit on the recovery of losses caused by breach. This 
is that loss must not be too remote – or rather, that the breach must be the legal, and 
not merely the factual, cause of the loss suffered. The term legal causation is not 
																																																						
1 See HJ Erasmus & JJ Gauntlett “Damages” in WA Joubert, JA Ferris & LTC Harms (eds) LAWSA  7 
2 ed (1995) paras 24-26; H McGregor, M Spencer, J Picton McGregor on Damages 18 ed (2009) 7. 
2 Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22; Novick 
v Benjamin 1972 2 SA 842 (A) 857F; Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 
276 (SCA) para 26; Bellairs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A); JC De Wet & AH van Wyk Die Suid 
Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 224. 
3 Combined Business Solutions CC v The Courier and Freight Group (Pty) Ltd 2010 JDR 0826 (SCA) 
para 24; Vision Projects (Pty) Ltd v Cooper Bell & Richards Inc 1998 4 SA 1182 (SCA) 1191H; SWJ 
van der Merwe, LF van Huysteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract – General Principles 4 ed 
(2012) 357. 
4 De Pinto v Rensea Investments (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 S 1000 (A); Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Co Ltd 
v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22; GF Lubbe & CM Murray Farlam & Hathaway – 
Contract: Cases, Materials, Commentary 3 ed (1988) 629; Van der Merwe et al Contract 365. 
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customarily used in the context of contract law, but it could describe this type of causal 
connection.5 This limitation ensures that the defendant is held liable for harm caused 
by his breach only to the extent that it would be fair and reasonable to do so. In other 
words: 
“In addition to the fact that a person can naturally not be liable to pay damages if damage 
did not actually flow from his or her breach of contract, it is likewise clear that he or she is 
not necessarily liable for all damage resulting from such breach.”6 
In order to determine whether the loss suffered as a result of a breach of contract is 
too remote, the South African law of contract draws a distinction between general and 
special damages.7 It is said that general damages can be considered to flow naturally 
and generally from a breach in the normal course of events8 and is recoverable without 
a need to prove anything more.9 This is because the law presumes that parties could 
reasonably have foreseen all natural consequences of breach of contract.10 A plaintiff 
need only prove that the particular damage was of the kind that flows naturally and 
generally from the type of breach in question.11 
When damages are not the kind that would have flowed naturally and generally from 
the breach in question they are considered special damages.12 Such damages are in 
principle considered to have been unforeseeable, and parties will not be presumed to 
have contemplated it. A defendant will only be liable for special damages if two things 
can be proven. First, a plaintiff has to prove that there are special circumstances which 
make it reasonable to presume that the parties contemplated the damage as a 
																																																						
5 Van der Merwe et al Contract 366; JM Potgieter, L Steynberg & TB Floyd Visser & Potgieter – Law of 
Damages 3 ed (2012) 316. 
6 Potgieter et al Law of Damages 315. 
7 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 687B-687F; Shatz 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1962 2 SA 545 (A) 550B; Lavery & Co v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156 
162-163; Van der Merwe et al Contract 366; Lubbe & Murray Contract 626-267; Erasmus & Gauntlett 
"Damages" in LAWSA para 34.  
8 Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 580H; Shatz 
Investment (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 550D. 
9 Van der Merwe et al Contract 367. 
10 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 687D.   
11 BAT Rhodesia Ltd v Fawcett Security Organisation (Salisbury) Ltd 1972 4 SA 103 (R) 104E. 
12 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 550E; Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd 
v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 687D-688A. 
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probable result of the breach of contract.13 This is the contemplation requirement.14 
Secondly, it must also be proved that the parties entered into the contract with these 
special circumstances in view, or (under a more strict formulation of this requirement) 
that the parties had agreed, expressly or tacitly, that there would be liability for such 
damages.15 This is the convention requirement.16   
The South African approach to remoteness in contract is controversial.17 In Shatz 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas,18 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated, with 
reference to the primary source of the current approach to special damages, Lavery & 
Co v Jungheinrich ("Lavery"),19 that:  
"[T]he principles enunciated in [Lavery]'s case ... are criticizable in certain respects. 
Perhaps the time is fast approaching when, in an appropriate case, the correctness of the 
principles stated there should be reconsidered."20 
Authors and courts have raised doubts as to whether the current position resulted from 
a proper interpretation of the sources on which the courts relied.21 In Lavery, the 
convention and contemplation requirements for the recovery of special damages were 
set out with reference to English case law22 and the work of Pothier.23 However, it has 
been stated by the Supreme Court of Appeal that 
"neither the Hadley v Baxendale nor the Victoria Falls Power case, both of which were, 
inter alia, relied on in the judgment of [Lavery], insist on the convention principle; they 
																																																						
13 Van der Merwe et al Contract 369. 
14 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 552B.  
15 Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156 177. 
16 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 552C, Lazarus Bros v Davies & Kamann 
1922 OPD 88 91.  
17 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 687H; Lubbe & 
Murray Contract 624. 
18 1976 2 SA 545 (A). 
19 Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156. 
20 551A. 
21 GA Mulligan “Damages for Breach: Quantum, Remoteness and Causality IV: Special Damages in 
South African Law" (1956) 73 SALJ 27 38; Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 
SA 553D; see the discussion in Ch 2 (2 5 3). 
22 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex 341. See Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156 161, 168, 
174. 
23 Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156 164, 174-175. 
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postulate merely the contemplation principle. And the latter principle is apparently not ... 
the present English law."24 
Courts have also interpreted Pothier in a way that is inconsistent with the convention 
principle.25 This indicates that it may be worthwhile to undertake a thorough overview 
of the civilian and common law sources on which our approach to remoteness is 
based. In addition to the uncertainty about the appropriate interpretation of the sources 
that our courts have relied on, several points of criticism have also been raised against 
the operation of our approach to remoteness as it currently stands. 
One of these points of criticism is directed at the distinction between general and 
special damages, which has been described as artificial and theoretically impure.26 
When determining whether or not damages are general, courts only refer to the 
content of the contract.27 The concept of a normal course of events, or of the natural 
consequence of a breach, is therefore determined largely in a vacuum and without 
reference to the subjective positions and knowledge of parties. The result is that 
damages that are clearly foreseeable to parties will sometimes not be considered to 
be general.28 The impact of this approach to general damages is exacerbated by the 
strict requirements set for the recoverability of special damages in the form of the 
convention requirement.29  The result is that damages which parties clearly could have 
foreseen will not always be recoverable.30 And to this can be added the related 
criticism that the convention requirement in any event  relies on a fiction – parties often 
do not contemplate breach of contract at all, but rather its performance.31 If 
contemplation of liability for special damages is highly unlikely, requiring agreement 
																																																						
24 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 553A-553B. 
25 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 553D-553F; Mulligan 1938 SALJ 38. 
26 JC De Wet & AH Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 227. 
Durban Picture Frame Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeena 1976 1 SA 329 (D) 335-336 describes the approach as 
having “limited practical use”. 
27 Van der Merwe et al Contract 370. 
28 370. 
29 Shatz Investment (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A); Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts 
Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A); Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 
SA 276 (SCA) 291B-291D. 
30 Van der Merwe et al Contract 370. 
31 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 227. 
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before special damages can be recovered does not seem fair or well-founded.32 In 
other words, given the fact that the foreseeability inquiry usually involves supposing a 
contemplation process which "may not actually have been present to the mind of either 
party",33 to insist on the convention requirement "seems merely to add unnecessarily 
to that criticizable artificiality."34  
Another source of uncertainty and controversy in South African law is the level of 
likelihood with which damages must have been foreseeable in order to be recovered.35 
It has been stated that damages had to be foreseeable as a likely consequence of 
breach.36 This was later changed to the requirement that damages had to be 
foreseeable as a probable consequence of breach.37 This does not necessarily make 
the inquiry easier, however: 
"It is not altogether clear whether the word 'probable' in the phrase 'which the law presumes 
the parties contemplated as a probable result of the breach' ... is to be understood in the 
sense of 'more likely to occur than not'."38 
This warrants an exploration, in the context of different jurisdictions and theories of 
remoteness, of the challenges faced when delineating a particular level of likelihood 
within which damage must have been likely to occur. 
Finally, criticism has also been raised against the recoverability of damages being 
determined with reference to the time of contract conclusion and not the time of 
breach.39 Some authors argue that, because parties do not contemplate breach but 
performance at contract conclusion, there is no reason to determine the foreseeability 
of damage at the point of contracting.40 The opposing argument, which has been 
																																																						
32 227. 
33 Bower v Sparks, Young and Farmers' Meat Industries Ltd 1936 NPD 1 16. 
34 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 SA 554E. 
35 Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 580G. 
36 Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22.  
37 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA (A) 687D; Lavery and Co 
Ltd  v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156 169.  
38 Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) para 49. 
39 Van der Merwe et al Contract 370. 
40 370.  
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accepted by the Supreme Court of Appeal,41 is that the rights and duties of the parties 
are set at contract conclusion, and therefore the contemplation of the parties would 
have to be determined at that time.42 The debate on the issue has not been resolved, 
however.43  
South African courts have acknowledged the limitations of the current approach,44 and 
have indicated that it "may be the subject of reconsideration on [an] appropriate 
occasion".45 The uncertainty around the convention requirement, as well as the time 
at which foreseeability is determined, reveals a fundamental ambiguity about the 
underlying rationale for limiting contractual damages. It seems that there is uncertainty 
about whether liability for damages is determined with reference to the act of 
contracting, or the act of breach.46 Additionally, there is disagreement about the 
premise underlying the remoteness inquiry. It is not clear whether liability is being 
limited based on parties’ (presumed or actual) intentions, or rather on the 
consideration of reasonableness in the absence of any intentions.  
1 2 Research purpose, overview and methodology 
The purpose of this study is to address the problems identified above by examining 
various theories of remoteness with a view to identify the rationale underlying the 
remoteness inquiry. In the light of that rationale, different approaches to remoteness 
will be evaluated to gain insight into possible future developments of the South African 
law of contract in this regard. 
The study commences with a historical and comparative overview of the development 
of rules of remoteness in the civil and common law. The various sources relied upon 
																																																						
41 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 SA 551D-551H. 
42 AL Corbin A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law 5 (1964)1007. 
43 See, for instance, Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 
583C where the court suggests that the time of breach could be decisive.  
44 Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (SCA) 554F; Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) 
Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 688A; Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v 
Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 581J and 582D. 
45 Mia v Verimark Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2009 JDR 0913 (SCA) 11.  
46 Van der Merwe et al Contract 370. 
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by South African courts are placed in context and a detailed overview of the current 
approach, as well as its limitations, will be provided. 
This will be followed by an evaluative discussion of the three major theories of 
remoteness:47 the direct consequences theory, the adequate cause theory, and the 
foreseeability theory. The first theory limits the recovery of loss to those losses that 
can be said to flow directly from a particular breach.48 It has been most prominently 
employed in English law, and will be discussed in that context. The adequate cause 
theory in turn limits the recoverability of damages with reference to normative 
restrictions, such as community standards of justice and fairness.49 This theory will be 
discussed in the context of German law. In terms of the third approach, the 
foreseeability theory, liability for damages is limited to those losses that can be 
reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties as a probable 
result of the breach of contract. The application of the foreseeability theory will be 
explored in three different contexts: English law, the model instruments, and South 
African law. 
In particular, each of the different theories of remoteness and their application in 
different jurisdictions will be evaluated to answer five questions: (i) why do we limit 
liability for contractual damages?; (ii) should there be a distinction between general 
and special damages?; (iii) should the recoverability of losses caused by breach be 
determined with reference to the parties’ intentions?; (iv) is it possible to define a level 
of likelihood with which damages had to have been foreseeable, and if so, how should 
that be defined?; (v) should damages be limited with reference to the moment of 
contract conclusion, or the moment of breach?  
This research will aim to place the South African approach in context, and provide 
insight into its possible future development, through a comparative study of how 
remoteness in contract is approached by different theories and across different 
jurisdictions. In light of the findings of the study, it will be argued50 that the 
foreseeability theory is most suited for the South African law of contract. Its alignment 
																																																						
47 Erasmus & Gauntlett "Damages" in LAWSA paras 24-25; Lubbe & Murray Contract 624. 
48 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 206. 
49 Lubbe & Murray Contract 624. 
50 Ch 7. 
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with the underlying rationale for limiting contractual damages makes it an economically 
efficient approach; and it gives effect to the constitutional value of human dignity.51 It 
is suggested, however, that the theory should be approached in a much more flexible 
manner, and that the distinction between general and special damages, as well as the 
convention requirement, should be abandoned.52  
																																																						
51 Ch 7 (7 2). 
52 Ch 7 (7 3).	
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
2 1 Introduction 
A study of the rules of remoteness of contractual damages can greatly benefit from an 
investigation of the rationale underlying those rules. The question of which limits 
should be placed on contractual damages, and how that should be done, have 
traditionally elicited controversial answers in South African law.1 The point of departure 
for this research will therefore be an overview of the origins and development of the 
normative justifications for the limitation of contractual damages. 
The South African law of damages consists of elements of both civil and common law.2 
Courts have turned to civil law when explaining the limitation of contractual damages 
in South African law – specifically with reference to the works of Voet, Domat and 
Pothier.3 However, it has also been stated that the South African law on remoteness 
in contract is substantially the same as that of England.4  Understanding the hybrid 
nature of our law of damages is especially necessary because the relative importance 
of the civil and common-law influences have varied over time.5 This chapter will 
therefore aim to provide a concise overview of civilian and common-law influences on 
the current South African approach to remoteness in contract. 
Section two considers the different measures used to limit liability for damages in 
Roman law. As we will see, classical Roman jurists formulated several provisions 
dealing with limitations on contractual damages in particular circumstances. The rules 
were not very clear, and there is no general underlying principle that can be identified. 
Section three explores how these rules were subsequently interpreted and introduced 
into the modern civilian legal tradition. This section will show how French jurists 
developed the foreseeability approach, and how that came to underlie the modern 
																																																						
1 GF Lubbe & CM Murray Farlam & Hathaway – Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed 
(1988) 624. 
2 JM Potgieter, L Steynberg & TB Floyd Visser & Potgieter – Law of Damages 3 ed (2012) 9. 
3 HJ Erasmus “Aspects of the History of the South African Law of Damages” (1975) 38 THRHR 104 
105.  
4 Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22.  
5 HJ Erasmus & JJ Gauntlett “Damages” in WA Joubert, JA Farris & LTC Harms (eds) LAWSA  7 2 ed 
(1995) para 2. 
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French approach to the issue. The work of the Roman-Dutch writers will be discussed, 
and it will be seen that their work closely resembles the classical Roman law provisions 
– often with the same interpretative difficulties. Finally, the modern German approach 
will be discussed. 
This is followed by an outline of the historical development and current approach used 
in English law. As arguably the principal source of the South African approach to 
remoteness of contractual damages, the development of English law is discussed in 
detail and with reference to a few landmark decisions. Finally, section five examines 
the influence of the civilian and common-law authorities discussed in the previous 
sections on the South African approach to this issue. This section aims to put the 
different sources relied upon by South African courts in context, and to provide an 
overview of the current approach as well as its limitations. 
2 2 Roman Law 
Damages as it was understood in Roman law should not be equated with the remedy 
that we know today.6 The principle of omnis condemnatio pecunaria required all 
judgments to sound in money.7 In the case of breach of contract, the right to claim 
damages was therefore not understood as one of several remedies available to the 
plaintiff. Rather, every action required a defendant to be condemned in a monetary 
amount. 
In the case of actions for a specific thing (actiones certae) this amount would be 
objectively determined by the value of the object in question. For contracts of sale, this 
would be the value of the thing that was not delivered, for example. Damages were 
therefore not awarded based on the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff,8 and were 
consequently not aimed at putting the plaintiff in the position he would have been in 
had there been proper delivery. 
In the case of actions where the amount of damages could not be determined by 
ascertaining what the specific object was worth (actiones incertae), damages had to 
																																																						
6 R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 824.  
7 771-772. 
8 JE Sandys A Companion to Latin Studies 3 ed (1963) 326. 
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be determined with reference to the facts of each individual case.9 In such cases the 
inquiry was therefore individualised with no objectively ascertainable limit to the 
amount of damages.10 It was in this context that questions arose with regard to how 
liability for damages should be limited. 
Although there was no general rule applicable to the limitation of liability for contractual 
damages in classical Roman law,11 a number of jurists did discuss the topic in specific 
contexts. 
One such instance involved cases where the non-delivery of a thing caused a buyer 
to suffer some sort of additional harm over and above the loss of the value of the thing 
itself. Paul used the example of a buyer who, because of the non-delivery of wine, 
could not sell that wine at a profit. A second example was where there had been non-
delivery of grain, and the buyer’s slaves died of starvation because of this. In such 
cases, Paul wrote that only losses that are “in close connection with this matter” would 
be recoverable: 
“When the seller is responsible for non-delivery of an object, every benefit to the buyer is 
taken into account provided that it stands in close connection with this matter [circa ipsam 
rem]. If he could have completed a deal and made profit from wine, this should not be 
reckoned in, no more than if he buys wheat and his household suffers from starvation 
because it was not delivered; he receives the price of the grain, not the price of the slaves 
killed by starvation.”12  
The two cases mentioned here are examples where losses would not be recoverable. 
Profit that could potentially be made from selling the wine, or losses suffered because 
slaves died of starvation, are not in a sufficiently “close connection” with the matter. It 
is not apparent which losses would have been considered to be sufficiently closely 
connected, however. Moreover, it is also not apparent what Paul was referring to when 
he used the words “this matter”. Whether or not the “matter” is the object of the 
obligation, or the breach thereof, is not clear. 
																																																						
9 329. 
10 Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 826. 
11 HJ Erasmus “’n Regshistoriese Beskouing van Codex 7.47” (1968) 31 THRHR 213 217.  
12 D 19.1.21.3 as translated in A Watson The Digest of Justinian 2 (1985) 94. 
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The term, circa ipsam rem, has also been translated as damage that “has reference 
to the property itself”.13 Neither of the two translations make it clear which losses would 
be included as circa ipsam rem. Paul continued: 
“An obligation does not increase because it is carried out slowly, although it would grow 
greater if wine were worth more today, and rightly so, for if the wine had been delivered, I 
as buyer would have it, and if not, that which should have been delivered previously is due 
now.”14 
Perhaps an increase in the value of wine (possibly with reference to a market price) 
since the date of non-delivery could be regarded as damage that is circa ipsam rem 
and therefore sufficiently closely connected to “this matter”. That would imply an 
understanding of damage circa ipsam rem as losses sufficiently connected to the 
object of the obligation. This is not a very satisfactory explanation because this 
increase in the value would arguably also be the profit that a buyer would have been 
able to make from selling the wine later – and Paul expressly states that loss of profit 
is not recoverable. The rule and how it would function is unclear, and it does not 
necessarily assist us in defining which losses would have been included or excluded 
in damages in classical Roman law. 
Another example that received some attention involved cases where there had been 
delivery of a defective merx. Pomponius wrote that where the seller had warranted 
that the merx would be in a certain state or of a certain capacity, and it turned out to 
be defective, the seller would be liable for loss of profits suffered by the buyer.15 Ulpian 
also confirmed that where a seller knowingly delivered a defective merx, he would be 
liable not only for the reduction in the value of the performance received by the buyer, 
but also for losses caused by the defect. Labeo went even further. According to him a 
seller would be liable for all losses suffered by the buyer because of a defect in the 
merx, even in the absence of a warranty.16 As an example he stated that where a 
																																																						
13 SP Scott The Civil Law – Translated from the Original Latin 5-6 (2001) 67. 
14 Watson The Digest 2 94. 
15 Scott The Civil Law 5-6 55.  
16 DJ Joubert “Lawyers, Arguments, Principles and Authority” in C Visser (ed) Essays in Honour of 
Ellison Kahn (1989) 173 174. 
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seller knowingly delivers a diseased cow, he would be liable for all the other animals 
that died as a consequence of being infected with the disease.17 
The final instance that was specifically discussed was cases where someone leased 
a defective object. In this situation the extent of the lessor’s liability appears to have 
been dependent on the type of res that was being leased. Ulpian wrote: 
“If someone unknowingly leases out defective storage jars and wine runs out of them, he 
will be liable for the [lessee’s] interest, nor will his lack of awareness be excused, so 
Cassius wrote as well. It is quite different if you leased out a pasture in which harmful weeds 
grew; in this case, if cattle either died or lost value, the [lessee’s] interest is owing if you 
knew this, but if you were unaware of it, you may not sue for payment of rent, a view that 
Servius, Labeo and Sabinus also approved.”18 
The reason for this distinction is not clear, nor is it certain what exactly would be 
considered to fall under “the lessee’s interest”.  
By Justinian’s time, a single rule was formulated to deal with the limitation of 
contractual damages. This rule was adopted in reaction to the general uncertainty 
surrounding the issue of contractual damages that had existed at the time.19 C 7.47.1 
provided: 
“[W]henever the amount or the nature of the property is certain, as in the cases of sales, 
leases and all other contracts, the damages shall not exceed double the value of the 
property. In all other instances, however, where the value of the property seems to be 
uncertain, the judges… shall carefully ascertain the actual amount of the loss, and 
damages to that amount shall be granted…”20 
This rule has been described as arbitrary and mechanical.21 Apart from the justification 
that “it is not in accordance with nature”22 to impose penalties without limit, there was 
no principled justification for the rule. As we will see below,23 this rule was later 
explained in terms of one underlying principle: foreseeability. 
																																																						
17 D19.1.13 pr as translated in Watson The Digest 2 90. 
18 D19.2.91.1 as translated in Watson The Digest 2 105. 
19 Scott The Civil Law 12-14 190. 
20 190-191. 
21 Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 828.  
22 C7.47.1 as translated in Scott The Civil Law 12-14 191.  
23 Ch 2 (2 3 1).  
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In medieval law, there were several attempts to explain the different classical Roman 
law provisions dealing with the limitation of contractual damages. The text of Paul 
discussed above, which provides that, upon non-delivery, a buyer can only claim 
interests circa ipsam rem – in close connection with the matter24 – became the basis 
for a distinction drawn by the glossators between interesse circa rem and interesse 
extra rem.25 According to them, interesse circa rem referred to direct loss and 
interesse extra rem to consequential loss.26 As will be seen later,27 these distinctions 
were adopted in modern legal systems – although the terms came to convey different 
meanings in different jurisdictions. 
Ulpian’s text that imposed liability on a seller for losses caused by a defective merx if 
the seller had known about the defect became the basis of the notion that interesse 
extra rem should only be awarded in cases of fraud.28 We shall see that this idea is 
still prominent in modern French law.29 
Many writers also attempted to explain the distinction between cases where a lessor 
would be liable for defects in leased property and cases where he would not be liable. 
Accursius argued that a lessor would be liable for defects in leased wine containers, 
but not leased land, because defects in containers are easily detectable while this is 
not the case for a piece of land.30 Bartolus did not agree that there would always be 
liability for a defect in containers. According to him liability had to be determined with 
reference to the specific contract.31 This idea is also still prominent in modern law as 
we will see later. 
We may briefly conclude this overview of the earlier civil law up to the time of the 
glossators with the general observation that the limitation of contractual damages in 
Roman law was unclear and seems to have been developed somewhat arbitrarily in 
																																																						
24 D 19.1.21.3 as translated in Watson The Digest 2 94; see above. 
25 Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 831. 
26 JW Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa II (1937) 923, citing Molinaeus Opera Omnia II 
Tractus de Contractibus et Usuris 31 11. 
27  Ch 2 (2 3 3 1), (2 4), (2 5). 
28 Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 832.  
29 Ch 2 (2 3 3 1).	
30 Joubert “Lawyers, Arguments, Principles and Authorities” in Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 175. 
31 175. 
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reference to specific situations. It did not attempt to explain the limitation of contractual 
damages in terms of an underlying principle. Nonetheless, the basic rules that we find 
in Roman law have been influential in the development of the modern approach to the 
issue. As will be seen below, the provision on “double damages” in C 47.7.1 formed 
the basis of the highly influential foreseeability-based approach to remoteness in 
contract that was developed by the French jurists in the sixteenth century. And Paul’s 
provision in D.19.1.21.3 and the glossators’ distinction between interesse circa rem 
and interesse extra rem in turn is reflected in works of the Roman-Dutch jurists and is 
still used in the South African law of contract.32 To understand how the Roman law 
ideas about limitation of contractual damages were introduced into modern law, it is 
necessary to investigate how the French and Roman-Dutch jurists interpreted and 
developed these rules. 
2 3 Later civil law 
2 3 1 The French Jurists 
The sixteenth-century French jurist Molinaeus was the first author to explain the C 
47.7.1 double damages rule in terms of foreseeability.33 He argued that the rule had 
an underlying rationale: it is equitable to limit damages to those harms or losses that 
could have been foreseen at the time when the contract was concluded. He argued 
that it can be presumed that parties could not have foreseen losses of more than 
double the value of the property.  He added that where it is clear that parties actually 
did foresee the risk of damage in excess of the limit set by this rule, such damages 
would also be recoverable.34 According to him, therefore, recoverable damages had 
to be limited with reference to what the defendant could be considered to have 
foreseen at contract conclusion. In cases where the defendant actually foresaw the 
risk of damage in excess of this limit, damages could be increased. 
This principle – that liability for contractual damages is limited to losses that had been 
foreseeable – was adopted by the seventeenth and eighteenth century jurists Domat 
																																																						
32 Erasmus & Gauntlett “Damages” in LAWSA 7 para 17; Whitfield v Phillips 1957 3 SA 318 (A) 329. 
33 Tractatus de eo quod interest (Venetiis, 1574) 60 as quoted by Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 
829. 
34 Erasmus 1975 THRHR 117. 
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and Pothier.35 Pothier stated that a defendant would only be liable for loss or harm 
caused by breach which could have been contemplated at the time of contract 
conclusion – for he can only be presumed to have intended to submit to liability for 
losses that he could have foreseen. 
As to which losses are deemed to have been contemplated at contract conclusion, he 
formulated the principle in a way that is similar to Paul’s rule in D19.1.21.3. All damage 
and interest which would be suffered “in respect of the thing that is the object of the 
obligation” would be recoverable:  
“In general parties are deemed to have contemplated only the damages and interest which 
the creditor might suffer from non-performance of the obligation, in respect of the particular 
thing which is the object of it, and not such as may have been incidentally occasioned 
thereby in respect to his other affairs: the debtor is not answerable for these, but only for 
such as are suffered with respect to the thing which is the object of the obligation…”.36 
As an example he used the case of a seller who failed to deliver a horse at the agreed 
time. In such a case the seller would be liable for any increase in the market price of 
horses that the buyer had to pay in order to obtain a horse of similar quality. He 
considered such damages to be intrinsic.  According to Pothier, intrinsic damages 
ought to be recoverable because it related to the thing that is the object of the 
obligation (the horse) and because the particular damage – fluctuation in the market 
price of horses – could therefore have been foreseen.37  
Using the same example, he stated that if the buyer had forfeited some revenue 
because he could not buy another horse in time to collect rent from tenants, such 
losses could not be claimed from the seller. Even though the losses were caused by 
the non-performance of the seller, Pothier considered it extrinsic and therefore in 
principle not recoverable: 
“I should not be liable for the loss he sustained [because he could not collect rents]; 
although it was occasioned by the non-performance of my obligation; for this is a damage 
																																																						
35 Domat Les Lois Civiles Dans Leur Ordre Naturel 3 5, Pothier Traité Des Obligations as cited by 
Erasmus 1975 THRHR 118.  
36 WD Evans RJ Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts – Translated from the French 
(1853) para 161. 
37 Para 161. 
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which is foreign to the obligation, which was not contemplated at the time of the contract, 
and to which it cannot be supposed that I had any intention to submit.”38 
Pothier does not explicitly state why such losses “[were] not contemplated” at contract 
conclusion. The most plausible explanation might be that, exactly because extrinsic 
damages are foreign to the obligation, the seller was not necessarily able to foresee 
the damage. In other words – any losses directly related to the horse can be deemed 
to have been contemplated. But losses related to something that the buyer plans to 
do with the horse is not necessarily a type of loss that is reasonably foreseeable – that 
would depend on whether or not the seller knew what the horse was being bought for. 
This seems in line with the rest of the text where Pothier states that extrinsic damages 
can be recovered in certain circumstances. Where it appears that extrinsic losses had 
been contemplated and that the defendant submitted to liability for those losses 
expressly or tacitly, he would also be liable for extrinsic damages. 
“Sometimes the debtor is liable for damages and interest of the creditor, although extrinsic, 
which is the case when it appears that they were contemplated in the contract, and that the 
debtor submitted to them either expressly or tacitly, in the case of non-performance of his 
obligation…”39 
The same example is used to explain that if there had been an express term in the 
contract stating that the horse must be delivered at a particular time so that the buyer 
may collect rents, and the buyer is unable to procure another horse and therefore 
forfeits the revenue, the seller would be liable for such damages. This would be 
because the loss was rendered foreseeable through the inclusion of an express term 
in the contract and the seller was therefore deemed to have taken that risk upon 
himself.40 It seems therefore that Pothier based liability for intrinsic damages on 
deemed contemplation,41 and liability for extrinsic damages on actual contemplation.42 
																																																						
38 Para 161. 
39 Para 162.  
40 Para 162.  
41 “In general, the parties are deemed to have contemplated only the damages and interest which the 
creditor might suffer from the non-performance of the obligation, in respect of the particular thing which 
is the object of it…” Para 161 as translated in Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 181. 
42 “[T]he debtor is liable for damages and interests of the creditor, although extrinsic ... when it appears 
that they were contemplated in the contract, and that the debtor submitted to them either expressly or 
tacitly...” Para 162 as translated in Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 182.  
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This is a distinction that became especially controversial in South African law, as will 
be seen later. 
Finally, Pothier stated that in cases of fraud the defendant would be liable for 
unforeseeable damages as well. He relied on Ulpian’s rule in D 1.19.1.13 pr. as 
authority for this statement.43 When a defendant committed fraud, he would be liable 
for all losses or harms relating to the object of the contract itself, and those relating to 
any other property. Such damages would be imposed without considering whether the 
defendant can be presumed to have submitted to them.44  
The rules set out by Pothier above had a direct impact on the modern French law of 
contract as well as on the English approach to the limitation of liability for damages as 
will be seen later in this chapter. Even though his use of foreseeability, or 
contemplation, as an underlying principle limiting liability for damages was not 
accepted by the Roman-Dutch writers, as we will presently see, it came to influence 
South African law. 
2 3 2  The Roman-Dutch jurists 
The Roman-Dutch jurists, like their predecessors,  accepted that there had to be some 
limitation on liability for contractual damages.45  Exactly how liability for damages 
should be limited seems to have been explained with reference to particular situations 
– an approach similar to that used in classical Roman law. Rather than the formulation 
of one over-arching principle in terms of which liability should be limited, different 
writers expressed their opinion on the matter with regards to particular contracts or 
circumstances. 
																																																						
43 J Gordley “Responsibility in Crime, Tort and Contract for the Unforeseeable Consequences of an 
Intentional Wrong: A Once and Future Rule?” in P Cane & J Stapleton (eds) The Law of Obligations – 
Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (1998) 176 202.  
44 Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations para 166.  
45 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 19.1.20 as translated in P Gane The Selective Voet: Being the 
Commentary on the Pandects by Johannes Voet (1647-1713) and the Supplement to that Work by 
Johannes van der Linden (1756-1835) 5 (1956) Paris Edition of 1829 and the Supplement to that Work 
6 (1959) 396. 
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Voet relied on D 19.1.21.3 to provide that loss of profits could not be claimed if it “is 
either too indefinite or too farfetched”.46 As illustration for this rule he employed the 
same examples used by Paul to describe damage that would not be sufficiently closely 
connected to the object of the obligation in question. A buyer would not be able to 
claim for loss of profits because he could not sell the wine that the seller had failed to 
deliver. He would also not be able to claim for losses incurred because his household 
suffered hunger as a result of the seller’s failure to deliver wheat. 
It is still not clear which losses would be recoverable under this rule. To add to the 
uncertainty, where Paul’s provision dealt only with non-delivery, the text by Voet does 
not limit the rule to non-delivery. What the rule would mean in cases where a defective 
merx was delivered is therefore somewhat unclear. Regardless, our courts have 
referred to this rule as set out by Voet when dealing with the limitation of contractual 
damages47 as will be seen later. 
In cases where losses were caused by a defect in the merx, other Roman-Dutch jurists 
also formulated rules based on the provisions discussed earlier in the overview of the 
position in Roman law. Where the seller had made certain dicta et promissa with 
regard to the goods being sold, he would still only be liable for the reduction in the 
purchase price or for restitution in terms of the actio redhibitoria and not for additional 
damage suffered by the buyer.48  The exception was in cases where the seller acted 
in bad faith – then he would be liable for all losses suffered by the buyer. 
With regards to contracts of lease, both Grotius49 and Voet50 held that a lessor would 
be liable for all losses caused by a defect in the leased property if he knew about the 
defect, or should have known because of his trade. 
																																																						
46 45.1.9. 
47 Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Company Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22.  
48 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 21.1.3. as translated in Gane The Selective Voet 644. 
49 H De Groot Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid I 2 ed (1910) 3.19.12.  
50 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 19.2.14 as translated in Gane The Selective Voet 6 419. 
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Furthermore, various Roman-Dutch jurists also confirmed the rule as set by Justinian 
in C 47.7.1: in cases where the value of the thing was certain, damages could not 
exceed double that value.51 Voet wrote that this rule “still holds good”.52 
There seems to be no reference in Roman-Dutch law to the French jurists’ works that 
relate the limits on damages to what could have been contemplated and therefore 
(presumably) submitted to by the defendant. The most likely candidate, Van der 
Linden, refers to the work of Pothier – specifically sections 168 and 169 that deal with 
how damages must be defined. However, he does not make any mention of Pothier’s 
foreseeability-centred explanation of the limits on liability for damages.53 
The rules dealing with limitation of damages in Roman-Dutch law seemed to have 
loosely followed those discussed in classical Roman law. The rules were set out in 
reference to specific situations and no attempt was made to reconcile them under one 
principle. Our courts have relied mostly on English law and on the works of the French 
jurists to deal with the limitation of contractual damages. Our courts do refer to Roman-
Dutch and Roman authorities, however – often in attempts to reconcile the Roman-
Dutch principles with those found in the work of Pothier.54  As will be seen later, this is 
a potential source of the current confusion seen in our law of remoteness of contractual 
damages. Before turning to the primary source of our rules for limiting contractual 
damages – English law – a brief comparative overview of the approach followed in 





51 Van der Linden Rechtsgeleerd, Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek 14.7  as translated in H Juta 
Institutes of Holland or Manual of Law, Practice and Mercantile Law by Johannes van der Linden- 
Translated from the Original Dutch 4 ed (1904) 110. He also refers to Voet, Groenewegen and 
Bynkershoek in support of this conclusion.  
52 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 45.1.10 as translated in Gane The Selective Voet 5 631. 
53 Van der Linden Rechtsgeleerd, Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek 14.7 as translated in Juta 
Institutes of Holland by Johannes van der Linden 110. 
54 Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Company Ltd  v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22. 
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2 3 3  Modern civil law 
2 3 3 1 French Law 
The limitation of liability for damages in modern French law closely follows the rules 
laid down by Pothier.55 The Code Civil provides that: 
“A debtor is held only to damages which were foreseen or which could have been foreseen 
at the time of the contract, when it is not by his wilfulness that the obligations were not 
executed. Even in the case where the inexecution of the agreement results from the 
wilfulness of the debtor, damages are to include … only what is an immediate and direct 
consequence of the inexecution of the agreement..”56  
Therefore, liability for losses caused by breach of contract is limited to those losses 
that were the direct consequence of the breach. If the breach was not intentional, 
liability is further limited by the requirement that the loss should have been foreseeable 
by the defendant. 
2 3 3 1 1 Direct Consequences   
The precise meaning of the requirement that the loss must be the direct consequence 
of a breach of contract and how one determines whether the loss is a sufficiently 
“direct” consequence is uncertain.57 Reference is often made to Pothier’s 
																																																						
55 Erasmus 1968 THRHR 235. 
56 Code Civil des Français 1150-1151 as translated in JH Crabb The French Civil Code revised edition 
(1995) 223. The French Civil Code is currently under revision and the proposed changes, contained in 
Ordinance Nº 2016-131, are set to be adopted on 1 October 2016. The revision largely codifies judicial 
reforms. The new provisions on remoteness of damages, Articles 1231-3 and 1231-4, does not depart 
from Articles 1150-1151 discussed here. The provisions are: "A debtor is bound only to damages which 
were either foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time of conclusion of the contract, except 
where non-performance was due to a gross or dishonest fault. In the situation where the non-
performance of a contract does indeed result from gross or dishonest fault, damages include only that 
which is the immediate and direct result of non-performance." as translated in J Cartwright, B 
Fauvarque-Cosson & S Whittaker "The Law of Contract, the General Regime of Obligations and Proof 
of Obligations – The new Provisions of the Code Civil created by Ordinance nº 2016-131 of 10 February 
2016 Translated into English" Legifrance <	 http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-OF-
CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf.> (accessed 05-09-2016).  
57 HG Beale, A Fauvarque-Cosson, J Rugters, D Tallon & S Vogenauer Cases, Materials and Texts on 
Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 1004; B Nicholas The French Law of Contract 2 ed (1992) 229. 
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explanation,58 where he uses the example of a man who knowingly sells a cow with 
an infectious disease to a farmer. This causes the farmer’s other animals to die, and 
as a result he cannot cultivate his land. Because of this he is unable to pay his debts 
and consequently his creditors seize his property. 
Pothier held that the loss suffered because of the death of the cow and other animals 
is a direct consequence of the seller’s intentional breach and can therefore be claimed. 
There is no clear explanation in the text as to why the deaths of the other animals are 
considered to be a direct consequence. It seems to be simply because there is a close 
causal connection between the breach and the damage: “it is a fraud of the seller 
which occasions the damage”.59 
To get a better idea of what is meant by direct consequences one has to refer to 
Pothier’s explanation of how the other consequences of breach must be regarded. 
According to him, the loss of the farmer’s land is an indirect consequence and has no 
‘necessary relation’ to the breach. It is therefore not recoverable: 
“[T]he seller will not be liable for the damage which I suffer from the seizure of my effects; 
this damage is only a very remote and indirect consequence of his fraud, and has not any 
necessary relation to it…”.60  
It seems therefore that something is considered a ‘direct’ consequence by Pothier and 
modern French law if there is a ‘necessary relation’ between the breach and the 
consequence in question. This does not make the inquiry easier. To explain the 
principle further, Pothier wrote that the loss suffered because land was not cultivated, 
although not a direct consequence of the breach, should also be compensated in part 
by the seller: 
“The loss, which I suffer for want of cultivating my lands, appears to be a less remote 
consequence of the fraud of the seller [than the loss of land], nevertheless I think that he 
ought not to be liable for the whole of it. This want of culture is not an absolutely necessary 
consequence of the loss of my cattle: for, notwithstanding such loss, I might have obviated 
the want of cultivation by buying, or … by hiring other cattle, or by farming out my lands; 
																																																						
58 Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations para 166-167. Beale et al Cases, Materials and 
Texts on Contract Law 1004 indicates that it is quoted in Maularie & Aynès Les Obligations 9 ed (1998) 
838; Nicholas French Law of Contract 229.  
59 Para 166 as translated in Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 186.  
60 Para 167 as translated in Evans Pothier:  A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 187.  
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nevertheless… I should not derive so much profit by my land, as if I could have cultivated 
it myself, by cattle that were lost in consequence of the fraud: this therefore may in some 
degree be taken into account of the damages and interests for which he is liable.”61 
This sounds like the rule limiting liability for damages based on the defendant’s duty 
to mitigate his losses that is also recognised in South African law.62 Apart from this 
requirement that a defendant has to mitigate losses to the extent that would be 
reasonable, all consequences that are sufficiently direct – in other words, necessarily 
related to the breach in question – would be recoverable in cases where the breach 
was committed with intent. This is by no means a satisfactory explanation of the test 
for directness. It is however also not something that is often practically relevant in 
French law because most cases of breach of contract do not deal with intent.63 In all 
cases that do not deal with intent, liability for damages would be limited to the loss that 
the defendant could have foreseen or actually did foresee at contract conclusion.  
2 3 3 1 2 Foreseeability 
As we have seen, if a person did not breach a contract intentionally, the direct 
consequences of the breach will only give rise to liability for damages when they were 
or could have been foreseen. 
This ‘foreseeability limit’ on liability was originally applied only to the type of loss 
recoverable. If a defendant could foresee a certain type or kind of harm as a 
consequence of his breach, he would be liable for it regardless of the foreseeability of 
the extent of the actual harm. However, the foreseeability limit has since been adapted 
to apply to the extent of loss as well.64 This shift reflects the principle underlying the 
remoteness provisions – a party must have been reasonably able to know the extent 
of potential liability he was undertaking in terms of the contract in question.65 In 
applying the test, the courts adopt an objective approach: they have to determine 
whether a reasonable man (bon père de famille) would have been able to foresee the 
																																																						
61 Para 167 as translated in Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 187.  
62 SWJ Van der Merwe, LF Van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke  & GF Lubbe Contract – General Principles 
4 ed (2012) 366-367. 
63 Nicholas French Law of Contract 230. 
64 Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law 1004. 
65 Nicholas French Law of Contract 231. 
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loss in question – it is irrelevant whether or not the defendant actually did foresee the 
loss.66 
As we will see, this differs from the South African approach. Two differences can briefly 
be mentioned here. First, the French approach determines foreseeability only with 
reference to the defendant. In the South African approach foreseeability is determined 
with reference to both parties. Secondly, the French approach makes use of the term 
“direct consequences”, as is also seen in South African law, but the terms do not 
convey the same meaning. The differences between these two approaches can be 
especially enlightening because South African courts often refer to Pothier’s work on 
which the French Code Civil is based. These differences will be further explored in the 
section on South African law and in Chapter 3 when dealing with the direct 
consequences theory of remoteness.  
2 3 3 2 German Law 
2 3 3 2 1 The adequate cause theory 
In German law, the primary test for the limitation of contractual damages is 
encompassed in the Adäquanztheorie – the adequate cause theory. This is one of the 
three theories that have been mentioned in our law as possible bases for the limitation 
of contractual damages.67 A brief introductory overview of the content and functioning 
of the adequate cause theory in modern German law will be provided here as 
background for later discussion in Chapter 4. 
Briefly summarised, the limitation of contractual damages in German law is 
determined with reference to a basic factual causation test, further refined by the 
adequate cause test.68  The adequate cause test is summarised by the 
Bundesgerichtshof as follows: a condition is an adequate condition if it generally and 
appreciably enhanced the objective possibility that a consequence of the kind in 
																																																						
66 H Mazeaud, L Mazeaud & A Tunc Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle 
et contractuelle III 6 ed (1965) paras 2381-2382 as cited by Nicolas The French Law of Contract 231. 
67 The others are the direct consequences theory and the foreseeability theory. See Lubbe & Murray 
Contract – Cases, Materials and Commentary 624. 
68 R Schulze & F Zoll The Law of Obligations in Europe: A New Wave of Codifications (2013) 210. 
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question would have occurred.69 This is determined firstly with reference to the 
circumstances that an “optimal” observer at the time of the event would have 
recognised. Secondly, the court also takes cognisance of additional circumstances 
actually known to the defendant.70  
2 3 3 2 2 The Schutzzwecklehre 
Academic opinion71 and increasingly also the German courts72 favour the application 
of a further refinement of the adequate causation test, captured in the “protective 
purpose of the norm”73 theory, or the Schutzzwecklehre. The Bundesgerichtshof has 
held that the theory of adequate causation only serves to eliminate the most unlikely 
of consequences and that it does not preclude an inquiry into the purpose of the 
contract to determine liability.74 There are many examples of German courts applying 
this test alongside that of adequate causation.75 
One such example can be found in the case of OLG Köln, 8 July 1982.76 In this case 
a banker gave confidential information to the authorities about a number of false 
accounts held by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was consequently prosecuted and convicted 
for tax evasion and sought to claim damages from the bank employee because of his 
breach of the confidentiality clause in the banking agreement. Although the action of 
the bank employee was the adequate cause of the damage suffered by the plaintiff, 
the court held that the purpose of the contract with the bank was never to avoid such 
disclosures and therefore the banker was not liable for the damages. 
The Schutzzwecklehre limits liability for damages to a greater extent than the 
adequate causation test. It therefore serves as an additional refinement of the test for 
																																																						
69 BGHZ 3, 261 as translated in BS Markesinis A Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Torts 
3 ed (1994) 607-609. 
70 609. 
71 BS Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 2 
ed (2006) 474. 
72 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 2 ed (1985) 476. 
73 Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law 1004. 
74 BGH NJW 2001, 514 as quoted in Markesinis et al. The German Law of Contract: A Comparative 
Treatise 474. 
75 Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 473. 
76 BB 1992, 2174 as discussed in Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law 824. 
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the limitation of liability for damages.77 The theory requires a court to determine 
whether or not the contractual provision that had been breached had the purpose of 
protecting the plaintiff from the type of harm that resulted from the breach.78 It therefore 
involves a teleological interpretation of the breached contractual term.79 The nature 
and extent of the protective purpose of the breached provision is determined by taking 
account of all circumstances, including the intentions of the parties. The test gives a 
judge considerable discretion.80 
According to Zimmermann, the Schutzzweck theory is an example of the way in which 
German law was influenced by the contemplation principle as it was adopted in French 
and English law.81 The Schutzzweck approach was first proposed by Ernst Rabel in 
1932.82 He formulated the approach with reference to the test for foreseeability as 
formulated by Pothier83 and English case law on the matter.84 He stated that the scope 
and the purpose of the contract should determine the consequences of breach. 
According to Rabel, determining the scope and purpose of a contract indicates which 
types of risks the defendant can be presumed to have accepted when contracting.85 
 Although the Schutzzwecklehre approaches the issue of limiting contractual damages 
from a different perspective than that of French law, it has the same underlying 
premise. This is the premise that damages should be limited with reference to what 
parties can reasonably be considered to have taken into account at contract 
conclusion. In the foreseeability approach, what parties could have taken into account 
is determined with reference to what could have been foreseen. In the Schutzzweck 
approach, this is determined with reference to the purpose of the contract. 
																																																						
77 Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law 1014. 
78 P Schlechtriem & M Schmidt-Kessel Schuldrecht: Allgemeiner Teil 6 ed (2005) as quoted in Beale et 
al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law 1010. 
79 R Young English, French and German Comparative Law (1988) 302. 
80 H Lange Schadensersatz (1979) 79 as cited in Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract 
Law 1014. 
81 Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 830. 
82 E Rabel “Die Grundzüge des Rechts der unerlaubten Handlungen“ (1932) Deutsche Ref. Int. Kong. 
Rechtsvergl. as cited in HLA Hart & T Honoré Causation in the Law 2 ed (1985) 476. 
83 E Rabel Das Recht Des Warenkaufs – Eine Rechtsvergleichende Darstellung I (1936) 492.  
84 495. 
85 495 para 8. 
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Stated more simply: in terms of the foreseeability approach that is used in French law, 
a court will determine what a defendant could be considered to have contemplated by 
examining whether the damage was reasonably foreseeable. If that is the case, such 
damage is deemed to have been in the contemplation of the defendant and he is 
presumed to have assumed liability for it. 
In terms of the Schutzzweck approach, a court determines what parties could be 
considered to have contemplated with reference to the purpose and protective scope 
of a particular contractual provision. This is done by determining if the damage affects 
an interest that the contractual provision was aimed at protecting. If that is the case, 
such damage is deemed to have been contemplated, and the defendant is presumed 
to have assumed liability for it.86  
The Schutzzweck theory remains, however, a subsidiary part of the inquiry into the 
limits of liability for damages in German law. Generally, it is regarded as a useful 
supplement to the adequate cause theory, but not as a replacement.87  It has been 
argued that the theory is useful in cases where a violated provision has a clear and 
circumscribed purpose. In other cases, reliance on the purpose of a contractual 
provision is to entrust too much of the inquiry to the discretion of the judge.88 German 
law’s primary focus on adequate causation as a limit on liability in contract remains 
intact. 
As will be seen later in this study, the German approach is relevant to the discussion 
of the South African law of contractual damages. This is because the adequate cause 
theory – and possibly further developments such as the Schutzzweck theory - has 
been suggested as an alternative to our current approach.89 Further evaluation of the 
adequate cause theory and its implications for our current approach will be discussed 
in chapter four. Now, however, we turn to the jurisdiction which forms the primary basis 
of the South African approach: English law. 
																																																						
86 Von Caemmerer “Das Problem des Kausalzusammenhangs” in Gesammelte Schriften II (1956) 395, 
as cited in Markesinis The German Law of Torts 101. 
87 Hart and Honoré Causation in the Law 477. 
88 477. 
89 Lubbe & Murray Contract 624. 
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2 4 English law 
2 4 1 The development of the reasonable expectations test 
Early common law drew a distinction between two basic types of actions. These were 
the action of trespass on the one hand and the action of debt and detinue on the other 
hand. Actions of trespass were based on a wrong committed against a plaintiff, in 
terms of which he claimed damages. Here, the purpose of damages was to 
compensate the plaintiff for the loss he had suffered. Opposed to this, actions of debt 
were used in cases where a plaintiff wanted to claim something that he was entitled 
to. In such a case the compensation awarded to him was based on his entitlement, 
and not necessarily the loss that he suffered.90  
By the fifteenth century this distinction had been developed more strongly. On the one 
hand, the action of trespass was used for all claims that were based on damage 
suffered. The action of debt was used for all claims based on entitlements demanded.  
In the case of breach of contract, this distinction was reflected in the separation 
between actions based on non-performance of a contract and those based on 
defective performance. The former resorted under the action of debt, where the core 
focus was the plaintiff’s entitlement. The latter resorted under the action of trespass, 
where the focus fell on damages that were actually suffered by the plaintiff. The action 
for trespass was part of the law of tort and the action of debt was part of the law of 
contract. 
The result was that, when there was non-performance of a contract, this would be 
addressed within the framework of the law of contract – by the action of debt. When 
there had been defective performance, it would be addressed within the law of tort – 
with an action of trespass.91  
The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that it shaped the thinking around 
contractual remedies: they would be primarily entitlement-based. The inquiry when 
awarding compensation for breach of contract was not what the defendant had done 
																																																						
90 DJ Ibbetson A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999) 87. 
91 88-89. 
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wrong, or even what losses the plaintiff had suffered. Rather, the focus was on what 
the plaintiff was entitled to – his expectations. This focus also led to the current position 
in common law that fault is relevant for tort, but not in contract. Contractual remedies 
came to be entitlement-based, and tortious remedies wrong-based. 
As a consequence, the assessment of contractual damages had as its primary focus 
the expectations of the plaintiff, and not the fault of the defendant. By the seventeenth 
century the expectations-based rule for assessing damages was well-established.92 
This rule had to be refined to deal with cases where a plaintiff claimed for 
consequential loss. In such cases, it was held that a plaintiff could only claim damages 
for the natural, direct, or necessary consequences of the defendant’s breach.93 
This rule was absorbed into the reasonable contemplation test as set out in the 
seminal case of Hadley v Baxendale (“Hadley”).94 Here the court combined the idea 
that only natural consequences of the breach can be claimed with the foreseeability 
principle as set out by Pothier.95 It is believed that this was under the influence of the 
contemporaneous work on damages by the American author Theodore Sedgwick.96 
In his work, he emphasised that a decision about the extent of damages is not aimed 
at fully compensating all losses, but rather at dividing losses fairly between parties 
according to the circumstances of each case.97 
The Hadley decision seemed to follow this view of liability for damages as a more 
reasonableness-based decision, reflected in the foreseeability requirement, rather 
																																																						
92 213. Ibbetson cites Lowe v Peers (1768) 4 Burr 2225.  
93Boorman v Nash (1829) 9 B. & C. 145 and Walton v Fothergill (1835) 7 C. & D. 392 as cited in AWB 
Simpson “Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law” 1975 91 LQR 247 274; J Chitty Treatise on 
Pleading 5 ed (1831) 1.371 as cited in Ibbetson A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations 229. 
94 [1854] 9 Ex. 341. 
95 Simpson 1975 LQR 274. 
96 T Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages, or An Inquiry into the Principles which Govern 
the Amount of Compensation Recovered in Suits at Law 1 ed (1847). The influence of this work on the 
decision in Hadley v Baxendale is mentioned by Simpson 1975 LQR 276 and Ibbetson A Historical 
Introduction to the Law of Obligations 231. 
97 T Sedgwick A Treatise on the Measure of Damages 64, 112. 
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than the mechanical discovery of causal relationships.98 The court formulated a rule 
for the limitation of liability for damages as follows: 
“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages 
which the other party ought to receive in respect of such contract should be such as may 
fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual 
course of things, from such breach of the contract itself, or such as may reasonably be 
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the 
contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”99  
The rule was formulated as two alternatives:100 either a defendant was liable for 
damages because the loss suffered by the plaintiff was the natural and direct 
consequence of his breach, or he was liable because the loss suffered was reasonably 
supposed to have been contemplated by both parties as a probable consequence of 
the breach. The second part is essentially based upon Pothier’s work – one difference 
is the emphasis placed on the foreseeability of damage by both parties as opposed to 
Pothier’s reference to only the defendant.101 Additionally, Pothier’s further rule 
determining that a defendant would be liable for even unforeseen consequences if his 
breach was fraudulent was not incorporated in this test.102 
Briefly summarised, Hadley determined that a plaintiff can recover all losses suffered 
as a natural consequence of the breach in the usual course of things as well as those 
losses that could have reasonably been contemplated by the parties.103 This approach 
differs from the position set out by Pothier and adopted in modern French law. The 
French position regards “direct consequences” as a wider concept than “foreseeable 
or contemplated” consequences and holds the defendant liable for the former only in 
cases of intentional breach. As the Hadley test developed, English law came to regard 
“direct” consequences as those that are deemed to have been contemplated. 
																																																						
98 Ibbetson A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations 231. 
99 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex 341 para 354.  
100 Simpson 1975 LQR 277.  
101 Ibbetson  A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations 232. 
102 Gordley “Responsibility in Crime, Tort and Contract for Unforeseen Consequences of an Intentional 
Wrong” in The Law of Obligations – Essays in Honour of John Fleming 205. 
103 H Beale Remedies for Breach of Contract (1980) 179. 
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The approach set out in Hadley, despite combining two different tests, has often been 
treated as one single test for remoteness of damages,104 consisting of two limbs.105 
This is seen in the manner in which the rule was restated in Victoria Laundry (Winsor 
Ltd) LD v Newman Industries LD (“Victoria Laundry”).106 Here the court held that, 
where a loss is the natural and direct consequence of a breach, it is deemed to have 
been in the contemplation of the parties and is therefore recoverable. Where this is 
not the case, the loss could still be recovered if it could be proven to have been in the 
contemplation of both parties based on their actual knowledge of special 
circumstances.107  
The court therefore set out the foreseeability approach to remoteness of damages as 
one rule – operating with reference to two types of knowledge. What is considered 
foreseeable by parties is dependent on knowledge: imputed (in cases where the loss 
was a natural and direct consequence of the breach) or actual (where there was 
knowledge of special circumstances rendering the loss foreseeable). If damage was 
foreseeable, it can be recovered. 
The distinction between “natural” or “usual” losses and unusual losses should not be 
equated with the distinction between direct and consequential losses. Rather, the 
former distinction focuses on those direct or consequential losses that are deemed 
sufficiently foreseeable in the light of the nature of the breach, and those that are 
not.108 Such foreseeable losses may be direct or consequential. It has been argued 
that these two different distinctions make the operation of the rule uncertain.109 
To address this, early cases following Hadley had interpreted its test to require proof 
of a tacit agreement when damages for unusual loss were claimed.110 Courts held that, 
where the loss was not the natural consequence of a breach, a party could only 
recover damages if he could prove that the defendant expressly or tacitly contracted 
																																																						
104 E McKendrick Contract Law – Texts, Cases and Materials 2 ed (2006) 1081. 
105 HG Beale Chitty on Contracts I 31 ed (2012) 26-104. 
106 (1949) 2 KB 528.  
107 G Treitel The Law of Contract 14 ed (2015) 965-967.  
108 Beale Remedies for Breach of Contract 181. 
109 180. 
110 British Columbia and Vancouver’s Island Spar, Lumber and Saw-Mill Co v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 
CP 499; Horne v Midland Railway (1873) LR 7 CP 583. 
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to pay such damages. But by the beginning of the twentieth century this interpretation 
had been discredited.111 It is now widely accepted that the reasonable contemplation 
test in English law does not require proof of a tacit agreement between parties in order 
for liability for damages to arise.112 If the knowledge that the parties had of special 
circumstances was of such a nature that it rendered the loss in question reasonably 
foreseeable, that loss would be recoverable.  
2 4 2 The Assumption of Responsibility Test 
There are recent developments in English law which seem to indicate a movement 
back towards a tacit agreement requirement. This can be seen in the adoption of the 
“assumption of responsibility” test in the decision of Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator 
Shipping Inc, the Achilleas (“The Achilleas”).113 This decision incorporated earlier 
reasoning by courts that foreseeability only serves as an indication of what the parties 
had intended at contract conclusion.114 Therefore, according to the court, the real 
inquiry should focus on the intentions of parties and what they had agreed upon. This 
can be determined by considering different factors. One of these factors – arguably 
the most important one – would be foreseeability. 
The Achilleas decision incorporated this reasoning into a single test for remoteness, 
referred to as the assumption of responsibility test. The court stated that a defendant 
can only be liable for damage that lie within the scope of the responsibilities that he 
had assumed in terms of the contract.115 The adoption of this test signals a more 
agreement-focussed approach to contractual damages. 
The test for whether or not there had been assumption of responsibility entails “the 
interpretation of the contract as a whole against its commercial background”.116 Lord 
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Hoffmann stated that the court must determine what a reasonable observer would 
understand the contracting party to have undertaken. Ordinarily, this will be 
compensation for any loss which the parties would reasonably regard as likely to flow 
from the breach. However, there are many cases where a reasonable man would 
consider that more, or less, responsibility had been accepted.117 An example might be 
a contract where it is common knowledge between the parties that the buyer will re-
sell the merx and that the quality of that merx will impact on his business reputation. 
In such a case a reasonable person might consider the seller to have accepted 
responsibility for the loss of business reputation caused by a breach.  
The assumption of responsibility test does not replace the traditional contemplation 
test. Rather, reasonable contemplation reflects what parties can be deemed to have 
assumed responsibility for.118 Foreseeability therefore is seen as a means to an end, 
rather than an end in itself. In other words, foreseeability serves as an indication of the 
deemed intention of the parties – and it is on this basis that liability is imposed. 
As will be seen in the next section, South African courts greatly relied on English law 
when developing their approach to the limitation of contractual damages, often 
referring to the Hadley test in the formulation of the contemplation requirement. The 
next section will also illustrate how the two different limbs of the Hadley test came to 
be conflated into one. Finally, the next section also explores how the South African 
convention principle developed and is currently applied. This is an issue that is better 
understood when approached with the background of the English assumption of 
responsibility test. The relevance of an agreement between parties has been 
approached differently in South African law, but as we will see – there is a shared 
emphasis on agreement to be liable for damages over and above the mere 
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2 5 South African law 
2 5 1 Overview 
As South African law currently stands, damage is categorised as loss that flows 
naturally and generally from a breach of contract, and loss that does not. The former 
can be recovered as general damages, and the latter as special damages.119 General 
damages are deemed by law to have been contemplated by the parties and can 
therefore, in principle, always be recovered.120 A plaintiff need only prove that the 
particular loss was of the kind121 that flow naturally and generally from the type of 
breach in question. 
As a point of departure, special damages is considered too remote and cannot be 
recovered. However, in certain circumstances a plaintiff will be able to claim special 
damages. First, a plaintiff has to prove that there are special circumstances which 
make it reasonable to presume that the parties contemplated the loss as a probable 
result of the breach, or alternatively that the loss was actually contemplated by the 
parties.122 This requirement that the loss was presumably or actually contemplated by 
the parties is referred to as the contemplation principle.123 Secondly, a plaintiff also 
has to prove that the parties entered into the contract with these special circumstances 
in view,124 or (under a strict formulation of the test) that parties had tacitly or expressly 
contracted that the defendant would be liable for such damages.125 This is referred to 
as the convention principle.126 The next section explores how our courts developed 
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121 BAT Rhodesia Ltd v Fawcett Security Organisation (Salisbury) Ltd 1972 4 SA 103 (R) 104E. 
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2 5 2  Historical Development 
2 5 2 1 Early contemplation tests and the development of a test for the recovery of 
general damages 
Early South African case law on remoteness in contract focussed their inquiry on 
whether or not damage was capable of being contemplated. In one of the earliest 
cases on the issue, Stent v Gibson Brothers,127 the court held that: 
“[t]he question seems to come to this: was the [damage] a matter of such ascertainable 
value [at the time of contract conclusion], as to have been capable of contemplation by 
both parties? If it was not ascertainable then, it is difficult to see how it could have formed 
part of the contract, and if it did not form part of the contract, it could not enter into damages 
for breach.”128 
This statement was made with reference to early English case law129 that preceded 
the seminal Hadley decision. Subsequent to the Hadley decision, South African courts 
formulated this objective test with an emphasis on the question whether or not a 
defendant could be deemed to have submitted to liability for damages. This was done 
with reference to other authorities as well. In Transvaal Silver Mines (Limited) v E. 
Brayshaw130 the court referred to Pothier131 to state that a defendant will only be liable 
for losses arising from breach that he might have contemplated. According to the court 
the reason for the rule is that the defendant could only have intended to submit to 
damages that he might have contemplated.132 The court stated that this “is also in 
accordance with the well-known case of Hadley”.133 
The test was an objective one. The question was whether or not it would be reasonable 
to presume that parties contemplated and submitted to liability for damages – not if 
they actually did. If losses could have been contemplated, it was deemed that the 
defendant had submitted to liability for such damages. This was explicitly confirmed in 
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Erasmus v Russell’s Executor134 where the court held that a defendant would be liable 
for damages 
“…though he had no express knowledge, [if] the circumstances were such that he must be 
considered to have had knowledge.”135 
Courts came to refer to damages that can reasonably be presumed to have been in 
contemplation of the parties as damages that flow “naturally and generally” from a 
breach of contract. This was concisely formulated in Steenkamp v Du Toit:136 
“[A] person who has rendered himself liable for damages is responsible for the natural and 
probable consequences of his act, those consequences being ascertained with reference 
to the defendant’s knowledge at the time. A man, therefore, who has failed to carry out his 
contractual obligation, is liable for such damages as he must reasonably have known would 
naturally and probably result from the breach, such damages, in other words, as given his 
knowledge of the circumstances might naturally be expected to flow from the breach.”137 
Damages that are objectively considered to be the natural and general consequences 
of a particular breach came to be referred to as general damages.138 When damage 
was the natural result of a breach, and therefore gave rise to a claim for general 
damages, there was no need to consider contemplation, as was confirmed in Emslie 
v African Merchants (“Emslie”):139 
“a plaintiff must show either that damages he claims were in the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of entering into the contract, or are the direct, proximate and natural 
result of the breach of contract.”140 
It was with reference to Emslie that Innes CJ set out the test for remoteness in the 
milestone Appellate Division decision of Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Company v 
Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd (“Victoria Falls”):141 
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“Such damages only are awarded as flow naturally from the breach or as may reasonably 
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties as likely to result 
therefrom.”142 
The first scenario under which damages would be recoverable – if the loss flows 
naturally from the breach – became the accepted formulation of the test for general 
damages that is still accepted today.143 The position was eloquently formulated later 
by Wessels JA: 
“The damages should be such as may be fairly and reasonably be considered arising 
naturally according to the usual course of things. This is the only damage which according 
to the usual course of things both parties must be held by law to have contemplated.”144 
The second scenario deals with all damages that cannot be considered to flow 
naturally from a breach in question – special damages.145 The test for the recovery of 
special damages saw significant development subsequent to Victoria Falls, and lies at 
the heart of much of the criticism of our current approach. 
2 5 2 2 The development of a test for the recovery of special damages 
As can be seen in the statement quoted from Victoria Falls above, if damages did not 
flow naturally and generally from a breach of contract, it may still be recovered. 
According to Innes CJ, in such cases a plaintiff would have to prove that the damages:  
“may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties 
as likely to result [from the breach].”146 
If the circumstances surrounding the contract render it reasonable to suppose that the 
parties could have contemplated the damages as likely to result from the breach of 
contract, such damages can be recovered. This requirement is still applied today, but 
an additional requirement was soon formulated.  
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In Lazarus Bros v Davies & Kamann (“Lazarus Bros”)147 the court, relying on 
MacKeurtan,148 decided that the mere fact that parties can be presumed to have 
contemplated damage is not sufficient for the recovery of special damages. 
Additionally, 
“…it must be clear that [the defendant] contracted in such circumstances that the other 
party has rightly assumed consent upon his part to become liable for special damage upon 
breach. In other words, it must be clear that the aggrieved party at the time of contract 
relied upon him to prevent the damage, and that he, in his turn, led the other party to believe 
that he was willing to assume the extra burden or extra risk… [T]he origin of “special 
damages” is conventual.”149 
For this conclusion MacKeurtan relied on early English case law which had, soon after 
the Hadley decision, interpreted its rule to require proof of a tacit agreement to recover 
losses that had not arisen naturally from the breach.150 By the time of the Lazarus Bros 
decision, however, this idea had been rejected in England.151  
The question of recoverability of special damages came before the Appellate Division 
in the case of Lavery and Co Ltd v Jungheinrich (“Lavery”).152 Curlewis JA formulated 
the general rule that damages will only be recoverable if it would be reasonable to 
suppose that it had been in the contemplation of the parties at contract conclusion.153 
According to Curlewis JA, such a conclusion could possibly be drawn from the subject 
matter of the contract, but he held that in most cases the special circumstances 
surrounding contract conclusion would be decisive. This principle later became known 
as the “contemplation” requirement.154 In terms of this requirement, therefore, a court 
will look at circumstances surrounding contract conclusion and the parties’ knowledge 
at that time to determine if it would be reasonable to suppose that parties did 
contemplate the losses in question. 
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Curlewis JA went further, however. He stated that special damages will not be 
recoverable merely because the parties can be presumed to have contemplated the 
damage. In addition, parties must have contracted on the basis of such knowledge.155 
This principle – which was in keeping with the principle set out in Lazarus Bros,156 
became known as the “convention” principle.157 
In his judgment, Wessels JA confirmed this idea. He held that special damages cannot 
be recovered only because it had been actually or presumptively contemplated. 
Additionally, the contract must have been concluded in the light of knowledge that 
rendered the damage foreseeable:  
“If, however, special circumstances exist which show that both parties may reasonably be 
supposed to have contemplated other damages as the probable result of the breach of 
contract, then these damages may also be recovered. These special damages can, 
however, only be recovered if it is clear that both parties and not one party only knew of 
the circumstances, and if it can reasonably be inferred that the contract was entered into 
in view of these special circumstances.”158  
The Lavery decision has therefore been interpreted as setting two requirements for 
the recovery of special damages.159 First, damages have to be actually or 
presumptively contemplated by the parties (contemplation). Second, the parties must 
either have entered into the contract with knowledge and in view of either their actual 
contemplation, or in view of the circumstances that rendered it reasonable to presume 
that they contemplated the losses (convention).  
When discussing the test for the recovery of special damages, courts have tended to 
conflate different authorities. In the Lavery decision Wessels JA referred to damages 
that do not flow naturally and generally from a breach of contract as extrinsic damages. 
This was done with reference to Pothier.160 
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The terms special and general damages came to be used interchangeably with 
intrinsic and extrinsic damages in references to Pothier’s work.161 The Appellate 
Division has also equated the distinction between damages intra and extra rem (as 
introduced by the glossators in reference to Paul’s rule in D 19.1.21.3) with the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic damages.162 These concepts of intrinsic, 
general and damages intra rem on the one hand, and extrinsic, special and damages 
extra rem on the other came, in turn, to represent the two different limbs of the Hadley 
test. This conflation is illustrated in Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts 
Construction Co Ltd:163 
“[T]he defaulting party’s liability is limited in terms of broad principles of causation and 
remoteness, to (a) those damages that flow naturally and generally from the kind of breach 
of contract in question and which the law presumes the parties contemplated as a probable 
result of the breach, and (b) those damages that, although caused by the breach of 
contract, are ordinarily regarded in law as being too remote to be recoverable unless, in 
the special circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract, the parties actually or 
presumptively contemplated they would probably result from its breach... [T]he damages 
described in limb (a) and the first rule in Hadley v Baxendale are often labelled “general” or 
“intrinsic” damages while the second rule in Hadley v Baxendale is called “special” or 
“extrinsic” damages…”164 
2 5 3 Criticism of the current position 
The approach to remoteness in contract that is currently followed in our law has been 
shrouded in controversy and uncertainty. One of the issues raised by academics and 
courts is the distinction between general and special damages. It is argued that the 
distinction is rigid because it classifies damages with reference to criteria that do not 
necessarily contribute to the process of limiting liability for damages. 
In addition to criticism directed at its usefulness,165 the distinction has also been 
criticised for leading to unfair results.  This is because the foreseeability of general 
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damage can only be proven with reference to the contract itself.166 The result is that 
there will be cases where circumstances are known to both parties and damage is 
therefore clearly foreseeable; but this foreseeability will not make the defendant liable 
for general damages. Damage arising out of such known circumstances may also not 
necessarily be recoverable as special damages. Recovery of special damages 
requires proof of both contemplation and convention. Much of the discomfort with the 
current approach followed by our courts can therefore be said to lead back to criticism 
of the convention requirement.  
The imposition of the convention requirement – that is, requiring consensus before 
imposing liability for special damages – has been criticised both by academics and in 
case law subsequent to Lavery.167 Academics argue that the convention principle is 
premised upon a fiction. At the time of concluding a contract, parties usually 
contemplate performance of the contract and not its breach. It is highly unlikely that 
the parties would agree that the defendant would be liable for special damages in the 
event of breach of contract when they have not even considered the possibility of such 
a breach in the first place.168  
It has been also been brought into question whether or not Lavery should be 
interpreted as requiring proof of a tacit agreement. Although it is clear that this is the 
Appellate Division’s interpretation of Lavery,169 it has been criticised as incorrect. 
Mulligan has argued that the convention principle as it stands in our law today is not a 
proper interpretation of Pothier, or even a proper interpretation of the Lavery	
decision.170	 
Pothier’s texts have sometimes been interpreted by our courts in a manner that does 
not require convention for the recovery of special damages.171 It has been suggested 
that Pothier only meant that where special damage is sufficiently foreseeable due to 
surrounding circumstances, the law deems the defendant to have submitted to liability 
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for it.172 This interpretation can imply that once special circumstances sufficiently 
establish that the relevant damage was in the actual or presumptive contemplation of 
parties, there is no need also to prove that the defendant had contracted to pay such 
damages. 
It has been argued by Lubbe and Murray that this is what Wessels JA intended in 
Lavery, and that his words have been misinterpreted to mean that there must be proof 
of a tacit agreement to pay damages.173 Particularly, they note his statement that   
“loss of business is certainly not general damage, nor is it such special damage as the party 
sought to be held liable could have reasonably contemplated… The defendant could only 
be held liable if he in such a case had contracted that he would pay damage for loss of 
business…”174 
Arguably therefore, Wessels JA meant that where losses are too remote to be 
recovered as special damages, they can still be recovered if a plaintiff can prove an 
agreement (tacit or express) to that effect.175 Contributing to the uncertainty 
surrounding the issue, there have been numerous cases dealing with special damages 
that do not refer to the convention requirement and only focus on contemplation.176 
A final source of uncertainty stems from the fact that the courts determine 
recoverability of damages with reference to the time of contract conclusion and not at 
the time of breach of contract. As De Wet and Van Wyk argue, if parties do not 
contemplate the consequences of breach at the time of contract conclusion, there is 
no reason to determine foreseeability at that time.177 
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The opposing argument that has been accepted by the Appellate Division178 is that 
the rights and duties of the parties are set at contract conclusion, and therefore the 
contemplation of the parties would have to be determined at that time.179 This 
argument has not silenced the academic debate on the issue, however.180 
The criticism levelled against the current approach to remoteness in contract has been 
acknowledged by our courts.181 However, beyond highlighting the controversy 
surrounding the convention principle in Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas182 it 
has not been found necessary to decide on the issue. In subsequent cases where the 
issue was raised, the court found that the facts of the case dealt with general rather 
than special damages.183 It is expected that, when the court will decide on the matter, 
the convention principle will be rejected.184   
The latest development in this area of our law is the suggestion made in Thoroughbred 
Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse185 to adopt an alternative approach. 
According to the court, consideration should be given to the possible adoption of a 
flexible or supple approach similar to the one used in the law of delict and criminal 
law.186 The court describes the suggested approach as follows:  
“[T]he competence of parties to regulate, limit or expand by arrangement amongst 
themselves the consequences of any prospective breach… must of course be 
accommodated in any flexible test…Both limbs of the current conventional test can readily 
be blended and integrated as being relevant factors to be taken into account. The fact that 
both parties had particular consequences in mind when they concluded the contract will 
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still be conclusive. There are many instances where the time of breach will be more 
appropriate than the time of contract. The circumstances of each case will determine where 
the emphasis belongs. Reasonable foreseeability, one imagines, will govern most but not 
all cases.”187  
The possible implications of this alternative approach will be evaluated later in the 
research with reference to the various theories of remoteness. 
2 6 Conclusion  
This chapter provided an overview of the development of the limitation of contractual 
damages across different civilian and common-law jurisdictions. The aim of this 
overview was to place the current South African approach, the authority that it relies 
on, and the difficulties that it experiences, in context.  
We have seen that classical Roman law, although dealing with the issue in certain 
contexts, did not provide a principled approach to the limitation of contractual 
damages. In addition, the rules that did exist were often convoluted and their 
implications were uncertain. The rule set out by Justinian in C 7.47.1 was also 
explored, particularly with reference to its influence on the French jurists’ approach to 
the limitation of contractual damages.  
As we have seen, Justinian’s rule came to be explained in terms of foreseeability by 
the French jurists. This chapter illustrated how the work of especially Pothier 
developed a foreseeability-based approach to the limitation of contractual damages. 
The rules that he set out, including his distinction between intrinsic damages (for loss 
suffered in respect of the thing that is the object of the breached obligation) and 
extrinsic damages (for loss that is not suffered in respect of the thing that is the object 
of the breached obligation), were adopted in South African law.  
Brief mention was made of another modern civilian jurisdiction: Germany. The chapter 
provided a cursory overview of the adequate cause approach followed there. The 
further elaboration of the adequate cause theory in the form of the Schutzzwecklehre 
was briefly explained and similarities between its premise and that of the foreseeability 
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approach used in French law was highlighted. This issue will be further explored when 
dealing with the adequate cause theory in more detail. 
As we have seen, South African courts have primarily relied upon English decisions 
and terminology when developing the current approach. The classic decision of 
Hadley and the reasonable contemplation test as developed in English law was briefly 
explored. This test has two limbs. Losses are either recoverable because they arose 
naturally according to the usual course of things from the breach of contract; or 
because it can reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the 
parties. The latest development in England – the assumption of responsibility test – 
seems to move away from this objective perspective. Rather, it seeks to ascertain the 
intentions of parties. This is done by determining whether or not the defendant had 
assumed responsibility for the damage that his breach caused. This development was 
briefly discussed and will be further explored later in the study. A thorough 
understanding of this development seems especially important in the light of the 
controversy in South African law regarding the convention requirement.  
Finally, this chapter has provided an overview of the development of the current South 
African approach to the limitation of contractual damages. We have seen how our 
courts have developed a contemplation test that is objective in nature. The test for 
whether damage should be deemed to have been contemplated by parties (and 
therefore be recoverable as general damages) came to centre on whether the damage 
was a natural result of the breach in the normal course of events.  
In the case of special damages – where losses are not the natural result of a breach 
and therefore not deemed to have been contemplated by law – the South African 
approach imposes two requirements which must be met before a defendant will be 
liable. First, the parties must actually or presumptively have contemplated the damage 
as a probable result of the breach of contract (the contemplation requirement).  
Secondly, the parties must have entered into the contract on the basis of their 
knowledge of the circumstances that makes the particular damage a probable result 
of the breach (the convention requirement). The convention and contemplation 
requirements as formulated seem to have involved the conflation of several separate 
authorities. The problematic nature of this has briefly been explored and will become 
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apparent when the study turns to an in-depth discussion of the different approaches 
to remoteness in contract.  
Finally, the criticism and uncertainty surrounding the current approach has been 
discussed. It seems clear that there are a number of problematic aspects of our current 
approach that merits further discussion. These are firstly whether or not convention 
should be a requirement for the recovery of special damages; secondly, whether or 
not the time of contract conclusion is the correct time to determine contemplation; and 
thirdly, whether or not the distinction between general and special damages should be 
maintained. All of these issues will be addressed in the subsequent chapters with 
reference to the different theories of remoteness: direct consequences, adequate 
cause, and foreseeability. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCES THEORY 
3 1  Introduction 
South African authors generally identify three alternative theories that could underlie 
an approach to the limitation of contractual damages: the direct consequences theory, 
the adequate cause theory, and the foreseeability theory.1 In the following chapters 
each of these theories will be analysed and evaluated. The aim, ultimately, is to 
provide a concise overview of each of these different theories and review their possible 
implications for the South African approach to the issue of remoteness of contractual 
damages. It is hoped that such an analysis would be able to help shed light on suitable 
solutions to the challenges currently seen in our law.2 This chapter will focus on the 
direct consequences theory. 
The direct consequences theory as a normative justification for the limitation of liability 
for damages is found in English law.3 It was originally formulated in the tort case of In 
re an Arbitration between Polemis and another and Furness, Withy and Co. Ltd 
(“Polemis”).4 Subsequent to that decision, it was argued that the theory is applicable 
both in cases of contract and tort,5 although its suggested application to contract cases 
was heavily criticised6 and it never really gained a foothold in English contract law. It 
is a theory that developed, was criticised and later largely discredited mostly in the 
arena of the law of tort.7 Also in South Africa, the direct consequences theory has been 
discussed almost exclusively in the context of the law of delict.8  
																																																						
1 GF Lubbe & CM Murray Farlam & Hathaway: Contract – Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed 
(1988) 624; JM Potgieter, L Steynberg & TB Floyd Visser & Potgieter: Law of Damages 3 ed (2012) 
paras 11.5.4-11.5.5; AD Jansen Van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit en Aspekte van 
Aanspreeklikheidsbeperking by die Onregmatige Daad LLD Thesis UNISA (1970) 189-226. 
2 2 5 2.  
3 Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 216-217.  
4 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.  
5 AL Goodhart “The Imaginary Necktie and the Rule in In Re Polemis” (1952) 68 LQR 514 518-519. 
6 519. 
7 WL Prosser “Palsgraf Revisited” in WL Prosser Selected Topics on the Law of Tort – Five Lectures 
Delivered at the University of Michigan (1953) 191 229-231.  
8 JC Van Der Walt & JR Midgley Delict – Principles and Cases I (1997) 168-173; RG McKerron The 
Law of Delict 6 ed (1965) 123-129; J Burchell Principles of Delict (1993) 119-120; PQR Boberg The 
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In the light of its rejection in England and the fact that it is primarily applied to cases of 
tort and delict, it might seem unusual to devote a chapter to the direct consequences 
theory. However, the theory does merit some discussion and evaluation, for at least 
two reasons. 
First, the term “direct consequence” is often used by our courts when dealing with 
remoteness in contract.9 In what is arguably the most quoted case,10 locus classicus11 
on the matter, Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte 
Mines,12 Innes C.J., for example, states that 
“…damages for loss of profits can only be awarded when such loss is the direct, natural or 
contemplated result of non-performance.” 13 
Although these references cannot be interpreted to imply that our law follows the direct 
consequences test as understood in English law,14 it is not at all clear what exactly is 
meant by “direct” when used by our courts. Indeed, the use of the term has been 
criticised by local authors as unsatisfactory and unclear.15 The term “direct 
consequences” is also used in French law, and is then explained with reference to 
																																																						
Law of Delict I (1984) 440-442; J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict 4 ed (2001) 192-
195. 
9 Emslie v African Merchants Ltd 1908 22 EDC 82 90; Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Company Ltd 
v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22; Bower v Sparks, Young and Farmers’ Meat 
Industries Ltd 1936 NPD 1 17; Administrator Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 558; Freddy Hirsch 
Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) 291.  
10 Probart v South African Railways and Harbours 1926 EDL 205 209; Hinz & Hinz v Kahlbester 1933 
SWA 96 98; Whitfield v Phillips 1957 2 SA 318 (A) 325; Novick v Benjamin 1972 2 SA 842 (A) 857; 
Shatz Investments Pty Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 551; Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v 
Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 678; Gloria’s Caterers (Pty) Ltd t/a Connoisseur Hotel 
v Friedman 1983 3 SA 390 (T) 393; Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 
SA 551 (SCA) 579-581.  
11 Gloria’s Caterers (Pty) Ltd t/a Connoisseur Hotel v Friedman 1983 3 SA 390 T 393.  
12 1915 AD 1.  
13 22.  
14 The direct consequences test as formulated in English law is seen as “opposing and irreconcilable” 
with foreseeability-based approaches – Van der Walt & Midgley Delict I 168. 
15 JC De Wet & AH Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 228. 
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examples provided by Pothier.16 As seen in the previous chapter,17 our courts often 
rely on Pothier when dealing with issues of remoteness. 
To analyse the implications of the direct consequences theory for the South African 
law of contract, a thorough understanding of its content and operation is therefore 
essential – if only to provide insight into the meaning of references to “directness” by 
our courts. In this respect, an overview of the traditional direct consequences theory 
as formulated in English law promises to be valuable.  
Secondly, the traditional direct consequences test formulated in Polemis does, in 
terms of content and functioning, differ quite substantially from our current approach 
to remoteness.18 These differences, and their implications for decisions relating to 
remoteness in contract, are worth evaluating if we are to have a holistic overview of 
the different approaches that could be adopted when limiting contractual damages.  
3 2  The direct consequences theory in English law 
3 2 1 Introduction 
The direct consequences theory as formulated in English law holds that, as soon a 
defendant has acted wrongfully – or breached a contract19 – he will be liable for all the 
direct consequences of his act, regardless of whether or not he could have foreseen 
those consequences.20 The test was formulated in the landmark decision on the 
matter, Polemis, as follows: 
“[T]he question to whether particular damages are recoverable depends only on the answer 
to the question whether they are the direct consequence of the act.”21 
A consequence is considered to be the direct consequence of an act if there had been 
no new cause intervening between the specific act and the consequence.22 Over time 
																																																						
16 B Nicholas The French Law of Contract 2 ed (1992) 229. 
17 2 5. 
18 DJ Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 251; Boberg Delict I 442. 
19 H McGregor, M Spencer & J Picton McGregor on Damages 18 ed (2009) 121-123; 190. 
20 Neethling et al Law of Delict 192.  
21 In re an Arbitration between Polemis and Another and Furness, Withy and Co. Ltd [1921] 3 K.B. 560 
574.  
22 Burchell Principles of Delict 119. 
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much has been done to elaborate on this admittedly vague definition. Prosser defines 
direct consequences as 
“those which follow in sequence from the effect of the defendant’s act upon conditions 
existing and forces already in operation at the time, without the intervention of any external 
forces which come into active operation later.”23 
Essentially, therefore, it would seem that a consequence is considered direct if there 
is no novus actus or nova causa identifiable in the sequence of events leading from 
the act of the defendant to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.24 If this is the case, there 
will be liability for all such direct consequences regardless of whether they were 
foreseeable or not. 
This test does not seem easy to apply. Deciding whether an intervening cause is new 
and independent enough to render consequences “indirect” often involves a 
determination that relies on policy considerations rather than the strict causal logic that 
the test seems to allude to. In a very telling description of the direct consequences 
test, it has been held that 
“[i]n the varied web of affairs, the law must abstract some consequences as relevant, not 
perhaps on the grounds of pure logic, but simply for practical reasons.”25 
The fact that the test is applied with an emphasis on practical considerations rather 
than purely logical reasoning is seen in the various ways in which courts decide 
whether intervening causes are independent “enough” to break the causal chain 
between an act and its negative consequences.26 It has been described as a flexible 
approach by its supporters,27 and complex and uncertain by opponents.28 To gain 
some insight into how the test would be applied and what results it would yield, a brief 
overview of its historical development follows.  
																																																						
23 WL Prosser Handbook of the Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 303.  The same definition is used by Van der 
Walt & Midgley Delict I 172. 
24 Burchell Principles of Delict 119. 
25 Liesbosch Dredger v SS Edison [1933] A.C. 449 460. 
26 Boberg The Law of Delict I 442.  
27 441. 
28 AL Goodhart “The Brief Life Story of the Direct Consequence Rule in English Tort Law” (1967) 53 Va 
L Rev 857 857.  
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3 2 2  Historical development 
The history of the direct consequences theory can be traced back to the case of Smith 
v The London and South Western Railway Company.29 In this case, Smith claimed 
damages from the railway company for the destruction of his cottage caused by a fire. 
During the summer, the railway company had cut grass and trimmed hedges next to 
the railway line. The refuse was placed in heaps next to the railway line and left there 
for two weeks. Because of a spark from a railway engine, a fire was started in the dried 
plant material. This fire spread to a field that did not belong to the defendant, crossed 
a road, and destroyed the plaintiff’s cottage 180 meters away.30  
The seven judges unanimously held the defendant liable for the damages claimed by 
the plaintiff.31 Three of the judges maintained that the defendant was liable even 
though they admitted that the fire could not have been foreseen to spread in the way 
that it did.32 However, it was argued that the foreseeability of the harm was not the 
proper test for liability: 
“But I am of opinion that no reasonable man would have foreseen that the fire would 
consume the hedge and pass across a stubble-field, and so get to the plaintiff’s cottage at 
the distance of 200 yards from the railway… but on consideration I do not feel that that is 
a true test of the liability of the defendants in this case.”33 
The foreseeability principle was rejected by these judges because they felt that it 
would be too restrictive – that it would limit liability to an extent that would be too 
favourable to wrongdoers.34 The judges had to formulate another principle in terms of 
which liability for damages could be limited. In this context, the notion that a defendant 
would be liable only for damage that can be said to be the direct consequence of his 
actions was formulated:  
“I think the law is, that if they were aware that these heaps were lying by the side of the 
rails, and that it was a hot season, and that therefore by being left there the heaps were 
																																																						
29 (1870-1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 14.  
30 14.  
31 Goodhart Va L Rev 1967 859. 
32 Smith v The London and South Western Railway Company (1870-1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 14 20. 
33 20. 
34 Goodhart Va L Rev 1967 860. 
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likely to catch fire, the defendants were bound to provide against all circumstances which 
might result from this, and were responsible for all the natural consequences of it.”35 
The idea formulated therefore was that once negligence was established, a defendant 
should be liable for all the “natural” consequences of their conduct. This concept was 
later formulated as “direct” consequences. 
Weld-Blundell v Stephens36 formed the primary authority for the later Polemis decision 
and applied the direct consequences theory within a contractual context. The case 
concerned breach of an implied term in a contract of employment. Mr Weld-Blundell, 
the plaintiff, had employed Mr Stephens, a chartered accountant. Mr Weld-Blundell 
wrote a letter to Mr Stephens that contained some libellous information about two 
officials at the company. Mr Stephens, in breach of an implied duty of care, gave the 
letter to his partner who negligently left it lying in the company’s office. The manager 
found the letter and disclosed its libellous contents to the two employees that Mr Weld-
Blundell had written about.  
This led to an action for libel against Mr Weld-Blundell, who had to compensate the 
parties to whom he referred in his letter. He in turn sought to recover that loss in an 
action for damages against Mr Stephens. He argued that, were it not for Mr Stephens’ 
breach of an implied duty of care, the information would not have become public and 
he would not have been liable for his libellous statements.37 
The court had to consider whether the loss suffered because of Mr Stephens’ breach 
was too remote. In the dissenting judgment of Viscount Finlay, he answered this 
question with reference to the contemplation of the parties. He considered whether Mr 
Stephens could have foreseen the possibility of his carelessness causing the harm 
suffered by Mr Weld-Blundell.38  
In the majority judgment of Lord Sumner however, the question of remoteness was 
answered not with reference to whether such harm could have been foreseen, but 
rather with reference to whether the harm was a direct consequence of the breach.  
																																																						
35 Smith v The London and South Western Railway Company (1870-1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 14 20. 
36 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] A.C. 956. 
37 956.  
38 970. 
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In determining whether the damage was too remote, Lord Sumner expressed his 
preference for the term “direct consequence”: 
“What are the ‘natural, probable and necessary consequences?’ Everything that happens, 
happens in order of nature and is therefore ‘natural.’ Nothing that happens by the free 
choice of a thinking man is ‘necessary,’ except in the sense of predestination. To speak of 
‘probable’ consequence is to throw everything upon the jury. It is tautologous to speak of 
‘effective cause’ or to say that damages too remote from the cause are irrecoverable, for 
an effective cause is simply that which causes, and in law what is ineffective or too remote 
is no cause at all. I still venture to think that direct cause is the best expression… Direct 
cause excludes what is indirect, conveys the essential distinction, which causa causans 
and causa sine qua non rather cumbrously indicate, and is consistent with the possibility of 
the concurrence of more direct causes than one…”39 
The court held that, although the disclosure of the contents of the letter could have 
been foreseeable, the limits of liability should be determined with reference to whether 
or not the harm is a direct consequence of the breach. In this case, the fact that the 
manager had taken the letter constituted a novus actus that excluded “directness” by 
breaking the causal chain.  
These statements formed the main authority for the Polemis decision and the 
subsequent acceptance of the direct consequences theory. Polemis was a tort case, 
in which the plaintiffs claimed for the value of their ship that had been destroyed by a 
fire caused by the negligence of the defendant’s employees. The cargo ship had 
containers with petrol which leaked during the voyage, causing petrol vapour to enter 
the hold. At a port, employees of the defendant had to move some of the cargo, and 
used heavy planks for that purpose. Due to the negligence of the employees, one of 
the planks fell down, causing a spark that led to a fire that destroyed the entire ship. 
The plaintiffs claimed for the value of the ship.40 It was accepted that the possibility 
that a falling plank may cause a fire was not foreseeable. Nonetheless, the defendant 
was liable to pay damages amounting to the value of the ship. This was because, 
according to the court:  
“[T]he falling of the plank was due to the negligence of the defendants’ servants. The fire 
appears to me to have been directly caused by the falling of the plank. Under these 
																																																						
39 983-984. 
40 In re Arbitration between Polemis and another and Furness, Withy and Co. Ltd [1921] 3 K.B. 560 
560. 
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circumstances I consider that it is immaterial that the causing of the spark by the falling of 
the plank could not reasonably have been anticipated.”41 
This idea - that once there has been some breach of duty, a defendant would be liable 
for all direct consequences arising out of his conduct, regardless of whether it was 
foreseeable - was subsequently confirmed.42  
The rule seems to cast the net of liability very wide. The rule is also vague – with no 
clearly defined method for determining the extent of “directness” between cause and 
consequence. It is arguably for these reasons that subsequent case law on the issue 
introduced certain limits on the application of the direct consequences theory. 
Subsequent to Polemis, the theory was honed, for example, to only apply “to specific 
interests of the plaintiff towards which the tort has been committed”.43  
Another example where courts limited the application of the direct consequences 
theory can be seen in the case of Liesbosch Dredger v SS Edison.44 In this case, a 
ship negligently collided with and sunk a dredger which was at the time performing in 
terms of a profitable contract. The owners of the dredger were unable to purchase a 
new one and therefore suffered financial loss because of their inability to perform in 
terms of the contract. In this case the court held that such loss of profits, although a 
direct consequence of the negligent collision, could not be claimed because it was not 
a direct “physical consequence”.45 Later case law explained this decision by saying 
that the loss of profit was not recoverable because it was not part of the interests of 
the plaintiff against which the tort was committed.46 Both of these interpretations serve 
as examples of how the practical effects of the direct consequences theory were 
limited. For this reason it has been described as theory that was of more academic 
than practical significance.47  
																																																						
41 571. 
42 Thorogood v Van den Berghs & Jurgens, Ltd [1951] 2 K.B. 537.  
43 Bourhill v Young [1943] A.C. 92 110.  
44 [1933] A.C. 449. 
45 459. 
46 McKerron Law of Delict 127.  
47 Goodhart Va L Rev 1967 862.  
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Exactly forty years after the Polemis decision, the Privy Council expressly rejected the 
direct consequences theory, ending its short and contentious role in English law. This 
was done in the decision of Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering 
Co, Ltd (“The Wagon Mound”),48 which concerned facts remarkably similar to those in 
Polemis. The court based its rejection of the direction consequences theory on three 
considerations.49 First, the Polemis decision was not a correct interpretation of the 
authority it relied on.50 Secondly it was held not to be in the interest of justice for a 
person to be liable for consequences which he could not reasonably have foreseen.51 
The third and arguably most important reason for the court’s rejection of the direct 
consequences rule was the court’s criticism of its logic. The court stated: 
“If, as admittedly it is, B’s liability depends on the reasonable foreseeability of consequent 
damage, how is that to be determined except by foreseeability of the damage which in fact 
happened – the damage in suit? And, if that damage is unforeseeable so as to displace 
liability at large how can the liability be restored so as to make compensation payable?”52 
In essence, the court argued that a defendant cannot be held liable for unforeseeable 
losses. The court’s argument is applicable to tort cases where negligence has to be 
determined with reference to the foresight of a reasonable man. If it cannot be 
reasonably expected that a defendant should have foreseen harm, he will not have 
been negligent. If he was not negligent in relation to the harm that he has caused, he 
cannot then be liable for those damages simply because it is a direct consequence of 
his action.  
As a result, the direct consequences test was rejected and replaced by a “reasonable 
foreseeability” test for remoteness. As we can see, however, the core of the debate 
and the criticism of the Polemis test focuses on the applicability of the direct 
consequences theory in the law of tort. The detail of the debate around the issue has 
not been addressed because it falls outside of the scope of this research. The next 
																																																						
48 [1961] 1 All E.R. 404. 
49 RG McKerron “Foreseeability is All: A Critical Note on The Wagon Mound” (1961) 78 SALJ 282 284. 
50 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] 1 All 
E.R. 404 416. 
51 413. 
52 425. 
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section will examine the applicability of the direct consequences theory in the English 
law of contract.  
3 2 3  The direct consequences theory in the English law of contract 
Despite the issue being argued at length,53 there seems to have been no consensus 
as to whether the direct consequences theory had application in contract cases. Even 
in the Wagon Mound decision, where the direct consequences theory was ultimately 
rejected, it remained unclear whether the theory was applicable in cases of breach of 
contract.54  
Lord Wright, who argued on behalf of the appellants in Polemis where the theory was 
initially adopted, stated that the direct consequences theory was applicable in both 
contract and tort.55 This was also the opinion of Lord Porter56 and has been supported 
with reference to dicta made by several judges.57 Additionally, authors have argued 
that the direct consequences theory has to be applicable in English contract law 
because the Weld-Blundell v Stephens58 decision, which concerned contractual 
damages, relied on the theory. This position has been heavily criticised, however. 
Most importantly, it is argued that the Polemis case never mentioned Hadley v 
Baxendale (“Hadley”).59 The court could therefore not have intended to change the 
law remoteness in contract so clearly established in Hadley. Decisions about 
remoteness in contract subsequent to Polemis continued to rely on Hadley and the 
reasonable contemplation test without much reference to the direct consequences 
approach as set out in Polemis.60 In an attempt to avoid this criticism, some authors 
																																																						
53 See for instance Wright “Re Polemis” (1951) 14 MLR 393 395; Goodhart 1952 LQR 515-517. 
54 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] 1 All 
E.R. 404 413. 
55 Wright 1951 MLR 396. 
56 SL Porter “The Measure of Damages in Contract and Tort” (1934) 5 Cambridge L.J. 176 186. 
57 Goodhart 1952 LQR 519. He cites WTS Stallybrass & JW Salmond Salmond's Law of Torts – A 
Treatise on the English Law of Liability for Civil Injuries 10 ed (1945) 155.  
58 [1920] A.C. 956.  
59 [1854] 9 Ex. 341. 
60 Goodhart 1952 LQR 522. 
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have argued that the Hadley and Polemis tests imply the same thing: that “natural” 
consequences will be “direct”.61  
This seems like an attempted reconciliation which would render both terms 
meaningless. It is clear that “direct” as used by the court in Polemis includes even 
consequences that cannot be anticipated. If we are to argue that such consequences 
are also “natural” within the meaning of the first limb in Hadley, that would imply that 
the reasonable contemplation test deems unanticipated consequences to have been 
contemplated. It is therefore doubtful if any attempt at reconciling the reasonable 
contemplation test of Hadley and the direct consequences test of Polemis can be 
sensible. 
The direct consequences test as used in English law created much uncertainty – both 
with regard to the practical application of the test and its theoretical basis. This is 
especially true in the light of the way in which it seems to have contradicted the test 
set out in Hadley without ever explicitly intending to do so.  
As will be seen, regardless of this uncertainty, the term “direct consequences” has 
been used in South African law in the context of remoteness of contractual damages. 
What exactly is meant by the term, and to what extent – if at all – the thinking around 
direct consequences in England has shaped South African terminology is discussed 
in the next section.  
3 3 The meaning of direct consequences in South African law 
3 3 1 The direct consequences theory     
In South African law, the direct consequences theory as described above has been 
applied in isolated instances only.62 For example, in Frenkel & Co v Cadle (“Frenkel”)63 
the court rejected the foreseeability approach in favour of the direct consequences 
theory: 
																																																						
61 JW Salmond & WTS Stallybrass Salmond’s Law of Torts – A Treatise on the English Law of Liability 
for Civil Injuries 10 ed (1945) 156. 
62 Neethling et al Delict 193. 
63 1915 NPD 173.  
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“It is quite immaterial whether a result was one which the defendant could reasonably be 
expected to have foreseen or not, if it is the direct result of his neglect he is liable.”64  
This case was again referred to in Alston and Another v Marine & Trade Insurance Co 
Ltd (“Alston”),65 where the court favoured an approach to the issue of remoteness 
closely resembling the direct consequences approach.66 However, both the Frenkel 
and Alston cases dealt with liability for damages in the context of the law of delict. This 
does not mean that the direct consequences theory is applicable to remoteness in the 
South African law of contractual damages. 
It has been argued convincingly that, given the fundamentally different natures of 
obligations arising out of contract and delict, rules of remoteness used in one field 
cannot be transposed to the other.67 Especially the fact that contractual duties are 
voluntarily undertaken suggests foreseeability as a more logical approach than that of 
direct consequences in the law of contract. When contracting, parties decide the scope 
of their respective obligations amongst themselves. The nature of the obligations and 
risks they undertake is arguably determined by what parties are able to take into 
account when contracting. For that reason, it would seem more sensible to limit the 
consequences of breach to those that parties were reasonably able to consider when 
contracting. At least, that seems preferable to determining the consequences for 
breach of an obligation by examining the directness of the causal relationship between 
breach and harm, without regard for the context within which the breached contractual 
obligation was (voluntarily) undertaken originally.68 
Even if this is not the case, and the acceptance of the traditional direct consequences 
theory by our courts also applies to our law of contract, the decisions mentioned above 
have been subject to much criticism69 and it is fairly settled that the direct 
consequences theory has never been explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court of 
																																																						
64 186.  
65 1964 4 SA 112 (W).  
66 115G-116H. 
67 McKerron 1961 SALJ 288.  
68 Goodhart 1952 LQR 517-519; HJ Erasmus & JJ Gauntlett “Damages” in WA Joubert, JA Ferris & 
LTC Harms (eds) LAWSA 7 2 ed (1995) paras 33-34; SL Porter “The Measure of Damages in Contract 
and Tort” (1934) 5 Cambridge L.J. 185;  McKerron 1961 SALJ 288; McKerron The Law of Delict 169. 
69 Jansen van Rensburg Jurdiese Kousaliteit 220-224.  
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Appeal in South Africa.70  The direct consequences theory as understood in English 
law is therefore not part of our current approach to remoteness. 
3 3 2 Other uses of the term “direct consequences”  
Although the direct consequences theory has never been endorsed in the South 
African law of contract, judgments have referred to the concept of “direct 
consequences” in decisions about remoteness of contractual damages.71 It is possible 
to identify two contexts within which it is used. The first context is where the term 
“direct” consequences is mentioned with reference to Pothier. Here, an interpretation 
of Pothier’s work would suggest that the term “direct consequences” refers to 
something other than “foreseeable consequences”. The second context is where 
courts seem to suggest that the two terms have the same meaning. 
First, as indicated in the previous chapter, the rules of remoteness that are currently 
used by South African courts were directly and indirectly influenced by the writings of 
Pothier.72 He stated that a defendant who intentionally breaches a contract will be 
liable not only for foreseeable consequences, but also direct consequences.73 The 
logic behind this is that a defendant who intentionally breaches a contract should face 
wider liability than one who did not. It is clear that within this rule, harm that is the 
“direct consequence” of a breach will be a wider concept than harm that was 
foreseeable. The implication is therefore that “direct” consequences must be taken to 
mean something other than “foreseeable” consequences. 
However, the test for when damage is “direct” is unclear, also in modern French law.74 
French courts formulate their approach to directness in reference to the examples 
																																																						
70 Burchell Principles of Delict 120. 
71 Emslie v African Merchants Ltd 1908 22 EDC 82 90; Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Company Ltd 
v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22; Natal Shipping & Trading Co Ltd v African 
Madagascar Agencies Ltd 1921 TPD 530; Marais v Commercial General Agency Ltd 1922 TPD 440; 
Bower v Sparks, Young and Farmers’ Meat Industries Ltd 1936 NPD 1 17; Administrator Natal v 
Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 558; Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 
3 SA 670 (A) 688A; Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) 291. 
72 Ch 2 (2 5).  
73 WD Evans RJ Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations – Translated from French (1806) paras 
161-166. 
74 Nicholas French Law of Contract 230. 
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used by Pothier.75 This was discussed in chapter two. A brief summary will be provided 
here. 
Pothier uses the example of a man who fraudulently sells a cow with an infectious 
disease to a farmer. He then considers three different losses: the loss of other animals 
that contracted the disease, the loss of profits as a result of the fact that the farmer 
could not cultivate his land, and the farmer’s loss of his land because it was seized by 
creditors.76  
Pothier holds that the loss of the animals that contracted the disease is a direct 
consequence of the breach. He employs no specific test for directness – he merely 
states that it is the fraud of the seller that causes the loss.77 Arguably, he considers 
the loss of the animals to be a direct consequence of the breach simply because of a 
close causal connection. There is, however, no indication of how one can objectively 
determine whether or not a consequence is sufficiently closely connected to a 
particular breach. 
Pothier argues further that the loss of land is an indirect consequence because it has 
no “necessary relation” to the breach by the seller: 
“[T]he seller will not be liable for the damage which I suffer from the seizure of my effects; 
this damage is only a very remote and indirect consequence of his fraud, and has not any 
necessary relation to it…”78  
Finally, he refers to the problematic issue of the losses caused by the farmer’s inability 
to cultivate his land. In this case he states that such losses are not “an absolutely 
necessary”79 consequence of the breach and comes to the conclusion that the farmer 
must be compensated only in part for these losses. 
																																																						
75 Evans RJ Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts – Translated from the French 
(1853) para 166-167. H Beale, A Fauvarque-Cosson, J Rutgers, D Tallon & S Vogenauer Cases, 
Materials and Texts on Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 1004 indicates that it is quoted in Maularie & Aynès 
Les obligations 9 ed (1998) 838; Nicholas French Law of Contract 229.  
76 Para 166-167 as translated in Evans Pothier:  A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 187. 
77 Para 166.  
78 Para 167 as translated in Evans Pothier:  A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 187.  
79 Para 167 as translated in Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 187.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 61	
It seems therefore that the best possible explanation of the word “direct” in the context 
of Pothier’s work would be that direct consequences are those that are in a 
“necessary” relation to the breach of contract. The use of the word "necessary" does 
not really make the concept easier to understand. What is clear from Pothier’s work, 
however, is that “direct consequences” is not synonymous with “foreseeable 
consequences”.  
It might therefore be possible to argue that “direct consequences” is used by our courts 
to convey something different from “foreseeable consequences”. This would still not 
provide a clear understanding of what exactly the term “direct consequences” means 
in the context of our law of contract. It seems unlikely that the references to direct 
consequences by our courts refer to the theory of direct consequences as discussed 
in the context of English law. When our courts have referred to the directness of a 
consequence in the context of remoteness in contract, it was never with reference to 
authority pertaining to the test as set out in section 2 above. Rather, courts refer to 
Pothier, Voet, and Hadley.80 The test as set out in section 2 has also not been applied 
by our courts in any contract cases. 
Arguably, the term is also not used in a way similar to that of French law where the 
intention of the defendant is relevant to determine whether he would be liable for direct 
consequences. In the French approach, direct consequences are wider than 
foreseeable consequences – and that broader liability is justified with reference to the 
fact that the breach was committed intentionally. It seems unlikely that the wider 
meaning of the term “direct consequences” in French law can be applied in our law 
without such an underlying reason for it.  
The implication of an interpretation of “direct consequences” as distinguishable from 
“foreseeable consequences” is therefore uncertain. It might not be the correct 
interpretation, however. There are many other writers who argue that our courts use 
the word “direct” simply as a synonym for “natural” (and therefore reasonably 
foreseeable) consequences. This is the second context in which the term is used.  
																																																						
80 See, for instance: Emslie v African Merchants Ltd 1908 22 EDC 82 91; Victoria Falls & Transvaal 
Power Co Ltd V Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22; Bower v Sparks, Young and 
Farmer's Meat Industries 1936 NPD 1 13. 
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Under this interpretation, harm suffered will be considered to be the direct 
consequence of a breach if it is the immediate or natural consequence thereof.81 This 
seems in line with the use of the word “direct” in case law - most notably Emslie v 
African Merchants82 where the court held that for damage to be recoverable a plaintiff 
must prove: 
“[T]hat the damages he claims… are the direct, proximate and natural result of the breach 
of contract.”83 
It has therefore been argued, both by South African and English authors, that the terms 
“natural” and “direct” are  simply used to convey the idea that there exists a reasonable 
connection between the breach and the harm suffered, with the effect that damage is 
deemed to have been foreseeable by law.84 
It can therefore be concluded that the references to the term “direct consequences” 
do not refer to a test in addition to the contemplation and convention tests. Our courts’ 
use of the word can perhaps be criticised as unnecessary and confusing. It would 
seem that the reference to direct consequences in the context of remoteness does not 
convey any addition or expansion of the foreseeability-based approach that we follow.  
3 4  Evaluation 
In the light of the discussion above, it can be accepted that the direct consequences 
theory is not currently used to determine remoteness of contractual damages in South 
African law. References to “direct consequences” can arguably be taken to simply 
mean “natural consequences”. The purpose of this study is not only to clarify our 
current position, however, but also to highlight possible insights to be gained from 
alternative theories of remoteness. The final section of this chapter seeks to evaluate 
what the direct consequences theory might contribute when considering possible 
future developments of our approach to remoteness in contract. 
																																																						
81 HJ Erasmus & JJ Gauntlett “Damages” in LAWSA 7 para 14.  
82 1908 EDC 82. 
83 90-91. 
84 McKerron The Law of Delict 127.  
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In essence, when dealing with the issue of remoteness, courts determine whether 
there is sufficient justification to shift responsibility for losses from the person who 
suffered it to the person who caused it.85 This is ultimately an issue of policy and not 
logic, as Boberg states: 
“The merit of a test for remoteness depends, not on logic or justice, but on its ability to yield 
the results deemed desirable by other criteria. To let a predilection for a particular test of 
remoteness persuade us that its results are desirable is to abdicate responsibility for a 
policy decision, in effect allowing the tail to wag the dog.” 86 
An evaluation of the merits of the direct consequences theory could contribute to our 
understanding of the “criteria” by which a remoteness decision is deemed desirable. 
Even if it seems clear that “direct consequences” as currently referred to in our law of 
contract is an unclear and therefore arguably unhelpful concept,87 there are some 
noteworthy elements of the theory that might provide valuable insights.  
The first aspect of the theory that has been highlighted as positive is that it leaves the 
question of remoteness quite open to the court’s discretion. The direct consequences 
theory focusses on the causal relationship between the breach and the harm suffered. 
The manner in which this is determined is largely dependent on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.88 This has been said to provide the advantage of more 
flexibility.89 McKerron argues that, because remoteness will always be a question of 
degree, it can be better addressed by such a flexible approach than by the application 
of one “simple abstract principle”.90 
The second advantage of the direct consequences approach is that, according to 
some writers, it leads to more fair results. It is argued that, whereas foreseeability 
places an undue focus on what the defendant could foresee, directness places more 
focus on losses suffered by the plaintiff.91 In other words, when we consider 
																																																						
85 JC Van Der Walt “Vonnisbespreking: Van den Bergh v Parity Insurance Co Ltd and Another 1966 2 
SA 621 (W)” (1966) 29 THRHR 244 246. 
86 Boberg The Law of Delict I 442. 
87 Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 223-224. 
88 McKerron The Law of Delict 123-126.  
89 Burchell Principles of Delict 119; Boberg The Law of Delict I 442. 
90 McKerron The Law of Delict 123. 
91 Van Der Walt 1966 THRHR 246.  
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remoteness in contract as a policy decision, the key difference between the 
foreseeability and direct consequences approaches seems to lie in which party’s 
interests forms the primary focus. Should the measure or extent of damages be 
determined with reference to losses actually suffered by the plaintiff, or with reference 
to the value that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have 
expected it to be?92 
If we follow the first approach, the main method of limiting damages would be with 
reference to the quality of the causal relationship between breach and losses actually 
suffered: as long as harm can be said to result directly from the breach, it should be 
recoverable. If we follow the second approach, our emphasis would be on what the 
defendant could have foreseen or expected to be liable for upon breach – only damage 
that could have been contemplated should be recovered. The first seems to be the 
emphasis of the direct consequences approach, the second that of the foreseeability 
approach.93   
It is not apparent, however, that a focus on the interest of the plaintiff in the context of 
contractual damages is appropriate. It can be argued that exactly because of the 
voluntary nature of contractual obligations one should be more sensitive to which risks 
the defendant could be presumed to have submitted to. Regardless, the somewhat 
different emphasis of the direct consequences approach could be informative in 
formulating an approach to remoteness.  
Apart from these two points, the criticism against the direct consequences approach 
strongly outweighs any advantages that it might hold. The point of criticism that 
arguably carries the most weight is simply that the use of “directness” as a criterion 
adds nothing new to the remoteness inquiry. It is argued that the test is unable to 
satisfactorily distinguish between direct and indirect consequences.94 This is exactly 
because the conceptualisation of what would constitute an "independent" or 
"intervening" cause is so fluid. A consequence is "direct" if there has been no new or 
																																																						
92 JF Wilson & CJ Slade “A Re-Examination of Remoteness” (1952) MLR 458 462.  
93 Van Der Walt 1966 THRHR 246.    
94 Prosser “Palsgraf Revisited” in Selected Topics on the Law of Tort 230. 
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intervening (and independent) cause.95 But concluding that a cause is independent 
cannot be done without considering other factors – such as foreseeability.  
De Wet points out that proponents of the direct consequences theory include 
foreseeable consequences in those that are direct even if that is sometimes at the cost 
of logical consistency.96 As an example he mentions harm caused by the foreseeable 
action of a third party. Such consequences cannot really be considered direct. But the 
foreseeable action of the third party is in this instance not considered to be an 
independent intervening cause97 – illustrating how the concept of directness does not 
really help to draw a line between damages that can be recovered and damages that 
are too remote. The result would be that the direct consequences theory casts the net 
of liability too wide.98 
The core of the criticism against the theory is, therefore, simply that it does not 
contribute to solving issues of remoteness.99 It merely moves the question back one 
step. Instead of asking whether or not an action is the direct cause of harm suffered, 
one must now inquire if something was an intervening cause or not. The theory does 
not in itself really contribute to a method for answering this question. Rather, it seems 
to ask only if a connection between breach and harm is reasonable enough to impose 
liability.100 In the words of Jansen van Rensburg, the only real advantage of the direct 
consequences theory seems to be that it is vague and therefore flexible.101 
3 5 Conclusion 
Given the limitations of the direct consequences theory discussed above, there does 
not seem to be an argument for the employment of the direct consequences theory in 
South African contract law. It is a theory that does not solve the uncertainty that we 
currently face, and one that has many problems of its own. 
																																																						
95 McKerron The Law of Delict 123. 
96 De Wet 1941 THRHR 138. 
97 McKerron The Law of Delict 125; Boberg The Law of Delict I 441. 
98 De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 228. 
99 Van der Walt 1996 THRHR 246. 
100 McKerron The Law of Delict 127. 
101 Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 223. 
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However, there are two aspects of the direct consequences theory that might be worth 
mentioning with reference to future developments of our approach to remoteness in 
contract.  
First, we have seen how most of the proponents of the direct consequences theory 
advocate a flexible approach to remoteness. The policy-based nature of the inquiry 
into remoteness has been highlighted in the overview of the direct consequences 
theory. This has led to the suggestion that remoteness inquiries should not be fixated 
on one logical principle that is unable to accommodate the facts and circumstances of 
a particular case. This insight will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of this study. 
In this regard it might be appropriate to caution against formulating one logically 
principled test for remoteness at the cost of flexibility. This caution seems to be in line 
with our Appellate Division’s recent suggestion that our current foreseeability 
approach to remoteness in contract should be replaced by a flexible test such as the 
one we have in the law of delict.102 When evaluating that suggestion later in this 
research, it will be with due regard to the many authors who have argued in favour of 
a test for remoteness that is flexible in nature. 
The second aspect of the direct consequences theory that might be valuable to the 
further analysis of our approach is its emphasis on the plaintiff’s interest. The entire 
approach has reminded us that, when all is said and done, the plaintiff has suffered 
harm. All or most of that harm was factually caused by the defendant’s breach. The 
thinking behind the direct consequences theory warns against placing too high a 
burden on the plaintiff through emphasis on the defendant’s interests. As we have 
seen, this argument has to take account of the contractual nature of the relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant. It is therefore by no means a blanket statement, but 
rather a reminder that a test of remoteness implicitly makes certain assumptions about 
the relative importance of parties’ interests. 
Although these are valuable insights to consider when discussing possible ways 
forward, it clearly does not provide a distinct solution or possible alternative to our 
current approach to remoteness in contract and the criticism it faces. For a better 
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understanding of the issue and our possible alternatives, we need to turn to other 
theories of remoteness. The next chapter will explore a second possible theory of 
remoteness: the theory of adequate causation. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 68	
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 69	
CHAPTER 4: THE ADEQUATE CAUSE THEORY 
4 1  Introduction 
As seen in the previous chapter, the theory of direct consequences does not 
necessarily provide us with a viable alternative to, or better understanding of, the 
limitation of contractual damages in South Africa. The second theory mentioned as a 
possible basis for the limitation of contractual damages is that of adequate causation.1 
This theory underlies the approach to remoteness of contractual damages in German 
law.2 
The adequate cause theory is based on the premise that liability for contractual 
damages should primarily be limited with reference to causation.3 This chapter 
focusses on German law in particular, because it was German scholars who made the 
most important contribution to the development of this theory.4 Emphasis will be 
placed on the content of the theory and its refinement in the Schutzzwecklehre. The 
details of its historical development and application by German courts fall outside of 
the scope of this chapter, except where they contribute to an understanding of the 
adequate cause theory. 
As seen previously,5 the South African approach to limiting contractual damages is 
based upon the principle of foreseeability. The contemplation principle aims to 
determine which harm a defendant foresaw, or could reasonably be expected to have 
foreseen. 
It has been argued by some authors that German law also incorporates a 
foreseeability principle in its rules of remoteness through § 254 BGB. This provision of 
the German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch governs cases where the 
presence of fault or negligence on the part of the injured party results in a decrease in 
the amount of damages that he can claim. It provides that a plaintiff’s claim would be 
																																																						
1 GF Lubbe & CM Murray Farlam & Hathaway: Contract – Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed 
(1988) 624. 
2 R Young English, French and German Comparative Law (1998) 302. 
3 GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract – A Comparative Account (1988) 162. 
4 HLA Hart & T Honoré Causation in the Law 2 ed (1985) 431. 
5 Ch 2.  
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reduced in instances where he omitted to inform the defendant of the possibility of 
unusually extensive damage – damage of which the defendant was neither aware nor 
“should have known” about.6 The effect of this provision will often be similar to that of 
the foreseeability theory.7  
However, despite the provision in § 254 BGB, German law rejects foreseeability as 
the primary basis for the limitation of liability for contractual damages.8 It is safe to say 
that German law, unlike South African law, principally relies on adequate causation 
and not foreseeability when approaching the issue of remoteness in contract.9 For 
purposes of this chapter, therefore, the possibility of a foreseeability principle 
incorporated into § 254 BGB will not be discussed further. The links that do exist 
between the foreseeability theory in general and the adequate cause theory will be 
explored later in this chapter.10 
This chapter commences with a brief overview of the development and current 
operation of the adequate cause theory as well as its refinement in the 
Schutzzwecklehre.	This will be followed by a comparison between the adequate cause 
approach and the foreseeability approach that is applied in South Africa. Finally, the 




6 IS Forrester, SL Goren & H Ilgen The German Civil Code (1975) 42. 
7 J Gordley “Responsibility in Crime, Tort and Contract for the Unforeseeable Consequences of an 
Intentional Wrong: A Once and Future Rule?” in P Cane & J Stapleton (eds) The Law of Obligations - 
Essays in Honour of John Fleming (1998) 175 203. 
8 GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 162, citing L Enneccerus & H Lehmann Recht der 
Schuldverhältnisse 15 ed (1958) 73 and K Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts I 14 ed (1987) 493; A 
Komarov “The Limitation of Contract Damages in Domestic Legal Systems and International 
Instruments” in D Saidov & R Cunnington (eds) Contract Damages – Domestic and International 
Perspectives (2008) 245 253; O Kahn-Freund “Remoteness of Damage in German law” (1934) 50 LQR 
512 518; Young English, French and German Comparative Law 442.    
9 BS Markesinis A Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Tort 3 ed (1994) 99; GH Treitel 
“Substitutionary Relief in Money” in AT von Mehren (ed) International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law VII part 2 (1986) 66. 
10 See 4 below.  
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4 2 The adequate cause theory  
In very broad terms it can be said that the adequate cause theory uses community 
standards of fairness and justice to determine whether or not a sufficiently strong 
causal nexus exists between a breach of contract and the harm suffered as a 
consequence of that breach.11 If the causal nexus is found to be sufficiently strong, or 
adequate, liability for damages will be imposed. The existence of a causal nexus is 
determined by establishing whether or not the breach of contract would have the 
general tendency, based on human experience and knowledge, to increase the 
objective probability that the harm in question would occur.12 These general elements 
of the adequate cause theory are expressed in a variety of different formulations.  
Hart and Honoré argue that the continental approach to causation is more technical 
than conceptual in nature.13 Causal principles were initially formulated in a manner 
that focussed on scientific and philosophically technical principles of probability rather 
than on common-sense notions about the proximity between two actions in a legal 
sense. German jurists have applied complex philosophical doctrines such as the 
works of Kant and Mills to the issue of remoteness – something that has not been 
seen in common-law works on the issue.14 This continental emphasis on scientific and 
technical explanations for causal relationships can also be discerned in the 
development of the adequate cause theory. It was initially formulated more as a 
description of causal relationships than a justification for the limitation of liability.15 This 
has been contrasted to the common-law approach where we find a stronger emphasis 
on fairness and common-sense considerations.16 As we will see later,17 the common-
law approach to legal causation always focussed primarily on underlying policy 
reasons for limiting liability. By contrast, early formulations of the adequate cause 
																																																						
11 AT von Mehren & JR Gordley An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law - The Civil Law 
System 2 ed (1977) 1115. 
12 BS Markesinis, A Johnston & H Unberath The German Law of Torts – A Comparative Treatise 2 ed 
(2006) 106-107. 
13 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 432.  
14 432, citing Leonhard Die Kausalität als Erklärung durch Ergänzung (1946) 26, 31. 
15 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 432. 
16 WF Ebke & MW Finkin Introduction to German Law (1996) 206. 
17 Ch 5. 
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theory were preoccupied with explaining factual patterns. It was only later that policy 
considerations came to be incorporated into the theory.  
Below, a brief historical overview of these technical origins of the adequate cause 
theory will be provided. This will be followed by a discussion of the theory's 
development into a more normative and policy-driven approach. The adequate cause 
theory was developed as a refinement of the equivalence theory. Fundamental to the 
equivalence theory, and therefore also to our understanding of the adequate cause 
theory, is the distinction between conditions and causes. This will be explained in a 
discussion of the equivalence theory in section 2 1 1. This is followed by a description 
of the subsequent development of the adequate cause theory. Finally, an overview of 
the operation of the adequate cause theory as applied today will be provided in section 
2 1 3.  
The purpose this historical overview is to indicate that there has been a substantial 
shift in the German approach to the adequate cause test. It is now regarded not as a 
test for scientific or empirical causation but rather as a framework within which to make 
a normative judgment about the limits of liability.18 In keeping with this more normative, 
policy-centred approach to the limitation of contractual damages, and in an attempt to 
overcome earlier problems with the adequate cause test, German law has developed 
the Schutzzwecklehre or “protective purpose theory”. The theory will be discussed in 
section 3. 
4 2 1 Historical overview 
4 2 1 1 The theory of equivalent causation and the notion of conditions 
The German theory of conditions has its origin in the doctrine of versari in re illicita:19 
a person who acts illegally will be responsible for all the consequences of his actions 
that would not have occurred if it were not for his action.20 This idea was used to 
formulate the theory of conditions as set out by Glaser: 
																																																						
18 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 474-476, citing G Berbert “Die Leerformel der Adäquanz“ (1969) 
AcP 169 421.  
19 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 442.  
20 JM Burchell & J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed (2005) 544.  
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“[i]f one attempts wholly to eliminate in thought the alleged author [of the act] from the sum 
of the events in question and it then appears that nevertheless the sequence of 
intermediate causes remains the same, it is clear that the act and its consequence cannot 
be referred to him… [B]ut if it appears that, once the person in question is eliminated in 
thought from the scene, the consequences cannot come about, or that they can come about 
only in a completely different way, then one is fully justified in attributing the consequence 
to him and explaining it as the effect of his activity.”21   
Every event that is a sine qua non for a consequence is therefore described as its 
cause. This seems to resemble the basic test for factual causation that is also familiar 
in the South African law of contract.22  
This understanding of the concept of sine qua non led to the formulation of the notion 
of “conditions” amongst German writers. Something would be considered a “condition” 
of a consequence if it was necessary to bring that consequence about. In other words, 
conduct is considered to be a condition of a particular consequence if, “once it has 
been eliminated in thought, the consequence at once falls away”.23 
It is clear that, for any given consequence, the conditions will be endless – at least 
where the absence of something is also counted as a condition. For a fire to be started, 
one condition is the act of lighting that fire. Another condition would be the oxygen in 
the air. Even further, all negative conditions, whose non-existence make the fire 
possible, would also be a condition – such as the lack of water where the fire is made.24 
The equivalence theory held that all conditions of a consequence are equivalent. In 
other words, all conditions would be equally causally related to a certain consequence 
– regardless of the relative probabilities with which each condition made the 
consequence more likely.25 This idea was concisely formulated by Tarnowski:26  
																																																						
21 J Glaser Abhandlungen aus dem Österreichischen Strafrecht (1858) 298 as translated in Hart & 
Honoré Causation in the Law 443. 
22 SWJ van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract – General Principles 
4 ed (2012) 360. 
23 RGSt (1932) 181, 184 as translated in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 446.  
24 PK Ryu “Causation in Criminal Law” (1958) 106 University of Pennsylvania L.R. 773 782.  
25 T Wagner “Limitations of Damages for Breach of Contract in German and Scots Law” (2014) 10 
Hanse LR 73 83. 
26 H Tarnowski Die Systematische Bedeutung der Adäquaten Kausalitätstheorie für den Aufbau des 
Verbrechensbegriffs (1927) 257 as translated in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 444.  
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“The theory of conditions takes as its starting-point the proposition that all conditions of a 
consequence, which cannot be eliminated in thought without eliminating the consequence 
also, are equivalent and therefore each single one of these necessary conditions can be 
regarded as the cause of this consequence.”27 
He argued that everything without which a particular consequence could not have 
occurred is to be regarded as a cause of that consequence. This argument therefore 
held that the relative contribution that different causes made towards a consequence 
was irrelevant, as were the relative probabilities with which they increased the 
likelihood of the consequence occurring. To use the example mentioned above, the 
lack of water where the fire was made and the act of lighting the fire are equivalent 
causes of the fire. 
The theory of equivalent conditions is still widely applied in German criminal law today, 
but it has been rejected in civil law where the adequate cause theory is accepted.28  
The adequate cause theory still recognises the notion of conditions, however. 
Everything that is a sine qua non for a particular consequence is accepted as a 
condition. However, the adequate cause theory holds that not all conditions can be 
regarded as causes – as will be seen below.  
4 2 1 2 Development of the adequate cause theory 
Von Bar was one of the first scholars to criticise the idea that all conditions can be 
regarded as equivalent causes of a specific consequence.29 He argued that, while 
there are many different conditions that contribute to a particular consequence, not all 
will be legally relevant. Rather, he said, many conditions are regarded as being 
regularly present in the normal course of events. Such conditions cannot be causes.30 
He argued that these conditions are presupposed in a causal statement. In other 
words: if we say that someone lighted a fire, we are assuming that there was no water 
where the fire was started. The lack of water may be a condition for the fire, but it 
should not be considered a cause. He therefore concluded that: 
																																																						
27 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 257. 
28 445. 
29 JC de Wet “Opmerkings oor die Vraagstuk van Veroorsaking” (1941) 5 THRHR 126 128. 
30 L von Bar Die Lehre vom Kausalzusammenhange im Recht, besonders im Strafrecht (1871) as 
discussed in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 466. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 75	
“A man is in the legal sense the cause of an occurrence to the extent that he may be 
regarded as the condition by virtue of which what would otherwise be regarded as the 
regular course of events in human experience was altered.”31 
Von Bar therefore argued that there is a normal course of events in general human 
experience. Although there is an endless amount of conditions that are necessary for 
a particular consequence to set in, the law is only concerned with those conditions that 
alter the normal course of events in human experience. These will be considered 
causes in the legal sense. For a particular event to come about there are therefore 
endless conditions, but only some of these will be considered causes. 
This notion of “normal course of events in human experience” was expanded upon by 
Von Kries, who formulated the notion of adequate cause. Based on Von Bar’s 
argument, he argued that “the normal course of events” can be objectively 
ascertained.32 He therefore held that a given occurrence will be the adequate cause 
of a given harm if, (1) it was a sine qua non – or a condition – of the harm and (2) it 
had significantly increased the objective probability of the harm occurring.33  
The idea of a certain action increasing an objective probability of a consequence is 
illustrated by Hart and Honoré with reference to a particular example. If we know what 
proportion of human beings suffer from tuberculosis, and we know that a higher 
proportion of miners suffer from tuberculosis, we can infer that the objective probability 
of a miner contracting tuberculosis is higher. Therefore we can say that a man’s act of 
starting to work as a miner increases the objective probability of him contracting 
tuberculosis. If he does suffer from tuberculosis and he would not have contracted the 
disease without working at that mine, we can say that his work there is an adequate 
cause of his disease.34  
																																																						
31 L von Bar Die Lehre vom Kausalzusammenhange im Recht, besonders im Strafrecht (1871) 11 as 
translated in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 466. 
32 Hart and Honoré Causation in the Law 467. 
33 469. 
34 469.  
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The adequate cause theory was accepted by the civil senate of the Reichsgericht in 
189835 and it was subsequently confirmed and adapted by several authors.36 Arguably 
the most influential formulation of the test37 was by Traeger in 1904.38 He held that a 
condition would legally be considered to be the adequate cause of harm if it had 
increased the objective probability of that harm by a considerable extent. According to 
him, whether or not a condition is an adequate cause has to be determined with 
reference to two things. First, one must take account of all the circumstances that an 
optimal (or experienced) observer would have been able to notice at the time that the 
defendant acted. Secondly, one must also take account of all circumstances actually 
known to the defendant.39  
4 2 2 The operation of the adequate cause theory 
In cases of civil liability, German courts apply the adequate causation test as the 
accepted measure of remoteness in contract.40 The initial assumption is that a 
defendant is liable for all the harm that his breach of contract had caused.41 However, 
such liability will only be imposed, if: 
“[his breach] was apt to lead to the [harm] which occurred, taking things as they normally 
happen and ignoring very peculiar and improbable situations which men of the world would 
not take into account.”42 
The fact that the court will decide on the causal proximity between breach and harm 
with reference to some conception of “events as they normally would happen” has 
some similarities with phrases found in the foreseeability approach – such as “the 
normal course of events” or “the ordinary course of things”.43 These possible 
																																																						
35 RGZ 42, 291.  
36 See the discussion in De Wet 1941 THRHR 128-131 and Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 471-
472.  
37 Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 83; Hart and Honoré Causation in the Law 471.  
38 L Traeger Der Kausalbegriff im Straf- und Zivilrecht (1904).  
39 Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law II – The Institutions of Private Law (translated 
from German by T Weir) (1977) 269. 
40 GH Treitel “Substitutionary Relief in Money” in A Von Mehren (ed) International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law VII part 2 (1986) 54 66. 
41 66. 
42 RGZ 158, 38 as quoted in Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law II 269. 
43 GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 164. 
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similarities will be further explored in section 4. For purposes of this section a few 
general comments about the operation and subsequent development of the adequate 
cause theory will be made without reference to its possible correlation with the 
foreseeability theory.  
In deciding whether or not a breach of contract is an adequate cause of harm suffered 
by the plaintiff, the court does not, as a point of departure, take the subjective state of 
mind of the defendant into account.44 What the defendant actually knew will only be 
relevant in cases where such knowledge implies increased liability. Rather, the court 
seeks to ascertain whether or not an experienced observer would have considered 
the breach to be an adequate cause of the harm suffered.45 To determine this, the 
experienced observer is deemed to have knowledge of all the circumstances of which 
a person in the position of the defendant could be expected to have known, as well as 
all the additional circumstances of which the wrongdoer himself actually knew.46 This 
application of the test follows the formulation set out by Traeger.47 If the defendant 
knew more than what an optimal observer ought to have known, such knowledge will 
be taken into account. His subjective lack of knowledge does not limit his liability, 
however, because the test is primarily objective in nature. 
Another noteworthy element of the test in its early formulations is that it is stated in the 
negative. A defendant is liable for all the consequences of his breach, unless the 
damage did not occur in the normal course of events according to objective human 
knowledge and experience.48 It is therefore of no consequence whether or not the 
damage could be expected by the defendant to have occurred in the normal course of 
events. Rather, it is only required that the objective probability of damage of that kind 
was generally increased by the breach. The impact of the negative formulation of the 
test is best illustrated with reference to a famous case on the issue.49 
																																																						
44 Kahn-Freund 1934 LQR 516.  
45 K Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts I (1957) 439 as translated in Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 84.  
46 BGH 23 Oct. 1951; BGHZ 3, 261 166-167 as cited in Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 163.  
47 L Traeger Der Kausalbegriff im Straf- und Zivilrecht (1904) as discussed in Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 
84.  
48 Kahn-Freund 1934 LQR 518. 
49 RGZ 81 (1913), 359 as discussed in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 478-480; Kahn-Freund 
1934 LQR 517-518. 
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In this case there was a contract to tow two lighters (flat-bottomed barges) from 
Cuxhaven to Nordenham on 28 October 1909. On that particular day the weather was 
fine. Despite the owner’s objections, however, the contractor did not tow the lighters 
on that day. Rather, he towed the vessels on 29 October. The weather forecast for 
that day was also favourable, but during the trip a storm broke out and the lighters 
were severely damaged as a result.50 It was held that the delay by the contractor was 
an adequate cause of the damage. This was because the “objective probability of a 
consequence of the sort that occurred was generally increased or favoured by the 
breach”.51 At the end of October, every subsequent day will be less likely to have 
favourable weather. 
Liability for damages would only have been excluded if the damage did not occur in 
the natural course of things because of the influence of an additional event that had 
nothing to do with the breach and that could have caused the damage apart from the 
breach.52 Another ship crashing into the lighters would have been such an example. 
As we can see from this case, the result is that the net cast by the adequate cause 
theory as originally formulated was quite wide. Over time, we see a move away from 
a very rational focus on probabilities, to a more normative application of the test. 
Courts came to consider the policy reasons for imposing or limiting liability rather than 
simply focussing on probabilistic determinations of causation. This was explicitly 
acknowledged by the Bundesgerichtshof in 1951 in the important Edelweiss53 
decision.54  In this decision the court confirmed the adequate cause theory as 
formulated by Traeger, but stated that that it was not a formula that should be rigidly 
applied.55 In the court’s words: 
“only if courts remain conscious of the fact that the question is not really one of causation 
but of fixing the limits within which the author of a condition can fairly be made liable for its 
																																																						
50 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 478.  
51 RGZ 81 (1913), 359 363 as quoted in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 478. 
52 Kahn-Freund 1934 LQR 519.  
53 BGHZ 3 (1951), 261.  
54 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 475.  
55 474.  
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consequences… can they avoid schematising the adequate cause formula and guarantee 
correct results.”56 
Hart and Honoré argue that this decision should be interpreted as an invitation to 
courts to use the adequate cause theory as a guide to the application of common-
sense principles.57 German courts have subsequently confirmed the importance of 
common sense and fairness when determining the limits of liability.58 The issue of 
legal causation is seen as “the discovery of a corrective device which can limit the 
purely logical consequences of causation in the interest of equity”.59 
It can be said, therefore, that the adequate cause theory has developed from a very 
technical and probability-based analysis into more of a framework within which the 
equitable limits of liability should be determined. This shift in the application of the test 
has had the consequence of the test itself becoming more flexible and discretionary – 
and also, arguably, vague.60   
The adequate cause test as understood and developed above cannot be applied 
mechanically and relies to a large extent on the discretion of the judge.61 In the end, 
many applications of the adequate cause test seem more in line with common-sense 
than notions of causation.62 A good example is a case in which a storehouse keeper 
had contracted to store goods and keep them “absolutely dry”.63 He had stored the 
goods on the ground level of a shed. When a nearby dam burst and the shed was 
flooded, the goods were damaged. The court held that the storage of the goods on the 
ground floor did increase the risk of humidity and damage to the goods – and could 
therefore be considered a breach of contract. However, the court found that the 
damage suffered was not caused by the breach, and that the bursting of the dam had 
																																																						
56 BGHZ 3 (1951), 261, 267 as translated in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 475.  
57 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 475.  
58 BGHZ 18, 286 288 as cited in Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law II 269; BGHZ 30, 
154, 157 as cited in Ebke & Finkin Introduction to German Law 206. 
59 BGHZ 30, 154, 157; BGHZ 3, 261, 267 as translated in Markesinis A Comparative Introduction to the 
German Law of Torts 101. 
60 Markesinis A Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Torts 101. 
61 Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 163.  
62 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 491.  
63 RGZ 42, 291 as cited in Kahn-Freund 1934 LQR 518-519. 
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been an independent event. In the court’s words, the damage “did not lie in the 
direction of the obligation”.64 This conclusion does seem logical and in line with a 
common-sense approach to causation, but a strict application of the adequate cause 
theory would not necessarily support the same conclusion. The breach that occurred 
by placing the goods on the ground floor of the shed could arguably be considered to 
be the type of event that would, according to objective standards, increase the risk of 
the type of harm that occurred.  
As Hart and Honoré point out: 
“[I]n this way the courts preserve a certain flexibility of approach and are able to achieve 
results which on the whole are acceptable to common sense by applying at times the notion 
of increased risk, at others that of normality.”65 
Wagner notes that a similar flexibility has been seen in the courts’ definition of the 
adequate cause test in cases of breach of contract.66 He notes that it has been held 
that the damages claimed for must not be “beyond the inner relation with the breach 
of contract”.67 At other times, the possibility of the occurrence of harm because of the 
breach must not be “beyond any experience of life”.68 Similarly, courts have held that 
a breach is the adequate cause of harm if the breach created a risk which is generally 
capable of producing the kind of harm that occurred;69 or if the risk of the occurrence 
of a specific loss was substantially increased.70 In more general formulations the court 
has simply held that the adequate cause test merely aims to exclude liability for harm 
that falls beyond the expected course of things.71 
																																																						
64 RGZ 42, 291 as discussed in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 491. 
65 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 495. 
66 Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 83. 
67 BGH NJW, 1957, 1475 as cited in Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 83.  
68 BGH NJW-RR 2001, 887 888 as cited in Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 83. 
69 BGH NJW 2002, 2232 2233 as cited in Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 83.  
70 BGH NJW 1972, 195 197 as cited in Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 83.  
71 BGH NJW 2001, 514 515 as cited in Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 83. 
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The result is that the potential scope of the adequate cause test is imprecise, and at 
times very wide.72 This has created a necessity for the test to be supplemented and 
refined – as was done with the acceptance of the Schutzzwecklehre.73  
4 3  The Schutzzwecklehre  
The previous section reveals that adequate causation as it had developed might not 
be precise enough to serve as an effective method for limiting liability for damages. 
This criticism was raised by several authors.74  Von Caemmerer and Lange argued 
that the manner in which probabilities are estimated within a strict application of the 
adequate cause test would almost never lead to liability being excluded.75 In addition 
to this, authors have also pointed out that the adequate cause test is especially harsh 
on defendants.76 This is because an optimal observer can arguably be considered to 
have more knowledge than is fair to expect of a defendant.  
In the light of this criticism, support increased for an additional method to limit liability 
for damages – the so-called Schutzzwecklehre or “protective purpose of the norm” 
approach.77 This approach was first suggested by Rabel in 1932.78 He argued that the 
meaning and purpose of the contract should determine the scope of liability of the 
																																																						
72 Wagner 2014 Hanse LR 84.  
73 Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law II 269; Ebke & Finkin Introduction to German 
Law 206 
74 E Rabel Das Recht des Warenkaufs I (1936) 471-511 as cited in Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese 
Kousaliteit 210; E von Caemmerer Das Problem des Kausalzusammenhangs im Privatrecht Inaugural 
Address University of Freiburg (1956) as cited in Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 210; H 
Tarnowski Die systematische Bedeutung der Adäquaten Kausalität für den Aufbau des 
Verbrechensbegriffs 15 as cited in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 472; F Grispigni “Il nesso 
causale nel diritto penale“ (1935) 13 Riv. It. Dir. Pen. 3 18-20 as cited in Hart & Honoré Causation in 
the Law 472.  
75 Von Caemmerer Das Problem des Kausalzusammenhangs as cited in Jansen van Rensburg 
Juridiese Kousaliteit 210; H Lange “Empfiehlt es sich, die Haftung für schuldhaft verursachte Schäden 
zu begrenzen?” Verhandlungen des 43. Deutschen Juristentages I (1960) 12 as cited in Jansen van 
Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 210.  
76 Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 166. 
77 H Beale, A Fauvarque-Cosson, J Rutgers, D Tallon & S Vogenauer Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 1011. 
78 E Rabel “Die Grundzüge des Rechts der unerlaubten Handlungen“ (1932) Deutsche Ref. Int. Kong. 
Rechtsvergl. as cited in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 476. 
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defendant.79 The approach was rephrased by Von Caemmerer in 1956 where he 
stated that 
“…the question of the limits of liability is to be solved by deploying the meaning and range 
of a particular rule [or contractual term], not by applying general causal formulae.”80 
In 1958 this theory was adopted by the Bundesgerichtshof and it has since widely 
been accepted in German contract law.81 When deciding on the limits of liability, courts 
have therefore increasingly relied on the appropriate scope (Schutzbereich) of a 
breached contractual term, determined with reference to the contract’s purpose 
(Normzweck).82  
This theory requires a teleological interpretation of the contractual provision that 
imposes the breached obligation.83 The purpose of the contract is determined with 
reference to its content as well as all the circumstances surrounding its conclusion, in 
particular the intentions of the parties.84  The relevant point in time for determining the 
contract’s purpose is that of contract conclusion, and not the moment of breach, as is 
the case with the adequate cause theory.85 The intentions of the parties can be 
determined either objectively or subjectively. This gives a judge considerable 
discretion in the process of limiting or expanding contractual liability.86   
The value of this test is its flexibility, given the realisation that purely mechanical and 
abstract standards cannot sufficiently solve the essentially normative question of the 
limits of liability.87 The approach allows for the incorporation of fairness considerations 
which would otherwise not be taken into account in the adequate cause inquiry.88 
																																																						
79 Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 211.  
80 BGHZ 27 (1958), 37 as quoted in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 476. 
81 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 476; BGH NJW 1997, 2057 2058; BGH NJW 2002, 2459 2460 
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82 476.  
83 Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law II 269. 
84 Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law 1014. 
85 Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 166. 
86 Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law 1014. 
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Because of this it has been argued that the Schutzzwecklehre allows for more 
satisfactory limits on liability than adequate causation.89  
The value of the Schutzzwecklehre should not be overestimated, however. In cases 
where a contractual provision has a clear and limited purpose, it might be a very 
effective tool for limiting liability.90 Where that is not the case, however, the test would 
seem to rely too much on judicial discretion. As Hart and Honoré ask, 
“[w]hy should the vague generalities of the adequacy theory be replaced by a still more 
incalculable notion, the asylum ignorantiae of judicial discretion?”91 
In cases where a clear purpose and scope cannot be identified, the Schutzzwecklehre 
is indeed of no assistance.92 It has been pointed out that strict adherents of the 
Schutzzwecklehre fall into the same trap that we saw with adequacy theorists. The 
adequacy theorists started using probabilistic terms to formulate a value judgment and 
therefore rendered much of the test an empty shell of its earlier logic. In other words, 
a decision was reached as to what would be a fair and equitable limit for liability, and 
this was then justified in terms of probabilities and in the language of the original 
adequate cause test. The notion of adequate cause was no longer a guideline to 
determine the limits of liability; it was rather used after the fact to explain a decision 
reached on other grounds. 
In the same way, the Schutzzwecklehre approach has masked the normative exercise 
as an exercise in contractual interpretation. Now decisions based on discretionary and 
policy grounds are justified in terms of the court’s interpretation of the purpose of the 
agreement. Arguably much of what is formulated as an interpretation of a provision 




89 Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 166. 
90 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 477. 
91 477-478. 
92 Markesinis Introduction to the German Law of Torts 102.  
93 Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 215. 
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4 4 Adequate cause and foreseeability 
4 4 1  Introduction 
Not many South African writers have discussed the adequate cause theory.94 When 
the theory did draw the attention of writers and courts, it was predominantly in the 
context of criminal law.95 Indeed, most of the debate around the adequate cause test 
in South African law has been in the context of factual causation and the 
appropriateness of the sine qua non test.96 A few writers have discussed the adequate 
cause theory in the context of delict,97 but it does not seem to have been discussed in 
great detail as a method for limiting contractual damages. If we are to use the 
discussion above for a better understanding of the South African approach to 
remoteness in contract, however, the adequate cause theory has to be contextualised 
in the light of our current approach.  
This section will explore the similarities and differences between the adequate cause 
theory and our current foreseeability-based approach. Broadly, there are two areas of 
comparison. First, both approaches refer to the concept of the “normal or usual course 
of events in human experience”. Secondly, the relevant time at which liability is 
determined is the same for both the foreseeability approach and the Schutzzweck 
approach, although the adequate cause test takes the moment of breach of contract, 
and not its conclusion, as the relevant point in time to determine liability.  
4 4 2   The meaning of a “normal course of events” 
Although the German courts have rejected foreseeability as a limit on the recovery of 
contractual damages,98 there is an important similarity between the adequate cause 
																																																						
94 JC De Wet 1941 THRHR 126; JC Van der Walt “Enkele Gedagtes oor Nalatigheid en die Beperking 
van Deliktuele Aanspreeklikheid” (1964) 81 SALJ 504; WA Joubert “Oorsaaklikheid: Feit of Norm?” 
(1965) 6 Codicillus 6; JC Van der Walt “Vonnisbespreking: Van den Bergh Parity Insurance Co. Ltd. 
and Another 1966 (2) SA 621 (W)” (1966) 29 THRHR 244; Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 
190-216.   
95 Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 213-214, 221-223.  
96 Joubert 1965 Codicillus 6.  
97 De Wet 1941 THRHR 126, Van der Walt 1964 SALJ 504, Van der Walt 1966 THRHR 244, Jansen 
van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 190-216.  
98 Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 164. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 85	
approach and that of foreseeability. Both rely on concepts such as “the normal course 
of events” or “natural consequences” and “the common experience of mankind”.99  
In the case of the South African approach, general damage is that which flows 
“naturally and generally from the breach in question”,100 and this is determined with 
reference to what would happen “in the normal course of things”.101 Such harm would 
be deemed to have been contemplated by the parties, and would be recoverable as 
general damages.102 In the case of the adequate cause test, at least in its broader 
formulation, a breach would be the adequate cause of harm if: 
“…it has a tendency, according to human experience and in the ordinary course of events, 
to be followed by a [harm] of that sort.”103 
As has been pointed out by the Bundesgerichtshof, the adequate cause test is 
primarily aimed at excluding the defendant’s liability for all the consequences of a 
breach that are beyond the “expected course of things”.104 In this regard it is clear that 
both approaches will often lead to the same result – this has also been acknowledged 
by German writers.105 According to Lange, the purpose of the adequate cause 
approach is to exclude liability for events that were not foreseeable.106  
The two approaches differ, however, in that the adequate cause test tends to cast the 
net of liability wider than the foreseeability test.107 To illustrate where the two 
approaches will diverge, Hart and Honoré refer to the same example of a miner who 
contracts tuberculosis. As has been explained above,108 becoming a miner can be the 
adequate cause of contracting tuberculosis because it substantially increases the risk 
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of contracting the disease. This can be deduced from the fact that proportionally more 
miners suffer from tuberculosis than human beings in general. In a case where a miner 
contracts tuberculosis because of his work at a mine, his mining activities were the 
adequate cause of the disease and it also occurred in the usual course of events. By 
contrast, if the miner moves to a mining town and marries a woman from whom he 
contracts the disease, his becoming a miner is still the adequate cause of the disease 
because his occupation increases the probability of increasing tuberculosis.  However, 
it did not occur in the normal course of events for the miner due to the fact that it was 
not his occupation that caused the disease but rather his marriage. In terms of  the 
foreseeability test, contracting tuberculosis from his wife will not be reasonably 
foreseeable and therefore it will be considered too remote. 
A real-life example is the case discussed above where there had been a contract to 
tow two lighters and the lighters suffered damage in a storm as a result of the 
contractor’s delay by one day.109 The weather forecast for the day on which he did 
transport the lighters was favourable, and the storm was not foreseeable. His delay 
was the adequate cause of the harm, however. As Treitel points out, the adequate 
cause approach: 
“…makes it possible for a German writer to ask (even if rhetorically) whether a tailor who 
delays in delivering travelling clothes to a customer who in consequence travels on a later 
train which crashes is to become liable to the customer for personal injuries which he 
suffers in the crash.”110 
Another example used is that of a seller of a house who fails to transfer in time, and 
as a result of this the buyer is unable to accept an extraordinarily high offer on the 
house. The loss of profit that the buyer suffered would be of the kind that satisfies the 
adequate cause test and would therefore be recoverable.111 In terms of the 
foreseeability approach, the lost profit would be regarded as unforeseeable and not 
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something that occurs in the normal course of events. The buyer would at most be 
able to recover the loss of profits in respect of an ordinary or foreseeable offer.112  
Where the adequate cause test and the foreseeability approach do not reach the same 
result with regards to whether damage has occurred “in the normal course of events”, 
it seems that the adequate cause test imposes wider liability than the foreseeability 
approach. However, it is important to note that in terms of the foreseeability approach 
in South African law, if damage does not occur in the “normal course of events”, that 
is not the end of the inquiry. One must still consider the contemplation and convention 
of the parties. The essential question is therefore how this next part of the 
foreseeability inquiry compares with the adequate cause approach. This will be 
explored in section 5. First, we turn to the second area of comparison between the two 
approaches: the moment for determining liability. 
4 4 3  The relevant moment for determining liability 
A second marked difference between the two approaches is the point in time with 
reference to which the extent of liability is determined. As we have seen, the 
foreseeability approach operates with reference to the moment that the contract is 
concluded.113 In the case of the adequate cause test, the extent of liability must 
theoretically be determined at the time of action by the defendant, because that is 
when the court wants to determine whether or not the action of the defendant 
increased the probability of the harm occurring.114 This is of course not easily 
determinable in practice, and will many times be taken as the time of breach.115 
Regardless, the time of contract conclusion will not be relevant.  
This is one aspect of the German approach that was fundamentally changed by the 
Schutzzwecklehre.116 As we have seen, the Schutzzwecklehre requires that the 
purpose and scope of the breached contractual provision be determined with 
reference to the time of contract conclusion. The circumstances at the time of breach 
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would not be relevant. Given the fact that this issue is still controversial in our law,117 
it might be useful to consider the reasons for this shift in German law to a focus on the 
time of contracting as opposed to the time of breach.  
Ernst Rabel’s initial argument in support of the Schutzzweck approach was that liability 
for damages has to be rooted in the (presumed or actual) intentions of the parties.118 
This is a fundamental premise that underlies both the foreseeability approach and the 
Schutzzwecklehre, as explained previously.119 Both theories are premised on the idea 
that the limits of liability for contractual damages should be determined with reference 
to what parties could reasonably have taken into consideration when contracting. The 
foreseeability approach determines what parties could have taken into account with 
reference to what they could have foreseen, whilst the Schutzzweck approach 
determines this with reference to the purpose of their agreement.  If the limits of liability 
are determined with reference to what parties could reasonably have taken into 
account at contract conclusion, it does appear that the moment of contract conclusion 
must be the relevant moment for determining such limits. It is upon contract conclusion 
that parties decide on the obligations and risks for liability that they are assuming, and 
it is only at this point where they reasonably are able to bargain for such risks or 
potential liabilities.  
This issue will be discussed in depth in the final chapter of this study when the 
underlying rationale of the remoteness inquiry will be explored. For now it suffices to 
note that the Schutzzwecklehre and the foreseeability approach both focus on the 
moment of contract conclusion, arguably because of their shared underlying emphasis 
on what parties could have taken into consideration when contracting.  
4 5  Evaluation 
The adequate cause approach has been subjected to considerable criticism.120 Much 
of it relates to the seemingly technical nature of the test and its almost scientific focus 
																																																						
117 Ch 2 (2 5 4).  
118 E Rabel Das Recht des Warenkaufs – Eine Rechtsvergleichende Darstellung I 491-497. 
119 Ch 2 (2 3 3 2 2).  
120 A thorough overview is provided in Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 195-201; Hart & 
Honoré Causation in the Law 483-495. For more recent criticism, see B Markesinis A Comparative 
Introduction to the German Law of Torts 101. 
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on probabilities. The most convincing criticism is probably the argument that the entire 
exercise of estimating probabilities can be manipulated with one’s definition of cause 
and consequence. This can be illustrated with an example used by Von Kries.121  
In his example a coachman falls asleep, the coach consequently deviates from its 
course and a passenger is struck by lightning and dies. In this case, whether or not 
his falling asleep is an adequate cause of the death of the passenger depends only 
on whether the consequence is described as “death” or as “death by lightning”. In the 
former case it would be an adequate cause since the probability of death is increased 
significantly when the coachman falls asleep, but in the latter case not. 
Some other points of criticism against the adequate cause theory will sound familiar 
in a South African context – such as the uncertainty about the required degree to which 
a cause would have to increase the probability of a consequence to be considered 
adequate.122 This is also asked in the foreseeability context: with what probability must 
a consequence be foreseeable before liability for that consequence will be 
imposed?123 What may be taken from the overview of the adequate cause approach 
is that the search for a strict definition or range of probabilities within which to limit 
liability is futile. As we have seen in the discussion of the adequate cause theory, any 
answer to this question can be manipulated. Moreover, the emphasis on a specific 
level of probabilities loses sight of the normative nature of the exercise. 
Apart from these two points, a detailed overview of the criticism of the adequate cause 
theory falls beyond the scope of this chapter – especially in the cases where the 
foreseeability and adequate cause approaches will yield similar results. If the notion 
of a “normal course of events” allows both theories to reach similar answers, there is 
no reason to delve further into the technical criticism of the adequate cause theory. In 
these cases, the application of the adequate cause theory will not lead to outcomes 
different to those which result from an application of the foreseeability theory.  
																																																						
121 J Von Kries Über den Begriff der objektiven Möglichkeit und einiger Anwendungen desselben (1888) 
532 as discussed in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 470. 
122 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 485.  
123 Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 580G. 
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What remains to be explored, however, are cases where the two tests would yield 
different results. If, according to the foreseeability approach as followed in South 
Africa, one finds that damage is not the natural result of the breach, one would next 
turn to the contemplation and convention principles.124 Here, the court would seek to 
ascertain whether the special circumstances that resulted in the unusual damage were 
known to the parties. If it can be reasonably presumed that the parties ought to have 
foreseen the damage or actually did foresee the damage based on their knowledge of 
special circumstances, and that they contracted on the basis of such knowledge, the 
special damages would be recoverable. As explained earlier, this approach aims to 
give effect to the parties’ intentions (or to protect reliance on a reasonable assumption 
as to the other party’s intention). In other words, the limits of liability for damages is 
determined with reference to what parties ought to have foreseen, as this is taken to 
be indicative of what they might have intended to have submitted to.125 
The Schutzzwecklehre is based on the same premise. It was implemented to correct 
the overbroad scope of liability that arises from an application of the adequate cause 
test alone.126 This is done by determining to what extent parties might have submitted 
to liability for damages, which is ascertained with reference to the purpose of the 
agreement between the parties.  
It would seem therefore, that even where the adequate cause and foreseeability 
approaches do not yield similar results with regard to what the “normal course of 
events” would be, both resolve the issue of remoteness with reference to what parties 
could reasonably have taken into account when contracting. The foreseeability 
approach has done this by incorporating a contemplation requirement, and the 
adequate cause approach by its refinement in the Schutzzwecklehre. The South 
African approach goes further, however. It also requires convention – that parties 
entered into the contract in view of their contemplation. The appropriateness of this 
will be fully explored in the next chapter with reference to English law, where the 
debate on this has been especially lively in the aftermath of the Achilleas127 decision. 
																																																						
124 Ch 2 (2 5).  
125 Ch 2 (2 3 3 2 2).  
126 Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract 166; Jansen van Rensburg Juridiese Kousaliteit 210.  
127 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc, the Achilleas. [2009] 1 AC 61. 
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For purposes of this chapter it suffices to note that, if we are to accept the 
consideration of what parties could have taken into account when contracting as the 
underlying reason for limiting damages that occur outside of the “normal course of 
events”, foreseeability is only one way to do so. The Schutzzwecklehre offers another 
approach to give effect to the same principle.  
The Schutzzwecklehre also faces serious limitations: most importantly the fact that it 
is not always possible to identify a limited purpose and protective scope for a 
contractual provision.128 In such cases the test would rely too much on judicial 
discretion. It might not be a perfect alternative to our current foreseeability approach, 
but it might serve as a useful supplement to it. This will especially be the case if we 
are to move in the direction of a more flexible and policy-based approach to limiting 
contractual damages as suggested in Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price 
Waterhouse.129 This will be considered in chapter six and seven. The following 




128 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 477.  
129 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 583A-583C. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE FORESEEABILITY THEORY: THE ENGLISH 
APPROACH 
5 1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have explored two alternatives to the foreseeability theory: the 
direct consequences theory and the adequate cause theory. This has produced 
several insights into the strengths and weaknesses of these alternative approaches. 
We now turn to the theory of remoteness applied in South African law: the 
foreseeability theory. 
As we have seen,1 South African courts have relied heavily on English law in their 
formulation of the rules of remoteness in contract law. The classic English decision on 
the issue, Hadley v Baxendale2 (“Hadley”), is still often referred to by our courts3 and 
forms the basis of the South African approach.4 Therefore, this chapter will provide an 
overview of the reasonable contemplation test as set out in the Hadley decision and 
its subsequent development in English law. The ways in which the English approach 
to reasonable contemplation can contribute to the development of the South African 
position on the issue of remoteness will also be explored. 
This chapter will then turn to the recent development in English law towards an 
agreement-centred understanding of remoteness in contract. This understanding is 
reflected in the “assumption of responsibility” test that was formulated in Transfield 
Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc, the Achilleas (“The Achilleas”).5 In this case, the 
House of Lords expressed the opinion that reasonable contemplation is not a limit on 
liability for contractual damages in its own right, but rather that it serves as a useful 
tool for determining what the parties had intended that limit to be. The proper limit on 
																																																						
1 Ch 2 (2 5).  
2 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex. 341.  
3 Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 579D-580A.  
4 JW Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa II (1937) 936. 
5 [2009] 1 A.C. 61.  
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contractual liability, according to this case, must be determined with reference to the 
parties’ intentions and can be deduced from the agreement itself.6 
This development and the subsequent academic debate that has been ignited focus 
on the nature of the rules governing remoteness in the law of contract. The debate 
centres around two different conceptions of the remoteness inquiry. On the one hand, 
some argue that the rules of remoteness determine how the parties had intended to 
allocate risk for losses – therefore, that the rules essentially operate with reference to 
the contractual context and the agreement itself. On the other hand, it is argued that 
the rules of remoteness are gap-filling devices that allocate risk where the parties have 
failed to do so – they are rules that originate outside of the agreement.7 The 
remoteness inquiry in the English law of contract is therefore either approached as a 
rule of thumb for determining what the parties have agreed upon, or as a default rule 
to operate in the absence of an agreement.8 
The aim of this chapter is to gain insight into the contemplation principle as currently 
applied in South Africa by looking at how English law has dealt with its version of this 
test since the Hadley decision. Additionally, the debate around the proper role that 
parties’ intentions should play in the allocation of risk for losses caused by breach will 
be explored. This will be done in the light of the controversy surrounding the 




6 E Peel The Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 1057. There are some authors who have argued that the 
Achilleas decision does not reflect a ratio decidendi supporting the assumption of responsibility test – 
see for example, H McGregor McGregor on Damages 18 ed (2009) 6-173. However, it seems to have 
been confirmed by the courts that the assumption of responsibility test is indeed binding and part of the 
English law of remoteness of damages – most recently in Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP [2015] 
EWCA Civ 1146 para 69. 
7 M Harris “Fairness and Remoteness of Damage in Contract Law: A Lexical Ordering Approach” (2012) 
28 JCL 122 142.  
8 A Kramer “An Agreement-Centred Approach to Remoteness in Contract” in N Cohen & E McKendrick 
(eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 249 250. 
9 Ch 2 (2 5 3).  
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5 2 The reasonable contemplation test 
5 2 1 The Hadley decision  
As indicated in chapter 2, the locus classicus on the matter of remoteness of 
contractual damages in English law is the Hadley case.10 The case dealt with a carrier 
contract in which the plaintiffs gave their broken millshaft to the defendants, who had 
to take it to manufacturers to enable them to make a new millshaft as a replacement 
for the broken one. The defendants were aware of the fact that the item to be 
transported was a millshaft and that the plaintiffs were the owners of a mill. The 
defendants breached the contract by delaying unreasonably in delivering the broken 
millshaft to the manufacturers.  
Until the new millshaft was installed, the plaintiffs’ mill could not operate at all. The 
plaintiffs claimed damages for the loss of profit they suffered during this delay.11 The 
court held that these losses could not be recovered. The reason was that the facts 
which the defendants were taken to know were not sufficient to 
“[show]… that the profits of the mill must be stopped by an unreasonable delay in the 
delivery of the broken shaft by the carriers to a third person.”12 
According to the court, therefore, the fact that the defendants knew that they were 
delivering a millshaft and that the plaintiffs were the owners of a mill did not make it 
reasonable to suppose that the defendants should have known that a delay in 
delivering the millshaft would cause the plaintiffs lost profits. The mill might have had 
another shaft to operate in the interim, or there might have been other defects in the 
machinery that contributed to the standstill of the mill.13  
The rule was set by the court as follows:  
“[W]here two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages 
which the other party ought to receive in respect of such a breach of contract should be 
such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to 
the usual course of things, from such a breach of contract itself, or such as may be 
																																																						
10 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex. 341; McGregor Damages 199. 
11 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex. 341 341. 
12 355. 
13 355. 
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reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time when 
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special 
circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the 
claimants to the defendants and this known to both parties, the damages resulting from 
such a breach of contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount 
of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special 
circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special 
circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, 
would be only supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would 
arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special 
circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been 
known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms 
as to the damages in that case.” 14  
On these facts, the court held that the standstill of the mill was not a natural result of 
the breach.15 It was therefore not reasonable to hold that the defendants should have 
contemplated loss of profit as a result of their delay. The defendants would have been 
liable if they had known that the mill was dependent on the delivery of the new shaft 
to operate. But such knowledge was not proven.16 If they had such knowledge, they 
might have tried to limit their liability when negotiating the contract. And, the court held, 
“of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them”.17 
The rule set out in Hadley may be divided into two limbs: the first dealing with harm or 
loss that arises in the normal course of events, and the second with harm or loss that 
does not.18 In terms of the first limb, a defendant will always be liable for all loss that 
arises in the normal course of events. Such loss is considered to have been 
reasonably foreseeable – and a defendant is deemed by law to have foreseen it, even 
if he subjectively did not.19 This is because it is assumed that the defendant, 
reasonably able to foresee the loss, had the opportunity to limit his liability.20 If he had 
not done so, it is not for the court to impose such a limitation. 
																																																						
14 354-355. 
15 Peel Law of Contract 1049. 
16 S Harder Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations (2010) 37.  
17 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex. 341 355. 
18 McGregor Damages 202.  
19 PS Atiyah An Introduction to the Law of Contract 5 ed (1995) 465. 
20 Peel Law of Contract 1054.  
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Even if all loss that arises in the normal course of events is reasonably foreseeable, 
not all reasonably foreseeable loss occurs in the normal course of events.21 This is 
what the second limb of the Hadley test addresses. If the defendant had sufficient 
notice of facts that made unusual (or special) damage reasonably foreseeable at the 
time of contract conclusion, he will be liable for that loss as well. 
The Hadley decision did not impose liability for special damages and therefore did not 
have to discuss in detail the requirements for such liability. From the decision, it was 
clear that, if the defendants had known about the specific circumstances rendering 
these unusual losses likely, they might have been liable. Mere knowledge of such 
circumstances, however, would not have been sufficient to impose liability.22 Rather, 
a defendant would only have been liable for all losses that ordinarily follow from these 
"known and communicated" special circumstances. The court's reason was that, if 
such losses could have been contemplated, parties could have taken it into account 
when contracting. Accordingly, early cases interpreted Hadley as imposing a 
requirement for a tacit agreement or implied promise to be liable for losses that occur 
outside of the normal course of events.23  
This interpretation was subsequently rejected.24 Rather, it was understood that the 
undertaking to be liable for reasonably foreseeable special damage is implied by law 
(and not in fact). The defendant would be liable for exceptional losses regardless of 
any actual agreement to that effect.25 Therefore, the second limb of the Hadley test 
was firmly established not with reference to the underlying agreement of the parties, 
but rather to function as a “limiting principle of policy”.26 In other words, the limitation 
of contractual damages is determined with reference to considerations external to the 
																																																						
21 Atiyah Introduction to the Law of Contract 465. 
22 Peel Law of Contract 1054, citing Mulvenna v Royal Bank of Scotland [2003] EWCA Civ 1112.  
23 British Columbia and Vancouver’s Island Spar, Lumber and Saw-Mill Co v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 
499; Horne v Midland Railway (1873) LR 7 CP 583. 
24 GKN Centrax Gears v Matbro Ltd [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 555. 
25 Peel Law of Contract 1054. 
26 Satef-Huttenes Albertus SpA v Paloma Tercera Shipping Co SA (The Pegase) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
175 181. 
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agreement itself – it is therefore a default rule of law that operates outside of the 
contract.27 
5 2 2 Further developments in the application of the reasonable contemplation test 
The next important refinement of the reasonable contemplation test as set out in 
Hadley was developed in Victoria Laundry (Winsor Ltd) LD v Newman Industries LD 
(“Victoria Laundry”).28 This decision clarified two important aspects of the test. 
The first aspect was that the reasonable contemplation test as set out in Hadley was 
not really two tests, but rather one test that operated with reference to two different 
types of knowledge. In the words of the court:  
“[T]he aggrieved party is only entitled to recover such part of the loss… as was at the time 
of the contract reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the breach. What is at that 
time reasonably foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by the parties… 
For this purpose, knowledge ‘possessed’ is of two kinds; one imputed, the other actual. 
Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the ‘ordinary course of things’ and 
consequently what loss is liable to result from a breach of contract in that ordinary course. 
This is the subject matter of the ‘first rule’ in Hadley v Baxendale. But to this knowledge, 
which a contract-breaker is assumed to possess whether he actually possesses it or not, 
there may have to be added in a particular case knowledge which he actually possesses, 
of special circumstances outside the ‘ordinary course of things’, of such a kind that a breach 
in those special circumstances would be liable to cause more loss. Such a case attracts 
the operation of the ‘second rule’ so as to make additional loss recoverable.”29 
The court clarified that both rules set out in Hadley rely on the same underlying 
principle: a defendant would be liable for loss that a reasonable person in those 
circumstances, given the defendant’s knowledge, would have foreseen.30 Under the 
first rule in Hadley, a defendant is deemed by law to have knowledge of all loss that 
would occur in the normal course of events. He will therefore be liable for all such loss. 
Under the second rule, the defendant will be liable for all loss that a reasonable person 
in his position, with his actual knowledge, would have foreseen as likely to result from 
																																																						
27 N Andrews, M Clarke, A Tetterborn & G Virgo Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination 
and Remedies (2011) 443. 
28 (1949) 2 KB 528.  
29 539. 
30 D Winterton Money Awards in Contract Law (2015) 231. 
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his breach. The two tests are therefore not analytically distinct – rather, a defendant’s 
liability increases with his knowledge.31  
The second aspect of the reasonable contemplation test that was clarified in Victoria 
Laundry is that the test for remoteness is not concerned with the actual contemplation 
of the parties.32 The court stated: 
“In order to make a contact-breaker liable under either rule it is not necessary that he should 
actually have asked himself what loss is liable to result from a breach. As has often been 
pointed out, parties at the time of contracting contemplate not the breach of the contract, 
but its performance. It suffices that, if he had considered the question, he would as a 
reasonable man have concluded that the loss in question was liable to result.”33 
In the case of special damages, therefore, the only subjective inquiry is the 
determination of what a defendant actually knew. The court then considers whether or 
not the loss suffered was of a kind that a reasonable person with the defendant’s 
knowledge would have foreseen as likely to occur. If that is the case, the defendant 
would be liable for such loss.34 His actual foresight and contemplation is never part of 
the inquiry.  
The final important development of the reasonable contemplation test was articulated 
in the case of Czarnikow v Koufos, The Heron II (“The Heron II”).35 In this case the 
House of Lords addressed the uncertainty surrounding the degree of likelihood with 
which loss must have been foreseeable for liability to be imposed. Lord Reid attacked 
the blanket use of the term “reasonable foreseeability” as unclear and confusing.36 
The decision formulated the required level of probability with which damage must be 
																																																						
31 Peel Law of Contract 1055. 
32 Harder Measuring Damages 39, citing Foaminol Laboratories Ltd v British Artide Plastics Ltd [1941] 
2 All E.R. 393 400.  
33 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) LD v Newman Industries LD [1949] 2 K.B. 528 CA 540. 
34 Peel Law of Contract 1051. 
35 [1969] 1 A.C. 350.  
36 384. 
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foreseeable as “a serious possibility”,37 “a real danger”,38 “very substantial”,39 “not 
unlikely”40 or “easily foreseeable”.41 
Regardless of this attempt at clarification, there is still uncertainty about the degree of 
likelihood with which loss ought to have been foreseeable before it becomes 
recoverable.42 As we have seen previously,43 a specifically defined level of probability 
does not necessarily render the results of the remoteness inquiry more predictable. 
Often, the facts of each case will be interpreted and framed in a particular way to fall 
inside or outside of whatever the probability level has to be. Any attempt at delineating 
a very clear-cut range of probabilities within which harm must be foreseeable will 
arguably be fruitless. In Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse44 
the South African position on the matter was set out as follows: 
“what is required to be reasonably foreseeable is not that the type of event or circumstance 
causing the loss will in all probability occur but minimally that its occurrence is not 
improbable and would tend to follow upon the breach as a matter of course.”45 
This position seems to provide a guideline without attempting to formulate a hard and 
fast rule of probabilities. It seems that English law has, despite the heavy debate on 
the issue, not reached a more satisfactory answer.46 
5 2 3 Criticism of the reasonable contemplation test 
The reasonable contemplation test, despite the courts’ continued adherence to it, has 
not been without criticism.  One of the issues that has been highlighted by academics 
and courts alike is that the test is imprecise. An example of this imprecision is the use 
of the phrase “damage which occurred in the usual course of things”. The test does 
																																																						





42 Harder Measuring Damages 48. 
43 Chapter 4 section 5. 
44 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA). 
45 581H-581I. 
46 For more on the debate in English law, see for example Harder Measuring Damages 48; Parsons 
(Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791 (CA).  
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not indicate to what extent a court may take into account the commercial context within 
which the contract was concluded when determining whether or not a specific course 
of events can be regarded as usual.47 
The second point of criticism raised against the reasonable contemplation test is that 
it is restrictive due to its emphasis on the knowledge of parties and the likelihood of 
harm occurring. The test as it has been formulated and applied cannot take into 
account other, arguably important, factors. For example, the test does not take into 
account the proportionality between harm suffered and the breach committed, the 
nature of the particular contract in question, or public policy considerations.48 This 
criticism of the restricted manner in which the test has developed is concisely 
summarised by Lord Hoffmann: 
“Hadley v Baxendale is a very good example of a tendency which is endemic in a system 
of precedent, namely, for judges to take the ground upon which a particular case was 
decided as the sole criterion upon which different cases should be decided. That leads to 
an impoverishment of reasoning in subsequent authorities.”49 
The final point of criticism raised against the reasonable contemplation test is that its 
theoretical outcomes are not necessarily manifested in court decisions on the issue. 
This is because courts have tried to keep within the terminology of the test, while at 
the same time allowing for just outcomes. Some authors argue that the reasonable 
contemplation test is in fact merely a flexible policy tool, or a set of tests, that can be 
used by judges to secure just outcomes.50 However, such a view of the test does not 
respond to the criticism, because 
“the practice of disguising substantive principles in another form should be avoided where 
possible. This kind of camouflage is a shortcoming, not a strength, of the rule as stated in 
Hadley and related cases. It militates against transparency in decision-making, and 
undermines certainty by not exposing the real reasons underpinning conclusions in the 
case law.”51 
																																																						
47 Harris 2012 JCL 125. 
48 127. 
49 L Hoffmann “The Achilleas: Custom and Practice or Foreseeability?” (2010) 14 Edin. L.R. 47 53. 
50 Harris 2012 JCL 130. 
51 130. 
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Arguably, these points of criticism can also be raised against the South African 
approach to remoteness. It may be in recognition of difficulties such as those 
highlighted above that our Supreme Court of Appeal has suggested that the exclusive 
criteria currently used to determine remoteness might become only one of several 
tests in the future.52 The future development of the South African approach to 
remoteness will depend on how our courts view and deal with the convention 
requirement, however. This is an issue that can be better evaluated against the 
background of the adoption of the so-called assumption of responsibility test in English 
law.  
5 3 The assumption of responsibility test 
5 3 1 The Achilleas decision 
The Achilleas decision is widely regarded as a watershed in the development of the 
modern English law on contractual damages. In Achilleas the judges took it upon 
themselves, in the words of Lord Walker, “to revisit some important general issues 
[which are] all aspects of how the rule in Hadley v Baxendale has been developed”.53  
The case concerned a charter contract in terms of which the chartered ship was due 
to be returned to its owners (the plaintiffs) on 2 May 2004. With this expected day of 
return in mind, the plaintiffs signed a second charter contract with a different company 
at an increased daily rate. In terms of this second agreement the company would have 
a right to cancel the contract if the ship did not become available by 8 May. The 
defendants were delayed and it became apparent that they would not return the ship 
by 8 May. In order to avoid the cancellation of the second charter agreement, the 
plaintiffs had to renegotiate its terms. To extend the date from when cancellation could 
be elected to 11 May, they had to agree to reducing the daily rate by $8 000 from $39 
500 to $31 500.  
The plaintiffs claimed damages for breach of contract in the amount of the difference 
between the rate that they would have received in terms of the second agreement and 
the renegotiated rate, for the entire duration of the agreement – a princely amount of 
																																																						
52 Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 583G-583H. 
53 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc, the Achilleas [2009] 1 A.C. 61 66. 
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$1 364 584.54  The defendants in turn were only willing to pay the difference between 
the market rate and the charter rate for the 9 day “overrun” period between the date it 
was supposed to deliver the carrier (2 May), and the actual date of delivery (9 May).  
In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it was clear from the judges’ decision that the 
case dealt with the first limb of the Hadley test.55 Rix LJ stated that the refixing of the 
rate was “not unlikely” and “highly probable” to occur in the normal course of events.56 
Damages that occur in the normal course of events are, in terms of the reasonable 
contemplation test, recoverable. According to the Court of Appeal, any reasonable 
person in the charterer’s position would have contemplated the loss suffered as arising 
naturally and according to the usual course of things from a failure to deliver a ship at 
the agreed upon time.57 Therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim the difference 
between the first and the second (renegotiated) rate for the entire duration of the 
charter agreement.  
The charterers appealed to the House of Lords. They argued that there was a common 
understanding in the shipping industry that damages in such cases would consist only 
of the difference between the market and the agreed charter rates for the overrun 
period.58  The appeal was unanimously allowed by the House of Lords, but for different 
reasons.59 
5 3 1 1 The judgments of Lords Hoffmann and Hope 
Lords Hoffmann and Hope focussed their decisions on what they considered to be the 
underlying basis of the remoteness inquiry – the intentions of the parties at contract 
conclusion.60 Lord Hoffmann explained his reasoning as follows:  
“It seems to me logical to found liability for damages upon the intention of the parties 
(objectively ascertained) because all contractual liability is voluntarily undertaken. It must 
be in principle wrong to hold someone liable for risks for which the people entering into 
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55 D Winterton Money Awards in Contract Law 231. 
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such a contract in their particular market, would not reasonably be considered to have 
undertaken.”61 
Accordingly, both judges argued that the (presumed or actual) intentions of the parties 
form the fundamental premise upon which the limits of liability for damages are based. 
They held that this is also the justification for the reasonable contemplation test. In 
other words, the rule that loss must have been reasonably foreseeable 
“is a prima facie assumption about what the parties may have taken to have intended, no 
doubt applicable in a great majority of cases but capable of rebuttal.”62 
As a result, the judges found that the fact that loss was foreseeable was not decisive 
to determine liability. The real test, of which foreseeability would often be a prima facie 
indication, is whether or not a defendant can reasonably be taken to have assumed 
responsibility for the loss in question. 
Accordingly, they found that even if the charterer could have foreseen the damage in 
question, he was still not liable because he had not accepted responsibility for those 
damages. They based this conclusion on the commercial context within which the 
contract was concluded. In particular, they referred to the fact that the defendants had 
no control over the duration of the second charter agreement, and that the market 
understanding was that liability of the charterer was limited to the overrun period.63  
5 3 1 2 The judgments of Lady Hale and Lord Roger 
Lady Hale and Lord Roger reached the same conclusion, albeit by means of 
application of the traditional reasonable contemplation test. They held that the 
defendant was not liable because the loss in question was not reasonably foreseeable 
and therefore too remote.64 This conclusion was reached particularly with reference to 
the fact that the market had been very volatile,65 which exacerbated the loss suffered 
by the plaintiffs. According to them such volatility rendered the extent of the damage 
suffered unforeseeable. 
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The application of the reasonable foreseeability test by these two judges is 
problematic, however. The Court of Appeal had applied the exact same test with the 
opposite result. The decision by Lady Hale and Lord Roger did not focus on whether 
the loss itself was foreseeable, but only on whether its extent was foreseeable.66 This 
is clearly not in accordance with the reasonable contemplation test, as it only requires 
foreseeability of a type or kind of loss and not its extent. Indeed, Peel points out that 
market fluctuations have been held as an example of something that ought to be 
considered foreseeable at contract conclusion.67 As far as the application of the 
reasonable contemplation test goes, therefore, the conclusion of the Court of Appeal 
is generally preferred to that of Lady Hale and Lord Roger.68  
5 3 1 3 The judgment of Lord Walker 
The fifth decision by Lord Walker is not easy to classify as following either one of the 
two approaches outlined above.69 He supported aspects of both approaches, 
rendering the reasons for his conclusion unclear.70 Initially, this led to some debate as 
to whether the assumption of responsibility test, as set out by Lords Hoffmann and 
Hope, was indeed binding law. McGregor was especially sceptical about the value of 
the judgment and even found that it did not yield a ratio decidendi, which implied that 
the established position prevailed.71 It is not a debate that needs to be explored, as 
subsequent cases have accepted and applied the test,72 and even McGregor 
conceded that the Achilleas “appears to be here to stay with us, at least for the time 
being”.73 The assumption of responsibility test has also been accepted by academics 
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67 1056. 
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either as a new development or at least a reformulation of the reasonable 
contemplation test.74 It therefore forms part of English contract law. 
5 3 2 The operation of the assumption of responsibility test 
The test as set out and applied in the Achilleas decision founds liability for damages 
on the presumed intentions of the parties.75 Where such intentions cannot be deduced 
from the express terms of the contract, the court must take into account the larger 
business context in which the contracting took place.76 The approach is formulated by 
Professor Green in the following excerpt that has been quoted in support of the 
assumption of responsibility test:77 
“Parties, in making contracts, rarely contemplate the losses which would result from its 
breach. But they do count the advantages they will gain from its performance. What 
interests does the contract promote or serve? These are actually considered in the most 
part, and those which are shown to have been considered or reasonably falling within the 
terms [of the contract] in view of the language used and the background of the transaction; 
mark its boundaries – the limits of protection under it. Did the parties intend (using intention 
in the sense indicated above) that the injured interest was to be protected? Did this 
agreement fairly comprehend the advantage now claimed to have been lost? If such was 
not so intended or comprehended necessarily there can be no recovery for damages 
resulting from the injury or loss.”78 
The test therefore requires the interpretation of the contract against its commercial 
background, taking into account the words used, the contractual context, the factual 
matrix and the purpose of the contract.79 The test’s focus on the purpose of the 
contract might suggest similarities to the Schutzzwecklehre as seen in German law,80 
but it is clear that the assumption of responsibility test is broader in its focus. This is 
because the assumption of responsibility test takes into account not only the purpose 
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of a breached provision, but also the commercial context in which it was concluded as 
well as the broader factual matrix. 
5 3 3 Impact on the reasonable contemplation test 
The Achilleas decision represents a departure from the reasonable contemplation 
test.81 It seeks to determine remoteness of damages with reference to the implicit risk 
allocation underlying the parties’ agreement.82 This amounts to a rejection of the 
original conception of the reasonable contemplation test in Hadley as a default rule 
that operates outside of the parties’ agreement. However, the practical impact of this 
departure is not necessarily far-reaching. Even in terms of the assumption of 
responsibility test, foreseeability remains at the heart of the inquiry. Foreseeability is 
now treated as a rule of thumb or prima facie indication of parties’ intentions.83  
The liability that would have been imposed by the reasonable contemplation test can 
therefore be restricted or expanded with reference to the assumption of responsibility 
by the defendant.84 This view of the assumption of responsibility test has been 
confirmed by the Queen’s Bench.85 Essentially therefore, courts have understood the 
Achilleas decision to subject the reasonable contemplation test to an overriding 
“assumption of responsibility” inquiry. Reasonable foreseeability will still be indicative 
of the proper limits of liability for damages, except where a contract’s nature or 
commercial context, or indeed any “other relevant special circumstances”86 indicate 
that the outcome of the reasonable foreseeability test does not accurately reflect the 
parties’ intentions.87 
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Lord Hoffmann also conceded that cases where the assumption of responsibility test 
will change the outcome of the traditional contemplation inquiry would be “highly 
unusual”.88  
The immediate impact of the new test does not seem to entail a large shift in how risk 
for losses caused by breach will be allocated, therefore. It is also not controversial 
that, where parties agree to do so, the effects of default rules of law (such as the 
reasonable contemplation test) may be altered.89  
What is controversial, however, is the extent to which it is possible to identify an implicit 
allocation of risk by parties in the cases where the express terms of the contract make 
no such allocation. The agreement-centred approach to remoteness put forward in 
Achilleas assumes that it is always possible to identify an implicit allocation of risk. 
This is contentious. 
The debate around the accuracy of this conceptualisation seems especially important 
in a South African context where liability for special damages is currently based on 
agreement in the form of the convention requirement.90 A brief overview of the debate 
will be provided in the next section. 
5 4 The debate about an agreement-centred approach to remoteness of 
contractual damages 
5 4 1 The intention of the parties as the basis of remoteness 
The strongest and most prominent argument put forward in support of an agreement-
centred approach to remoteness is that parties do contemplate breach and the 
consequences of breach at contract conclusion. Consequently, the argument goes, it 
will be unfair to disregard parties’ intentions. If remoteness is approached as a default 
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rule of law that operates outside of the parties’ intentions, it will not be sufficiently 
sensitive to parties’ reasonable expectations.91  
There are academics who argue that it is simply not true that parties only contemplate 
the performance and not the breach of a contract at its conclusion.92 Even if breach of 
contract is the exception and not the rule, it is a very expensive exception and one that 
is clearly contemplated by parties as can be seen in limitation and exclusion clauses.93 
Therefore, 
“it is just not credible to assume that commercial parties draft toward performance but 
ignore breach in ways that justify more vigorous judicial intervention on remedial 
questions.”94 
When a defendant enters into a contract, he agrees to be bound to a contract which 
reflects a balance of risks and rewards. The limits of his responsibility should therefore 
be set with reference to what he can be taken to have accepted.95 
Some proponents of the agreement-centred approach even argue that it is not 
necessary for parties to have intended to assume an obligation to pay damages. 
Rather, they argue that every obligation has a certain orientation toward specific 
consequences and that the risks for such consequences are allocated within the 
contract.96 
The argument is therefore that every agreement reflects interests that it aims to protect 
and further. Losses that relate to these interests are considered to be recoverable.97  
This view was also supported by Professor Dawson: 
“just as a promisor’s primary obligation is best explained as flowing from the promisor’s 
assent to be bound, so the promisee’s right to recover damages for breach of contract… is 
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best viewed as the enforcement of a consensual obligation… assented to by the defaulting 
promisor at the time of entering into the agreement.”98 
Critics of this argument hold that parties contemplate performance and not breach at 
contract conclusion.99 Although it would be possible for parties to contemplate breach 
when they conclude their contract, opponents of the agreement-centred approach 
simply argue that this will not always be the case.100 Specifically, because remoteness 
questions usually concern consequences that are not fundamental or obvious at 
contract conclusion, it is argued that parties do not always intend a reciprocal 
allocation of risk. Consequently, courts cannot determine liability for damages solely 
with reference to the contract itself.  
This conclusion is further supported with reference to the uncertainty that exists about 
the level of foreseeability of harm that would render damages recoverable. If 
apparently reasonable persons cannot agree on the degree of foreseeability needed 
for liability to be imposed, it seems farfetched to argue that foresight of breach should 
have resulted in an implied term (a tacit term in the South African sense) governing 
liability for damages in the contract.101 If parties were very unlikely to have the same 
idea about the level of foreseeability at which losses become recoverable, how could 
they be in tacit agreement on the issue?  
Although it seems alluring to explain the question of remoteness of damages with 
reference to parties’ intentions, there is a point where they in fact did not agree 
anything and it is left to default rules of law to allocate risk for consequences of 
breach.102 
5 4 2 The determination of the intentions of parties 
The second argument raised against an agreement-centred approach to remoteness 
in contract is that, even if it can be accepted that parties always intend some sort of 
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reciprocal risk allocation for all losses that might occur, these intentions are not easily 
discovered. In essence, the argument holds that there is no reliable proxy for tacit 
intentions relating to remoteness of damages.103 This is because, in questions of 
remoteness,  
“we are not concerned with the interpretation of language and behaviour, but with an 
attempt to discern an allocation of risk from the nature of the contract and the factual matrix 
in circumstances where the parties have remained entirely silent on the allocation of risk.”104 
In short, determining the consequences of a contract with reference to its construction 
has limits. Peel points out that these limits have led to the rejection of the implied term 
theory in explaining when a contract is void for mistake or discharged for frustration, 
for example.105 Although it seems acceptable that a focus on the intentions of parties 
might have value in certain cases, it cannot be seen as the exclusive basis of 
remoteness.  
Authors have also criticised the idea that the reasonable contemplation test serves as 
a rule of thumb for parties’ intentions.106 Rather, the reasonable contemplation test is 
very pertinently not concerned with the parties’ intentions. It asks what a party could 
have foreseen given his knowledge at the time of contracting, and then assumes a 
process of contemplation that is very unlikely to have actually occurred.107 The 
reasonable contemplation test therefore provides a mechanism for distributing 
unallocated risks.108  
5 4 3  Fairness 
Proponents of the agreement-centred approach have argued that it is more fair 
towards a defendant to limit his liability with reference to the risk allocation that was 
presumably agreed to by the parties. They argue that the reasonable contemplation 
test will often be too harsh on a defendant.109  
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The rebuttal raised against this is that, because the reasonable contemplation test is 
a default rule, parties can exclude it if they want to.110 The reasonable contemplation 
test is arguably therefore not unfair – rather, its predictability and the possibility of 
excluding it make it fair. 
There have also been arguments put forward that the assumption of responsibility test 
is unfair and harsh. This is because the test relies on implausible assumptions about 
what parties consider when they negotiate contracts. It is unlikely that parties negotiate 
while considering every possible consequence of breach in a way that would allow an 
impartial observer to objectively ascertain what extent of responsibility had been 
assumed.111  
Indeed, it is argued that fairness would require a balancing of all the interests that are 
at stake, and that this cannot be done if a court ultimately only seeks to ascertain and 
yield to the parties’ intentions.112 In other words,  
“the justice of the remoteness rule is not based on the notion that a defendant undertook 
responsibility for the risk in question, but on a concern that the defendant should have a 
reasonable opportunity to consider the risks that might arise from a breach and take action 
to avoid them.”113 
It would seem therefore that the assumption of responsibility test has fallen into some 
of the same traps that have led to criticism of the reasonable contemplation test. It 
might be too restrictive in focus to always lead to fair results. Regardless of its 
strengths and weaknesses, the debate it has ignited about the role of the intentions of 
parties in determining the limits of liability for damages is an important one – also in 
South Africa. 
5 5  Conclusion 
As we have seen earlier in the overview of the South African position on remoteness 
in contract, there are two main issues at the heart of the dissatisfaction with the current 
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approach.114 The first is the strict distinction between general and special damages, 
and the second is the controversy surrounding the convention principle. With both 
these issues, there is much to gain from an overview of English law. 
The first conclusion that can be drawn is that there might be value in abandoning the 
distinction between general and special damages. English courts do not approach the 
determination of these two types of damages as involving two mutually exclusive tests. 
By contrast, South African law first determines whether losses suffered can be 
considered to be "general" or "special" before turning to the test for remoteness. This 
is problematic because 
“[it] requires one to embark on an unnecessary, unhelpful and largely circular categorisation 
of loss as being either general or special. In truth, one shades into the other.”115 
What we can see from the discussion in this chapter, specifically from the Victoria 
Laundry decision, is that it might be preferable not to fixate on the distinction between 
general and special damages. All losses that occur naturally will be deemed 
foreseeable based on the knowledge that every person is taken to have of the natural 
and normal course of events. As the occurrence of the loss in question becomes less 
“normal”, it will only be considered foreseeable based on a person’s knowledge of 
circumstances that render that loss likely to occur. As a defendant’s knowledge 
increases, so does his liability.  
The test is therefore the same: reasonable foreseeability – based either on deemed 
or actual knowledge. Our emphasis on a strict distinction between the two types of 
losses might have hampered the fair application of the essential test that is relevant in 
both cases – foreseeability.  
The second controversial aspect of the South African approach to remoteness is the 
convention principle. As we have seen previously, the convention principle is generally 
considered to have been established as part of South African law in the decision of 
Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich116 (“Lavery”). In terms of the convention principle, 
special damages – compensation for losses that do not occur in the normal course of 
																																																						
114 Ch 2 (2 5 3). 
115 Burrows Breach of Contract 85. 
116 1931 AD 156. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 114	
events – can only be recovered if it can be proven that the contract in effect contained 
an express or tacit term that the defendant would be liable for such damages.117 In a 
less strict formulation of the convention principle it is only required that parties entered 
into the contract in view of the special circumstances which render the loss in question 
reasonably foreseeable. In terms of both these formulations it is clear, however, that 
the intention of the parties is central to the remoteness inquiry.118 
The Lavery decision was based upon earlier case law on the issue of remoteness of 
special damages119 which formulated a convention requirement with MacKeurtan as 
primary authority.120 When MacKeurtan formulated his opinion that “the origin of 
special damages is conventual”,121 he was relying on English decisions that, soon after 
Hadley, interpreted the reasonable contemplation test to require an agreement 
between parties that the defendant would be liable for special damages.122 
As we have seen, however,123 this idea was soon rejected in England. Rather, it was 
firmly established that the remoteness rules operate outside of the agreement and are 
not dependent on parties’ intentions. English law therefore decisively set out on a track 
where remoteness was not concerned with the intentions of parties while South African 
law made the recovery of special damages dependent upon those intentions.  
It is interesting, therefore, to contrast the criticism that has been raised in South Africa 
against our convention principle (and in favour of moving away from parties’ 
intentions), whilst looking at the English move towards parties’ intentions with the 
assumption of responsibility test.  
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In South Africa, even though our courts have confirmed that the convention principle 
is still part of our law,124 it has been heavily criticised.125 It has also been acknowledged 
that the convention principle is not in accordance with the common law or with the 
authorities on which our test of remoteness was based.126 It has been labelled by some 
academics as artificial, theoretically inaccurate and without practical use.127 
Furthermore, it has been put forward that the obligation to pay damages for breach of 
contract arises out of the act of breach and not the contract itself, rendering the 
agreement of the parties on the issue of remoteness irrelevant.128 It seems therefore 
that the convention principle, and with it the idea that the recoverability of special 
damages is determined with reference to parties’ intentions, has been largely 
discredited and is  likely to be rejected by our courts when the opportunity arises.129  
Against this backdrop, the shift in English law towards an agreement-centred 
approach to remoteness and the debate about the correctness of that change in 
position is noteworthy. In the overview that this chapter has provided, it can be seen 
that the debate around the agreement-centred approach to remoteness in contract 
“seems to be reducible to a disagreement regarding just how far it is possible to push the 
objective theory of contractual interpretation. The disagreement, in other words, concerns 
whether at the time of contract it can be said that a reasonable person in the breaching 
party’s position would have understood the content of his contractual undertaking to be 
either to perform or to compensate the other party for a certain amount of the loss that 
results from not performing.”130 
From the discussion above it is clear that there is no definitive answer to this question 
in English law. It seems unlikely that it can be concluded that the parties will always 
reach an agreement on liability for damages.131 It is even more unlikely from a South 
African perspective, where specific performance is contemplated as the primary 
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remedy for non-performance and not damages. It is arguable therefore that the 
conclusion should be that the intentions of parties do not and ought not to lie at the 
heart of the remoteness inquiry.  
However, even if there is an argument to be made in favour of some recognition for 
the intentions of parties (and more specifically the intention to be liable for damages) 
in the remoteness inquiry, the recent developments in English law serve to illustrate 
that the convention principle as it currently stands in our law is ill-equipped to do this.  
The requirement that intentions with regard to liability for damages must be “virtually 
a term in the contract”132 is insufficiently flexible. This criticism was also raised in 
England: authors argue that the objective theory of interpretation cannot be stretched 
that far.133 Very often there simply will not be a tacit term regarding the allocation of 
risk for damages in the contract.  
However, the debate in England has added some much-needed insight into the 
approach we could follow when determining remoteness in the context of parties’ 
intentions. What we see in the work of Adam Kramer and others is the notion that 
every contractual term has some general orientation, that it seeks to promote certain 
interests, or serve a certain purpose.134 
English courts might have been incorrect in trying to reduce these aspects to tacit 
terms of the contract, but there is value in incorporating them into the remoteness 
inquiry. This is also what we have seen with the Schutzzwecklehre – an emphasis on 
the purpose of a breached provision and the interests that the provision sought to 
protect. Arguably, taking these aspects into account could contribute to a more fair 
and robust approach to remoteness.  
In this chapter we have seen a tug of war between two conceptions of remoteness.  
The debate is framed as a trade-off between remoteness as a tool to discern parties’ 
intentions about the risk allocation for damages, or alternatively as a default rule which 
operates when parties did not agree upon anything. Arguably, the answer to the 
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question of the appropriate test for remoteness does not lie at either extreme but rather 
somewhere in between depending on the context. It is for this reason that a more 
flexible approach to foreseeability might be needed.  
The lesson to be learnt could be that our struggles to find a satisfactory single rule for 
remoteness inquiries have been unsuccessful precisely because there is no one such 
rule. This idea will be further explored in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
Before doing so, the foreseeability test as developed in the model instruments will be 
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CHAPTER 6: THE FORESEEABILTY THEORY: THE MODEL 
INSTRUMENTS 
6 1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters of this study explored three alternative theories of remoteness 
in contract and highlighted the insights to be gained from those approaches. The 
origins, development and application of both the direct consequences and adequate 
cause theories have been discussed – and their strengths and weaknesses were 
identified. Against this background, the previous chapter focussed on the theory 
applied in South African law of contract: the foreseeability theory.  
From the discussion of the application of the foreseeability theory in English law, we 
have gained insights into possible ways in which it could be developed in the South 
African context. However, the previous chapter has also identified weaknesses in the 
English approach to the foreseeability theory, such as the recent adoption of the so-
called “assumption of responsibility” test. In an attempt to avoid some of the negative 
consequences of the traditional foreseeability test, English courts adopted a new test 
that treats foreseeability as a proxy for parties’ intentions. This is problematic, as has 
been discussed.1 In the search for possible future developments of the South African 
approach to foreseeability, it may therefore be helpful to turn to other applications of 
the theory for insights.  
This chapter seeks to investigate another approach to foreseeability – the approach 
adopted in model instruments that aim at regulating international commercial law. This 
may prove to be a worthwhile inquiry, especially because international instruments 
have faced the challenge of formulating an approach to remoteness in contract that 
can be applied across different jurisdictions. The process of drafting the international 
instruments has been concerned with the identification of common principles shared 
between countries with different approaches to remoteness.2  
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The result, as will be seen below, is arguably a renewed focus on the core rationale 
underlying the foreseeability theory. This rationale seems to be simply that parties 
should only be liable for risks that they could reasonably have taken into account when 
entering into a contract. This understanding has led to the development of a more 
flexible approach to foreseeability that could possibly avoid the weaknesses of the 
different individual approaches we have explored thus far. 
The next section provides a brief overview of the model instruments and the 
foreseeability provisions that they have incorporated. This will be followed by a more 
detailed exposition of how the foreseeability test is applied under the model 
instruments. As we shall see, the approach they follow could potentially result in a 
foreseeability test that is better able to deal with the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case. 
6 2  Overview of remoteness in the model instruments 
6 2 1 ULIS, ULFS and the CISG 
6 2 1 1 Historical background 
Amongst the first instruments aimed at harmonising the rules governing international 
contracts (specifically in the context of the sale of goods) were ULIS3 and ULFS.4 
These instruments were the result of more than thirty years’ work and negotiations. In 
1930, UNIDROIT5 founded a drafting committee of scholars with the aim of developing 
a draft uniform law of sales.6 A protracted drafting process resulted in the adoption of 
ULIS and ULFS at the Hague Conference in 1964.7 
One of the prominent influences on the foreseeability provisions that were eventually 
codified in Articles 82 and 86 of ULIS was the work of Ernst Rabel. His comprehensive 
																																																						
3 Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (adopted 1 July 1964, entered into force 18 August 
1972) 834 UNTS 108 (ULIS). 
4 Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (adopted 1 July 1964, 
entered into force 23 August 1972) 834 UNTS 170 (ULFS).  
5 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.  
6 J Honnold “The Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods: The Hague Convention of 1964” 
(1965) 30 Law & Contemp Probs 326 326-327. 
7 326. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 121	
comparative study on sales law, Das Recht des Warenkaufs,8 was instrumental in the 
drafting of an international sales law.9 In his study of remoteness of damages in 
contract, he discussed the foreseeability theory as it had developed in France and 
England,10 and in later works he also considered foreseeability provisions adopted in 
American law, as reflected in the Uniform Sales Act.11 
Rabel argued that remoteness in contract should be determined with reference to the 
(presumed or actual) intentions of the parties to the contract. In this regard he praised 
the American and English adoption of foreseeability as a limit on contractual damages: 
“I think that the English and American Courts remained truer to the ancient approach to 
contract law than continental judges and authors in so far as they never ceased to ask what 
the intention of the party was, and, where no intention could be found, what the parties 
would have intended had they foreseen this contingency.”12 
With this approach as the point of departure, he formulated the principle that later 
formed the basis of the Schutzzwecklehre in Germany:13 
“Ideas expressed by American courts and writers make me feel the best theory to be the 
following one: it depends on the sense and scope of the contract, what interests the creditor 
should have been warranted by the promise, and that these interests and no others, in case 
of breach of contract, ought to be protected by “concrete” (i.e. special) damages.”14 
In this regard he criticised the adequate cause test as being too objective.15 Rabel also 
conceded that tests to determine the parties’ intentions  are “defective and often 
																																																						
8 E Rabel Das Recht des Warenkaufs- Eine Rechtsvergleichende Darstellung I (1936). 
9 P Schlechtriem Uniform Sales Law: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (1986) 16. 
10 Rabel Das Recht des Warenkaufs 491-497. 
11 E Rabel “A Draft of an International Law of Sales” (1938) 5 U Chi L Rev 543 554, with reference to 
the Uniform Sales Act of 1906. 
12 554. 
13 The principle that the limits of damages should be determined with reference to the protective scope 
of the breached provision was set out by Rabel in “Die Grundzüge des Rechts der unerlaubten 
Handlungen” (1932) Deutsche Ref. Int. Kong. Rechtsvergl. as cited in HLA Hart & T Honoré Causation 
in the Law 2 ed (1985) 476. 
14 Rabel 1938 U Chi L Rev 555, (emphasis and parenthesis in original). 
15 555. This criticism was shared by several German scholars, as we have seen previously in Ch 4 (4 
3). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 122	
fictitious”.16 Therefore, he expressed his approval for a foreseeability test that seeks 
to determine what a reasonable person with the knowledge of the parties in question 
would have foreseen, had he applied his mind.17 He described the test as having a 
“much better foundation”18 than the alternative adequate causation test. He hailed the 
foreseeability limit on damages as included in the 1956 draft of ULIS as a “striking 
practical gain”19 for International Sales Law. 
Rabel's approval for foreseeability as a limit on contractual damages seems generally 
to have been shared amongst the drafters. At the first committee discussion on the 
issue an English delegate suggested foreseeability as the proper limit on damages.20 
Later, this position was clarified. It was stated that a party’s liability for contractual 
damages is rooted in the fact that he should have been aware of the possibility of a 
particular harm given his knowledge and the circumstances.21  
6 2 1 2 The foreseeability provisions in ULIS and the CISG 
ULIS draws a distinction between damages in cases where a contract was avoided 
(cancelled), and damages in cases where the contract was not avoided. In both 
instances, however, the limits of liability would be determined with reference to the 
foreseeability of the losses.22 In cases where a contract was not avoided, Article 82 
provides: 
“… [D]amages for a breach of contract by one party shall consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party. Such damages shall not exceed the loss 





19 E Rabel “The Hague Conference on the Uniform Sales Law” 1 (1952) Am J Comp L 58 63. 
20 F Faust Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens gemäß Art. 74 Satz 2 UN-Kaufrecht (CISG) (1996) 51 
as cited in N Altvater “Possible Consequences” as contained in Article 74 of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG): Friend or Foe? (2007) unpublished paper in the 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University available at: 
<https://works.bepress.com/norbert_altvater/> (accessed 9-8-2016). 
21 55. 
22 V Knapp “Section II – Damages Article 74” in CM Bianca & MJ Bonell Commentary on the 
International Sales Law – the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (1987) 538 538. 
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light of the facts and matters which were then known or ought to have been known to him, 
as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.”23 
Where a contract had been avoided, Article 84 provides that damages would be equal 
to the difference between the contract price and the current market price for the 
performance not delivered.24 Article 85 allows for cases where there is no such market 
price, in which case a reasonable substitute should be used.25 In terms of remoteness 
in these cases, Article 86 of ULIS provides: 
“The damages referred to in Article 84 and 85 may be increased by the amount of any 
reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the breach or up to the amount of the loss, 
including loss of profit, which should have been foreseen by the party in breach, at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters which were known or 
ought to have been known to him, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.” 
Both ULIS and ULFS did not become widely recognised international sales law. Few 
countries ratified the conventions,26 and their application was limited to transactions 
between parties of the member states. However, it was on the basis of these two 
conventions27 that arguably the most successful international instrument dealing with 
international commercial contracts came into being – the CISG.28 
The CISG was adopted on 11 April 1980 and entered into force on 1 January 1988. 
At the time of writing, it has been ratified by 84 states. Contracts between parties from 
any of these states will be governed by the CISG if the conditions for its applicability 
have been met,29 and if its application has not been excluded by the parties.30 The 
CISG is often referred to and applied by courts and arbitration tribunals,31 and has 
																																																						
23 82 ULIS. 
24 84 ULIS. 
25 85 ULIS. 
26 The conventions have been ratified by 9 states, two of which adopted the reservation which makes 
the law only applicable if elected by the parties – Schlechtriem Uniform Sales Law 17. 
27 Knapp “Damages” in Commentary on the International Sales Law 538. 
28 Zeller Damages 9. 
29 1(1) CISG: “This convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of 
business are in different States.” 
30 Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law “CISG: Table of Contracting States” (8-
01-2016) CISG <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html> (accessed 24-01-2016). 
31 D Saidov The Law of Damages in International Sales – the CISG and other International Instruments 
(2008) 3. 
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influenced the drafting of other conventions as well as the revision of certain domestic 
contract laws.32 It has also been affirmed as the most widely accepted international 
instrument on contracts for the sale of goods.33 
Unlike ULIS, the CISG does not incorporate the distinction between contracts that 
have been cancelled and those that have not. Its provision on the limitation of 
contractual damages corresponds, however, to Article 82 of ULIS.34 The two 
provisions are considered substantively identical by the Secretariat Commentary to 
the CISG.35 Article 74 of the CISG provides: 
“Damages for breach of contract by one party consists of a sum equal to the loss, including 
loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages 
may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters which he then 
knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.”36 
Article 74 is one of the CISG provisions most written and litigated about.37 Because of 
the rich body of literature and decisions on Article 74, its wide acceptance, and the 
fact that it formed the basis of the foreseeability tests we see in other instruments, it 
will be the main focus of section 3 below. Before dealing with the application of the 
foreseeability test under Article 74, a brief overview will be provided of the other 





32 Zeller Damages 9. Zeller makes specific mention of Estonian and Chinese contract law that have 
been revised based on the CISG. 
33 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law “Art. 1.6(2) UNIDROIT Principles” (2010) xxiii. 
34 Knapp “Damages” in Commentary on the International Sales Law 538. 
35 “Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods prepared by 
the Secretariat" (“Secretariat Commentary”) (14 March 1979) UN Doc A/CONF 97/5 59. The Secretariat 
Commentary is considered the closest counterpart to an official commentary to the CISG. 
36 74 CISG. 
37 J Gotanda “Awarding Damages under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods: A Matter of Interpretation” (2005-2006) 37 Geo J J Int’l L 95 95. 
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6 2 2 UNIDROIT PICC 
The PICC38 was first published in 1994 with the purpose of “establish[ing] a balanced 
set of rules designed for use throughout the world irrespective of the legal traditions 
and economic and political conditions of the countries in which they are applied”.39 It 
was intended, in other words, to become the soft law of international commercial 
contracts.40 Its application has a wider scope than the CISG because it is not restricted 
to any particular type of contract, such as sale. 
Article 7.4.4 of the PICC governs remoteness in contract and holds that: 
“[t]he non-performing party is liable only for harm which it foresaw or could reasonably have 
foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract as being likely to result from its 
performance.”41 
It must be noted that, where the model instruments refer to non-performance, this 
equates to the South African understanding of breach of contract in general. 
Despite striking similarities, this provision is not identical to Article 74 of the CISG.42 It 
seems as if the provision that a defendant will be liable for harm which he “could have 
foreseen” is less strict than the CISG provision imposing liability for harm which he 
“ought to have foreseen”. Authors have also pointed out that “could have foreseen” is 
a more preferable formulation of the test, because “ought” implies a duty on a 
defendant to foresee harm, which is a peculiar concept.43 A further difference is that 
harm must be foreseeable as “likely to result” from non-performance in order to be 
recoverable under the PICC. By contrast, the CISG requires only that harm was 
foreseeable as a “possible consequence” of the breach. It has been suggested that 
the PICC might therefore require harm to be foreseeable with a higher degree of 
																																																						
38 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law “UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts” (2010). 
39 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law “Art. 1.6(2) UNIDROIT Principles” (2010) xxiii. 
40 S Vogenauer Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(PICC) 2 ed (2015) 31-149. 
41 7.4.4 PICC. 
42 E McKendrick “Article 7.4.4” in S Vogenauer Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2 ed (2015) 993. 
43 R Zimmermann “Limitation of Liability for Damages in European Contract Law” (2014) 18 Edin L Rev 
193 205. 
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probability than under the CISG, causing it to restrict liability more than the CISG 
would.44  
However, it is unlikely that the foreseeability test contained in PICC will be interpreted 
differently from Article 74 CISG.45 No difference in substance seems to have been 
intended by the drafters of the PICC,46 since their official comments state that Article 
7.4.4 corresponds to Article 74 CISG.47 
6 2 3 PECL 
Another instrument  aimed at creating non-binding soft law that could inter alia promote  
the harmonisation of contract law was created in 2002, this time specifically aimed at 
European contract law: the PECL.48 When dealing with the issue of remoteness in 
contract, Article 9:503 PECL provides: 
“The non-performing party is liable only for loss which it foresaw or could reasonably have 
foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract as a likely result of its non-
performance, unless the non-performance was intentional or grossly negligent.”49 
One marked difference between this provision and the CISG is that the PECL 
distinguishes between cases where there was fault in the form of intent or gross 
negligence on the side of the defendant and cases where these forms of fault are 
absent - similar to the position in French law.50 Apart from the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference (DCFR),51 this limitation of liability based on certain forms of fault of the 
defendant is not found in other instruments. 
																																																						
44 McKendrick “Article 7.4.4” in Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC) 995. 
45 Saidov Damages in International Sales 104. 
46 O Lando “Foreseeability and Remoteness of Damages in Contract in the DCFR” (2009) E R P L 619 
620. 
47 UNIDROIT “Official Comments on the PICC” (2010) UNILEX 
<http://unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13637> (accessed 15-01-2016)  
48 European Union, Commission on European Contract Law “Principles of European Contract Law, 
Parts I and II (Completed and Revised)” (6 May 1994).  
49 9:503 PECL. 
50 See Ch 2 (2 3 3 1). 
51 C von Bar, E Clive & H Schulte-Nölte (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (2009). 
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It has been suggested that such a limitation would be strange in a system where 
liability for breach of contract does not depend on fault,52 because there is also no 
necessary relation between a defendant’s fault and the foreseeability of damage.53 
The focus of this chapter will therefore fall on the application of the foreseeability test 
under the model instruments, without further reference to the possible impact of the 
fault of the defendant on the limits of liability. 
6 2 4 Other instruments 
In addition to the PECL and the PICC, foreseeability can be regarded as a shared 
premise across a number of instruments.54 Article 161 of the European Commission’s 
now shelved “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a Common European Sales Law” (CESL)55 provides that: 
“[t]he debtor is liable only for loss which the debtor foresaw or could be expected to have 
foreseen at the time when the contract was concluded as a result of the non-
performance.”56 
As we have seen previously, there is a suggested difference in the scope of the 
foreseeability test between instruments that require loss to be foreseen as a “likely”57 
result of breach, in contrast to those requiring loss to be foreseen as only a “possible”58 
consequence of breach.59 The CESL, however, does not incorporate any such 
terminology, and merely requires that damages must have been “foreseen… as a 
result of the non-performance”.60 In previous chapters, we have seen how the debate 
about an appropriately defined level of likelihood at which damages must have been 
																																																						
52 Zimmermann 2014 Edin L Rev 209. 
53 209. 
54 S Eiselen “Art 74 CISG-UP” in J Felemegas (ed) An International Approach to the Interpretation of 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform 
Sales Law (2007) 211 212. 
55 (Brussels 11 October 2011) 2011/0284. 
56 161 CESL. 
57 7.4.4 PICC, 9:503 PECL, III 3:703 DCFR. 
58 86 ULIS, 74 CISG. 
59 McKendrick “Article 7.4.4” in Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC) 995; Zimmermann 2014 Edin L Rev 205.  
60 161 CESL. 
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foreseeable has, in different jurisdictions and contexts, proven fruitless.61 Against this 
background, the simplified formulation provided in the CESL might be an 
improvement. Arguably, the formulation of the CESL merely requires that a 
consequence of breach must have been foreseeable as possible at the time of contract 
conclusion. 
A third difference is that the CESL does away with the word “reasonably”. It has been 
argued that this is the most preferable way to phrase the rule, because 
reasonableness would be implicit in an inquiry as to what a person ought to have 
foreseen.62 
Article 161 CESL corresponds to Article III. – 3:703 of its precursor, the DCFR, which 
states that: 
“The debtor in an obligation which arises from a contract or other juridical act is liable only 
for loss which the debtor foresaw or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen at the 
time when the obligation was incurred as a likely result of the non-performance, unless the 
non-performance was intentional, reckless or grossly negligent.”63 
Again, we see that this instrument requires loss to have been reasonably foreseeable 
as a “likely” result of the breach, and not a “possible” result (as seen in Article 74 
CISG). Although the former might suggest a stricter test than the latter, it does not 
seem that a difference in substance was intended.64 The foreseeability limit on the 
recovery of damages formulated in this instrument “adheres to”65 the foreseeability 
test in Article 74 CISG. 
This chapter will not attempt to explore the nuanced differences between these 
instruments. Instead, its aim is to provide a succinct overview of how foreseeability 
has been treated in international contract law, with the purpose of gaining insight into 
the South African application of the foreseeability test. In order to contextualise the 
application of the foreseeability theory as seen under the model instruments, it is 
																																																						
61 Ch 4 (4 5), Ch 5 (5 2 2). 
62 Zimmermann 2014 Edin L Rev 205. 
63 III- 3:703 DCFR. 
64 Lando 2009 E R P L 620. 
65 639. 
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necessary to understand how the rationale for the rule has been understood by 
drafters and scholars. 
6 2 5 The rationale for the foreseeability theory 
After considering the CISG drafting committee proceedings, Schlechtriem explains the 
rationale for the foreseeability rule in the CISG as follows: 
“The underlying idea of the rule is that the parties, at the conclusion of the contract, should 
be able to calculate the risks and potential liability they assume by their agreement”66 
In other words, there should be no liability for unforeseeable damages because: 
“the non-performing party, in determining whether to enter into the contract, and, if so, on 
which conditions, whether to bargain for a limitation of liability, or to take out insurance, had 
not been able to take account of consequences of a non-performance which were not 
reasonably foreseeable.”67  
This is confirmed by the Secretariat Commentary to the CISG where the effect of the 
rule is described as follows:  
“Should a party at the time of the conclusion of a contract consider that breach of the 
contract by the other party may cause him exceptionally heavy losses or losses of an 
unusual nature, he may make this known to the other party with the result that if such 
damages are actually suffered they may be recovered.”68 
The operating principle seems to be that a defendant, when he concluded a contract, 
could only have bargained with knowledge of risks that he reasonably could have 
foreseen. What he reasonably could have foreseen would be determined by his 
knowledge and the particular circumstances. For such reasonably foreseeable risks, 
he could have taken steps to avoid, minimise or insure against the risks or 
alternatively, he could have driven a harder bargain to compensate for the assumption 
of those risks. He would not have been in a position to do so for any unforeseeable 
																																																						
66 Schlechtriem Uniform Sales Law 96. 
67 Zimmermann 2014 Edin L Rev 206. 
68 59. 
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risks, and should therefore not be held liable for them. Simply put, parties must be 
reasonably able to know what they are bargaining for.69 
This understanding of the underlying rationale for the foreseeability theory is shared 
amongst international trade law scholars,70 and the same rationale offered for Article 
74 CISG was used when incorporating the foreseeability theory into other prominent 
international instruments.71  
In light of this underlying rationale, the next section explores the operation of the 
foreseeability theory in the model instruments. This is done against the background of 
a brief discussion of the correspondence between the foreseeability theory in terms of 
English law with that of the model instruments. As will be seen, the understanding of 
the rationale for the foreseeability theory highlighted above has arguably allowed for 
a more flexible approach to foreseeability under the model instruments than what we 
have seen in terms of South African and English law.  
6 3 The operation of the foreseeability theory in the model instruments 
6 3 1 Correspondence with the foreseeability theory in English law 
As may be deduced from the overview of the relevant provisions above, the 
foreseeability test adopted by the model instruments functions similarly to the 
foreseeability test as discussed in the context of English law.72  
Article 7 of the CISG explicitly provides that, in the interpretation of the Convention, 
“regard is to be had to its international character”73. This sentiment is also echoed in 
																																																						
69 C Liu Remedies for Non-Performance: Perspectives from the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles & PECL 
LLM Thesis Renmin University of China (2003) 396. 
70 U Magnus “Remedies: Damages, Price Reduction, Avoidance and Preservation” in LA DiMatteo 
International Sales Law – A Global Challenge (2014) 257 257. 
71 O Lando 2009 E R P L 621. 
72 McKendrick “Article 7.4.4” in Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts 
(PICC) 993. 
73 7 CISG.  
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other instruments.74 In principle, therefore, foreseeability under the model instruments 
should be determined without reference to domestic law.75 
Despite this, many discussions of foreseeability in the model instruments refer to 
Hadley v Baxendale76(“Hadley”). It has also been admitted that, because of the 
seminal role that the Hadley decision played in the development of the foreseeability 
test, its interpretation of foreseeability has informed the formulation of Article 82 ULIS 
and Article 74 CISG.77 The result is that the foreseeability test as set out in the model 
instruments will in many respects correspond to the foreseeability test set out in 
Chapter 5 of this study. 
The key difference between foreseeability as understood in English and also South 
African law, and foreseeability under the model instruments, is that the latter approach 
to determining foreseeability is more flexible, and takes several different factors into 
account when determining whether or not damages were foreseeable. This will be 
considered later in the chapter. The operation of the foreseeability test, as well as its 
more flexible application, is explored in the next section. 
6 3 2 Application of the foreseeability theory under the model instruments 
6 3 2 1 The knowledge of the defendant 
Article 74 CISG limits a defendant’s liability for contractual damages to those losses 
that he either did foresee, or those that he should have foreseen given the facts and 
																																																						
74 See 1:101(4) PECL, 1.6  PICC. 
75 Zeller Damages 16. 
76 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex 341. See for example: F Blasé & P Hötter “Remarks on Damages 
Provisions in the CISG (Article 74), Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), and UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC)” in J Felemegas (ed) An International 
Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law (2007) 465 469; Zeller Damages 91; McKendrick “Article 7.4.4” 
in Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 993; J 
Gotanda “Article 74” in S Kröll, L Mistelis & PP Viscasillas (eds) UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) (2011) 990 992; I Schwenzer “Article 74” in I Schwenzer (ed) 
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer – Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) 3 ed (2010) 999 1000; C Liu Remedies in International Sales (2007) 458. 
77 Zeller Damages 95. 
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matters that he knew about or should have known about.78 This is determined with 
reference to the time of contract conclusion.79 Damage which becomes foreseeable 
after contract conclusion will therefore not have any effect on the defendant’s liability.80 
In contrast to the positions in terms of English81 and South African law,82 Article 74 
CISG and the other model instruments require that the losses are foreseeable only by 
the defendant. The question is therefore not what both parties foresaw or could 
reasonably have foreseen. This difference will not have much effect on the 
foreseeability inquiry in practice however,83 because:  
“In the case where loss is foreseeable to the aggrieved party, but not to the non-performing 
party, the aggrieved party should draw that loss to the attention of the non-performing 
party… If it does, the loss has been foreseeable to the non-performing party and is 
potentially recoverable. If he does not do so, or in the case where the loss was not 
foreseeable to either party, the non-performing party is not liable for the loss.”84 
In terms of how one should go about determining whether loss was foreseeable at 
contract conclusion, the CISG requires foreseeability to be determined with reference 
to knowledge of facts and circumstances that would render those damages 
foreseeable. The foreseeability inquiry therefore revolves around a determination of 
the knowledge that a defendant had or ought to have had. 
																																																						
78 74 CISG: “Damages for breach of contract by one party consists of a sum equal to the loss, including 
the loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not 
exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he knew then or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.” 
79 765. 
80 Knapp “Article 74” in Bianca & Bonell Commentary on the International Sales Law 542. 
81 I Schwenzer “Article 74” in I Schwenzer (ed) Schlechtriem & Schwenzer – Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 3 ed (2010) 999 1019. 
82 See for example Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Company Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines 
Ltd 1915 AD 1 22: “Such damages are only awarded… as my reasonably be supposed to have been 
in the contemplation of the contracting parties” (emphasis added). 
83 D Saidov "Methods of Limiting Damages Under the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods" (2002) 14 Pace Int’l L Rev 307 311. 
84 McKendrick “Article 7.4.4” in Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC) 993. See also AL Corbin Corbin on Contracts 5 (1962) 1010, as cited in AG Murphey 
“Consequential Damages in Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Legacy of Hadley” 
(1989) 23 Geo Wash J Int’l L & Econ 415 435. 
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This suggests that the knowledge that a defendant is taken to have had at contract 
conclusion will be of two kinds.85 First, such knowledge could be actual knowledge – 
the facts and circumstances that the defendant was aware of when he concluded the 
contract. This is a subjective test. Secondly, knowledge can be imputed – based on 
facts or circumstances that the defendant “ought to have known [about]”86. This will be 
determined objectively with reference to what a reasonable person can be expected 
to know about the facts and circumstances in a particular case.87 
The more “usual” losses are – that is, the more it can be expected in the normal course 
of events – the more likely it is that knowledge of the facts and circumstances 
rendering those losses foreseeable will be imputed. As losses become more 
extraordinary and unusual, the less likely it is that it can be reasonably expected of a 
party to have had knowledge rendering those losses foreseeable. In such cases he 
would only be liable based on actual knowledge. 
This idea that foreseeability is based on either actual or imputed knowledge, and that 
the one shades into the other as losses become more unusual, is very similar to the 
foreseeability test as explained in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) LD v Newman Industries 
LD88 (“Victoria Laundry”) in English law,89 where it will be recalled that the court held 
that both rules in Hadley rely on the same underlying principle. Under the first rule in 
Hadley, a defendant is deemed by law to have knowledge of all losses that would 
occur as a consequence of breach in the normal course of events. Under the second 
rule, a defendant will be liable for all losses that a reasonable person in his position, 
with his actual knowledge, would have foreseen. Victoria Laundry therefore held that 
the tests for subjective and objective knowledge are not analytically distinct, but rather 




85 Saidov Damages in International Sales 105. 
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87 Knapp “Article 74” in Bianca & Bonell Commentary on the International Sales Law 542. 
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89 See ch 5 (5 2 2). 
90 E Peel The Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 1057. 
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6 3 2 2 The extent of the damage 
When determining whether or not losses were foreseeable, the question inevitably 
arises as to what exactly must have been foreseen. Simply referring to “loss” or “harm” 
leaves it unclear whether the model instruments require foreseeability of only the 
nature of the harm or also of its extent. Some authors argue that the CISG requires 
foreseeability of both aspects.91 It has also been suggested that Article 74 CISG, by 
using the words “may not exceed” in the phrase “damages may not exceed the loss 
which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract”92 implies foreseeability of the extent of loss and not only 
the nature thereof.93 This is because a loss of a particular nature cannot be 
“exceeded”. The comments to the PICC state: 
“Foreseeability relates to the nature or type of harm but not to its extent unless the extent 
is such as to transform the harm into one of a different kind.”94 
In other words, when the extent of loss is considerably more than what is reasonably 
foreseeable, it would be considered to be a different type of loss95 – arguably because 
it ceases to be “usual” and becomes “unusual”. This would suggest, therefore, that it 
is not possible to completely exclude the extent of loss from an inquiry as to its 
foreseeability.  
Requiring foreseeability of not only the nature or type of loss but also its extent seems 
to be a sensible approach. In English and South African law, foreseeability of only the 
nature of harm and not its extent is required. This leads to unsatisfactory results, as 
seen for instance in the case of Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc, the 
Achilleas96 (“The Achilleas”) discussed in the previous chapter.97  
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In this case the nature or type of harm was foreseeable, but its extent was excessive. 
The minority ruling of the case denied the recovery of damages because of the fact 
that the extent of harm was not foreseeable.98 This was criticised as incorrect because 
the English foreseeability test does not require foreseeability of the extent of loss, only 
of its nature.99 Essentially, the court faced a dilemma – the strict formulation of the 
foreseeability test (only requiring foreseeability of the nature of loss) would clearly not 
yield equitable results in the particular case. 
The majority decision’s solution to this problem was the imposition of the assumption 
of responsibility test.100 As we have seen, this test for remoteness in contract focusses 
on the parties’ presumed intentions regarding liability for damages. The test 
reformulated the role of foreseeability in questions of remoteness of contractual 
damages. Foreseeability of harm was no longer the primary underlying reason for 
limitations on contractual damages, but rather a tool to discover the “presumed 
intentions”,101 “assumed responsibility”,102 “shared understanding”103 or “common 
expectations”104 of the parties – which is, according to the majority decision, the correct 
limit on liability. 
The problem with this approach is that it is essentially based on a fiction – as we have 
seen previously, there are many instances where parties simply do not have any 
intentions with regards to the limits of contractual damages.105  
More importantly, this statement does not give effect to the underlying rationale of 
foreseeability as a limit on contractual damages discussed earlier in this chapter.106 
The correct idea seems to be that a defendant must reasonably be able to take into 
account risks of liability when concluding a contract. He would be liable for all damages 
that he could, had he acted reasonably, have taken into account. This implies that the 
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test should not ask which risks he did take into account, or what parties had agreed 
upon in that regard – but rather whether he could have been able to take those risks 
into account if he had acted reasonably. 
The solution in Achilleas is apparently to replace one rigidly defined test with another. 
The dilemma faced in the Achilleas decision arose simply because of the failure to 
recognise that questions of remoteness of damages and of foreseeability are 
“inevitably imprecise”.107 This is especially true about the distinction between the 
nature and extent of a particular loss.108  
The problematic nature of this distinction can be illustrated in cases where the plaintiff 
claims damages for lost profits. The nature of a loss (i.e. loss of profits) is generally 
foreseeable in commercial contracts. However, lost profits could be of such a large 
extent that a defendant would not reasonably have been able to foresee them. The 
question whether this changes the nature of the loss, and at which point it does, is not 
one that elicits obvious answers. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that that whether or not foreseeability relates 
to the nature or to the extent of a loss caused by breach of contract depends on our 
definition of the consequence of a particular breach. If the consequence is “loss of 
profits”, its nature could have been foreseen. If, however, we define the consequence 
as “loss of profits from especially lucrative commercial contracts”,109 we could argue 
that the nature of the loss was unforeseeable. As seen previously,110 this is similar to 
the situation that arose in the application of the adequate cause theory: any clinical 
test aiming at delineating the relationship between cause and consequence becomes 
imprecise and opaque when we have to decide how to define cause and consequence. 
This is also seen with the foreseeability theory: we can define any consequence in a 
broad (“lost profits”) or narrow (“loss of profits from lucrative contracts”) manner, and 
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that would affect a conclusion as to whether we are dealing with foreseeability of the 
nature or of the extent of a loss. The extent of a loss is inextricably linked to its nature, 
and vice versa. The result seems to be that the remoteness inquiry cannot be 
definitively focussed on only one of the two. 
The solution to the imprecise nature of the remoteness inquiry probably does not lie 
in a new conception of remoteness and a newly defined test to go along with it as was 
done in Achilleas. Rather, a workable test for remoteness in contract would have to 
be flexible enough to take several different factors into account, and would have to be 
decided upon the facts of each case. The foreseeability test as developed and applied 
under the model instruments seems well suited to do this. 
The model instruments indicate that knowledge can be determined with reference to 
various different considerations, depending on the facts of each case. This is because, 
under the model instruments, what a party “ought to have known” is determined with 
reference to a variety of factors.  
6 3 3 Flexible approach to the foreseeability theory 
6 3 3 1 Rationale for a flexible approach to foreseeability 
As discussed earlier in this chapter,111 the rationale for foreseeability as a limit on 
contractual damages in the model instruments is explained in terms of assumption of 
risk. That is, a defendant's liability for damages should be limited to those losses of 
which he could have foreseen the risk. He must reasonably have had the opportunity, 
therefore, to take the risk of such liability into account when entering into the contract 
– affording him the opportunity either to refuse the contract, negotiate for a higher 
contract price, insure against the risk, or take steps to minimise such risk. If a 
defendant did not reasonably have the opportunity to the take risk of liability into 
account in that manner, he should not be liable. This view of the underlying rationale 
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for the foreseeability theory is shared by scholars112 and the drafters of the model 
instruments.113 
If we accept this as the correct reasoning behind the foreseeability test, it is also clear 
that there is a wide variety of factors and circumstances that influence what a 
defendant could have reasonably taken into account in a particular case. Arguably, 
the application of the traditional foreseeability test has not reflected an awareness of 
such factors and circumstances. 
This has been discussed in the context of both the South African and English approach 
to foreseeability. In both these approaches, the knowledge which a defendant is taken 
to have had at contract conclusion is determined within a limited frame of reference. 
A defendant’s presumed knowledge of the “usual course of things” is taken into 
account, and in addition to that any knowledge that he might have had of special 
circumstances which would render unusual losses foreseeable. In contrast to this, the 
model instruments determine foreseeability with reference to a number of additional 
factors. The official comments to Article 7.4.4 PICC, for example, state that 
“[f]oreseeability is a flexible concept which leaves a wide measure of discretion to the 
judge.”114 
Under the model instruments, the foreseeability test is therefore applied with reference 
to a wide range of factors, including the scope and purpose of the contract in 
question,115 the allocation of risk in the contract,116 previous dealings between the 
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parties,117 established practices between the parties,118 and common trade usage.119 
The next section explores some of these factors and how they are considered. 
6 3 3 2 Factors taken into account in the flexible approach 
The inquiry as to foreseeability under the model instruments has been approached in 
a manner that allows the facts of the case to determine which consideration will prove 
decisive. The inquiry of the court is  
“to determine to what degree a reasonable person within the meaning of Art. 8(3)120 CISG 
in the circumstances known to [the breaching party] at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract could (or should) foresee such [damage]”121   
To do so, the court relies on an inquiry into the party’s “risk evaluation at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract”.122 To this end, the various factors that courts have held 
to be indicative of foreseeability of harm have been applied in a flexible manner – 
depending on the facts of a particular case. This section explores some of these 
factors.  
Often, courts refer to a party’s experience and commercial expertise when determining 
what that party could or ought to have foreseen.123 Where the party is a trader in a 
particular market, courts will tend to assume that he ought to have known about 
prevailing prices in the market, as well as the tendencies of the market to be volatile. 
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For example, in one case decided under ULIS, the court held that a buyer, by virtue of 
his commercial expertise, should have foreseen volatility in market price.124 
Not only a party’s commercial experience, but also his specific knowledge of an 
industry or product could inform an inquiry as to what he could have foreseen. In one 
such case, the delivery of a defective packaging system had caused the aggrieved 
party harm in the form of increased maintenance expenses. This loss was held 
foreseeable because the defendant was “a company dealing in implements of 
manufacture”125. 
Another factor that has been taken into consideration by the courts is the relationship 
between the parties, as well as the parties’ knowledge of each other’s activities. In the 
so-called “Cheese case”,126 decided under ULIS, the plaintiff was a German company 
that imported cheese from the defendant, a Dutch cheese exporter. The plaintiff sold 
cheese to other customers, including wholesalers. Three percent of the cheese 
delivered by the defendant was defective. This caused the plaintiff to lose customers, 
four of whom were bulk buyers. The plaintiff also had to pay damages to its customers 
to compensate for the defective cheese, and because of deteriorated business 
relations with another customer, the plaintiff lost a group delivery arrangement. 
The plaintiff claimed damages for lost profits, the damages that it had to pay to 
customers, as well as the value of the lost delivery arrangement. The 
Bundesgerichtshof, applying Article 82 ULIS, found that all these losses were 
foreseeable based on previous dealings between the parties and the defendant’s 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s activities and of the relevant market: 
”[The] seller knew at the time of contract formation that the buyer was a middleman who 
would resell goods… [and] both the seller and buyer knew that the cheese market in 
Germany was saturated with Dutch imports so that the threat existed that purchasers such 
																																																						
124 Case No 10 Ob 518/95 (6 February 1996) Austrian Supreme Court 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html> (accessed 18-04-2016). 
125 Case 00 Civ. 5189 (RCC) (12 August 2006) U.S District Court, Southern District of New York 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060823u1.html> (accessed 25-03-2016). 
126Case VIII ZR 210/78 (24 October 1979) 1979 Bundesgerichtshof CISG 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/791024g1.html> (accessed 29-01-2016). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 141	
as the buyers’ customers might change suppliers even for trivially unsatisfactory 
deliveries.”127 
Another factor used in the determination of foreseeability is trade usage. The CISG 
makes explicit mention of the fact that trade usage should be considered when 
determining reasonable foreseeability.128 It has been held that the foreseeability 
requirement “can conclusively be met by showing a trade custom”.129 This also 
appears to be in line with the underlying rationale of the foreseeability theory – trade 
usage is formative in a party’s understandings and expectations when entering into a 
contract and it can therefore be considered part of what he takes into account when 
calculating the risks that he is assuming.130 
In the Achilleas case, the losses claimed were far in excess of the normal expected 
damages in similar cases based on common trade custom in the shipping industry. It 
was acknowledged that generally accepted trade custom in the shipping market was 
to restrict liability to losses suffered for the overrun period and not for the entire 
duration of a following fixture, as was claimed.131 The House of Lords, instead of 
incorporating the well-established trade custom into their analysis of reasonable 
foreseeability, turned to the lack of agreement between the parties about liability for 
damages to deny the claim. It seems that there was a simpler solution to the issue 
facing the court in Achilleas. If trade usage could be a factor that determines the extent 
of knowledge imputed to the defendant, there is no need for a reconceptualisation of 
foreseeability or for a new test.  
A final factor that is taken into account in determining foreseeability is the protective 
purpose of the contractual provision – or the scope of the contract. This corresponds 
to the Schutzzwecklehre as discussed earlier.132 This approach allows a court to take 
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into account the purpose of a contract – bearing in mind not only its content but also 
the circumstances surrounding its conclusion.133 
This factor was taken into account in the “Stones case”.134 The buyer, a German 
company, was commissioned to do construction work in Hamburg. For this purpose, 
it entered into a contract of sale with an Italian company for the provision of natural 
stones. The seller’s “sluggish and sporadic” deliveries resulted in the buyer being liable 
for an exceptionally harsh penalty fee toward one of its subcontractors. The court held 
that the seller was not liable for the penalty fee. It was held to have been unforeseeable 
by the seller, as “the risk that has materialised… does not conform to the risk of 
damages assumed by [the] [s]eller.”135 The scope and purpose of the contract was not 
to indemnify a buyer against the particular loss in question.  
As seen here and previously,136 there are cases where the consideration of a 
contract’s purpose provides a fair and appropriate limit on liability for contractual 
damages. Where a contract has no clearly defined purpose, the Schutzzweck 
approach will not have much value, however.137 It therefore makes sense to 
incorporate it as a factor to be considered depending on the circumstances of each 
case and the particular contract in question. This is what the foreseeability approach 
under the model instruments has done. 
6 3 3 3 Effect on imputed knowledge 
As we have seen previously,138 the foreseeability test under the model instruments 
takes as its point of departure, similar to the traditional foreseeability tests in English 
and South African law, the knowledge of the defendant. As a result of the flexible 
approach to foreseeability, however, the approach of the model instruments displays 
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a more nuanced treatment of the knowledge that is imputed unto the defendant. In the 
South African and English approach, a defendant is only expected to have known 
about the natural or normal course of events. No other knowledge is imputed to him. 
By contrast, the model instruments impute knowledge to the defendant based on his 
actual knowledge. In other words, actual knowledge could influence the extent of 
knowledge that a defendant can be taken to have had. The CISG not only refers to 
what a defendant ought to have foreseen in the light of what he actually knew. It also 
considers what a defendant ought to have known.139 For example:  
“The extent of a buyer’s lost profits and liability to its sub-buyers may be held foreseeable 
because of the supplier’s actual knowledge that the buyer is a trader and the further 
knowledge imputed to the supplier, in the light of his own business experience, of the usual 
levels of profit margins received from the sale of goods in question. In other words, a piece 
of actual knowledge often triggers a further presumption about what the seller is then 
expected to know.”140 
An example of this is provided in Case 48 of 2005 (Ukraine).141 Here, the arbitration 
panel found that the seller knew that the goods being sold were purchased by the 
buyer for purposes of processing and sale of a derivative product. The arbitration panel 
concluded that, due to this knowledge, the seller ought to have to realised that 
stoppage of supply would cause certain losses for the buyer, and accordingly the seller 
was held liable for those losses.142 
This seems like a more reasonable way to deal with the issue of foreseeability. In 
short, it makes the inquiry dependent on the particular facts of each case, without 
determining a hard-and-fast formula according to which foreseeability can be 
determined. The key question in each case is simply whether the defendant could 
reasonably have taken the risk of damages into account when entering into the 
contract. 
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6 4 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the foreseeability theory as reflected in the model 
instruments. While its formulation is largely similar to what we have seen in South 
Africa and England, it is applied in a more flexible manner. Under the model 
instruments, foreseeability is determined with reference to a variety of different 
considerations and not only the defendant’s actual knowledge and the abstract idea 
of a normal course of events. The foreseeability inquiry is shaped by the particular 
facts and circumstances of a case, in other words. The result seems to be a test that 
is able to avoid the pitfalls that have been discussed in the preceding chapters.  
Over the course of this study, the need for a flexible approach to remoteness in 
contract has been confirmed for each of the different theories. Despite its flaws, the 
direct consequences theory is praised because it allows for a judicial discretion and 
the consideration of policy factors when determining remoteness.143 In Germany, the 
adequate cause theory shifted from a strict application of probabilistic analysis to a 
guideline for the application of common-sense principles and policy factors.144 It also 
came to be supplemented with the Schutzzwecklehre. This was in recognition of the 
fact that the particular purpose and context of a contract must be taken into 
consideration.145 In English law, we have seen that the foreseeability theory has 
shifted away from distinctions between general and special damages due to the 
realisation that different types of damages shade into each other and that liability for 
damages must be determined on the facts of a particular case.146 There can be no 
abstract rule to determine which damages are normal and which are not.  
The discussion of each of these theories showed that the strict application of any one 
test for remoteness failed to yield equitable results in all cases. This is to be expected, 
given the infinitely variable range of circumstances in which a decision would need to 
be reached about the limitation of contractual damages.147 In the context of the 
foreseeability theory, the conclusion seems to be that 
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“foreseeability should not be taken literally. It is quite amenable to normative 
characterisation.”148 
The way forward, therefore, might lie in the development of an approach to 
foreseeability that allows courts to take account of the particular circumstances of each 
case. We have seen previously that the foreseeability theory as currently applied in 
South Africa is especially ill-suited to do that. South African courts determine the 
recoverability of general damages with reference to the concept of a normal course of 
events – “damages that flow naturally from the breach in question”149. However, over 
the course of this study, we have seen that what can be considered “normal” or “usual” 
cannot be determined in the abstract or in a vacuum. The extent to which particular 
consequences of a breach are normal would depend on the party’s knowledge and 
expertise, the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract, the scope 
and purpose of the contract, previous dealings between the parties, trade customs, 
and any number of other factors. None of these considerations are taken into account 
when determining whether or not losses are “usual” and therefore recoverable as 
general damages in South African law. Any losses that cannot be recovered as 
general damages, will only be recoverable as special damages if that has been agreed 
by the parties.150 It would seem that this is not a principled approach suited to the 
proper allocation of risks of losses arising from breach, where it would be of central 
importance to determine what parties could have (and should have) taken into account 
when entering into a contract. 
The foreseeability approach under the model instruments has provided some key 
insights in this regard. They have taken the foreseeability approach from an obscure 
and abstract formula to an approach which takes into account tangible and concrete 
considerations.  
First, we have seen that what can be foreseen – i.e. what can be considered losses 
arising in the normal course of events – cannot be defined in abstract terms. Rather, 
a defendant’s particular position, knowledge, as well as the commercial context of a 
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contract will inform what is considered general and normal. This has also been 
suggested by South African authors who are critical of our current approach.151 
Secondly, if we accept that foreseeability should be determined by taking into account 
a particular set of facts, then it follows that there are many considerations playing into 
such an analysis. The question is simply whether the defendant reasonably could have 
been able to consider these particular losses upon contract conclusion. In answering 
this question, it is clear that not only knowledge about the possibility of harm 
contributes to a conclusion. The trade usage and customs of the industry in which a 
defendant operates, the relationship he has with the other party, the knowledge and 
experience he has of a particular transaction, the risk allocation within the contract, as 
well as the purpose of the contract all contribute to a fair decision as to what a 
defendant can be expected to have foreseen. 
Of course not all of these factors will always contribute to a conclusion as to 
foreseeability. There might also be other important factors to be taken into account, 
such as the fault of the defendant, or the proportionality between contract price and 
harm caused. Nevertheless, the underlying principle is that a closed list of rigorously 
defined determinants of foreseeability leaves the test sterile. The way forward might 
be to apply the foreseeability principle flexibly depending on the facts of a particular 
case. The concluding chapter of this study will explore how such an approach could 
operate in the context of the South African law of contract. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7 1 Introduction 
This study has explored the origins, development, and merits of different approaches 
to remoteness of contractual damages. In the context of the rules on contractual 
damages, it has been noted that: 
“We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal 
concepts without the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry: toward what end is 
this activity directed? Nietzsche’s observation, that the most common stupidity consists in 
forgetting what one is trying to do, retains a discomforting relevance to legal science. In no 
field is this more true than in that of damages.”1 
The discussion in the preceding chapters suggests that this observation is especially 
appropriate in the context of the rules of remoteness. It has been indicated in Chapter 
2 that much of the criticism of the current South African approach is related to the lack 
of certainty about the fundamental purpose and nature of the remoteness inquiry.2 
This was also seen in the context of the other theories of remoteness. In the light of 
this uncertainty, various theories of remoteness were discussed with the purpose of 
discovering the underlying rationale of the remoteness inquiry. Against the 
background of that rationale, the study aims to identify the most appropriate approach 
in the context of South African contract law. This final chapter seeks to highlight the 
most important conclusions in this regard. 
The following section will illustrate that, across different theories of remoteness, the 
determination of what the parties could have considered when contracting has been 
recognised as a key underlying principle when determining remoteness of contractual 
damages. As will be shown, the question as to what parties could reasonably have 
considered when contracting can best be answered with reference to the foreseeability 
theory. This theory is also in line with the principle of economic efficiency, and can be 
supported on constitutional grounds.  
																																																						
1 LL Fuller & WR Purdue “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1” (1936-1937) 46 Yale L J 52 
52. 
2	Ch 2 (2 5).	
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This will be followed by a discussion of the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
findings regarding the application of the foreseeability theory. A few key observations 
are made about the way in which the foreseeability theory could be approached to 
avoid some of the identified problems with its application. The ultimate conclusion is 
that the foreseeability theory should be applied in a flexible manner with reference to 
the particular facts of each case. 
7 2 The most appropriate theory for determining remoteness: The 
foreseeability theory 
The preceding chapters explored several strengths and weaknesses of theories on 
remoteness. From these findings it can be concluded that the foreseeability theory is 
the most appropriate approach in the South African legal context for at least three 
reasons. First, it is in line with the underlying rationale for the limitation of contractual 
damages as identified by this study. Secondly, it provides for an economically efficient 
limit on the extent of liability for contractual damages. Finally, the foreseeability theory 
is aligned to the constitutional values that inform the development of the South African 
law of contract – in particular the value of human dignity. These reasons will now be 
considered in more detail. 
7 2 1  The underlying rationale for the limitation of contractual damages 
It is trite that liability for damages cannot extend indefinitely. After factual causation 
has been established between breach of contract and losses suffered, the extent of 
those losses might be in excess of what would seem reasonable to impose on a 
defendant. It seems intuitively unfair, or in the words of Justinian “not in accordance 
with nature”,3 to impose limitless liability on a defendant for all factually-caused 
damage. It is therefore understandable that already early in the civilian tradition legal 
principles governing the limits of contractual liability have been part of the law of 
contract. 
																																																						
3 C 7.47.1 as translated in SP Scott The Civil Law – Translated from the Original Latin 5-6 (2001) 67. 
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As we have seen,4 Roman law provided no general rule or single underlying principle 
to govern remoteness in contract,5 but rather developed different rules for particular 
contexts, such as the non-delivery of a thing causing harm,6 delivery of a defective 
merx,7 or lease of a defective res.8 Reasons advanced for these limitations were often 
diverse. Some limitations were explained with reference to the closeness of the 
connection between the harm suffered and the breach committed,9 and others with 
reference to the relative ease with which a defendant could have known about the 
possible consequences of his breach.10  
These limitations were later explained by Molinaeus with reference to one core 
underlying principle: a defendant should only be liable for damages which he could 
have foreseen (and therefore could have taken into account) at contract conclusion.11 
This principle was further developed by Pothier: 
“[T]he debtor is only liable for the damages and interests which might have been 
contemplated at the time of the contract, for to such alone the debtor can be considered as 
having intended to submit.”12 
Pothier’s further elaboration of foreseeability as a limit on damages incorporated a 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic damages, each with its own implication for 
what a defendant could be considered to have contemplated.13 This has had a 
pronounced impact on the way in which foreseeability has been approached in both 
English and South African law.14 In the case of the latter, Pothier’s distinction between 
																																																						
4 Ch 2 (2 2). 
5 HJ Erasmus “’n Regshistoriese Beskouing van Codex 7.47” (1968) 31 THRHR 213 217.  
6 D 19.1.21.3 as translated in A Watson The Digest of Justinian 2 (1985) 94. 
7 DJ Joubert “Lawyers, Arguments, Principles and Authority” in C Visser (ed) Essays in Honour of 
Ellison Kahn (1989) 173 174, with reference to the writings of Pomponius, Ulpian and Labeo on the 
issue. 
8 D 19.2.91.1 as translated in Watson The Digest 2 105. 
9 D 19.1.21.3 as translated in A Watson The Digest 2 94. 
10 D19.2.91.1 as translated in Watson The Digest 2 105, discussed in DJ Joubert “Lawyers, Arguments, 
Principles and Authority” in Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 174. 
11 Erasmus 1975 THRHR 117. 
12 WD Evans RJ Pothier: Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts – Translated from French 
(1853) para 160. 
13 Paras 161-163. 
14 JC De Wet & AH van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5 ed (1992) 227. 
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intrinsic and extrinsic damages is sometimes equated with the distinction between 
general and special damages.15  
Later on in this chapter16 these issues relating to the application and interpretation of 
the foreseeability theory will be considered in more detail, but for present purposes 
the focus will be on the core principle underlying this theory, namely that liability for 
contractual damages should be limited with reference to what the parties could have 
taken into account when entering into the contract.17 In other words, 
“[t]he underlying idea of the rule is that the parties, at the conclusion of the contract, should 
be able to calculate the risks and potential liability they assume by their agreement.”18 
A recognition of the importance of this consideration seems to have formed part of the 
evaluation of the direct consequences theory and the development of the adequate 
cause theory.  
The direct consequences theory was explored in Chapter 3. In terms of this theory, a 
defendant will be liable for all direct consequences of the breach.19 The directness of 
a consequence is determined with reference to the absence of a novus actus or nova 
causa in the sequence of events leading from the breach to the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff.20 In determining whether a particular factor did indeed constitute an 
intervening cause, courts take into consideration a wide range of policy factors and 
fairness considerations.21 These include the nature of the interests that have been 
harmed,22 as well as the foreseeability of harm.23 
																																																						
15 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 687H; Whitfield v 
Phillips 1957 3 SA 318 (A) 329D.  
16 Ch 7 (7 3 1).  
17 R Zimmermann “Limitation of Liability for Damages in European Contract Law” (2014) 18 Edin. L. R. 
193 206. 
18 P Schlechtriem Uniform Sales Law – The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (1986) 96. 
19 In re an arbitration between Polemis and another and Furness, Withy and Co. Ltd [1921] 3 K.B. 560 
574.  
20 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] A.C. 956 983-934. 
21 Liesbosch Dredger v SS Edison  [1933] A.C. 449 460. 
22 RG McKerron The Law of Delict 6 ed (1965) 127.  
23 JC De Wet “Opmerkings oor die Vraagstuk van Veroorsaking”(1941) 5 THRHR 126 138. 
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In the application of the direct consequences theory to the law of contract, it was 
recognised that a test for remoteness has to take account of the fact that parties to a 
contract need to reasonably know what risks and obligations they are undertaking 
when entering into a contract.24 The direct consequences theory was ultimately 
rejected because, amongst other considerations, it was considered unfair to hold 
someone liable for consequences that he could not reasonably have foreseen.25 
We also see an acknowledgement of this core principle in the adequate cause 
theory.26 Broadly speaking, this theory applies community standards of justice and 
fairness to determine whether there is a sufficiently strong causal nexus between a 
breach of contract and the harm suffered as a consequence of that breach. The 
question is whether the breach of contract would have the general tendency, based 
on human experience and knowledge, to increase the objective probability of the harm 
in question to occur.27 If the answer is in the affirmative, the breach is considered to 
have been an adequate cause of the harm in question, and liability for such damages 
will be imposed.28 
The adequate cause theory was initially formulated as a description of causal 
relationships rather than as a justification for the limitation of liability.29 However, we 
have seen how courts have moved away from a strict probabilistic analysis of cause 
and consequence, towards a focus on common-sense policy factors. As the 
Bundesgerichtshof has stated: 
																																																						
24 AL Goodhart “The Imaginary Necktie and the Rule in In Re Polemis” (1952) 68 LQR 514 517-519; 
HJ Erasmus & JJ Gauntlett “Damages” in WA Joubert, JA Ferris, LTC Harms (eds) LAWSA  7 2 ed 
(1995) paras 33-34; SL Porter “The Measure of Damages in Contract and Tort” (1933-1935) 5 
Cambridge L.J. 185;  RG McKerron "Foreseeability is All: A Critical Note on The Wagon Mound" (1961) 
78 SALJ 282 288; McKerron The Law of Delict 169. 
25 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] 1 All 
E.R. 388 413. 
26 Ch 4. 
27 BS Markesinis & H Unberath The German Law of Torts – A Comparative Treatise 4 ed (2002) 106-
107. 
28 AT von Mehren & JR Gordley An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law – The Civil Law 
System (1977) 1115. 
29 HLA Hart & T Honoré Causation in the Law 2 ed (1985) 432. 
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“[O]nly if courts remain conscious of the fact that the question is not really one of causation 
but of fixing the limits within which the author of a condition can fairly be made liable for its 
consequences… can they avoid schematising the adequate cause formula and guarantee 
correct results.”30 
The adequate cause theory came to be understood, therefore, as “a corrective device 
which can limit the purely logical consequences of causation in the interest of equity”.31 
Courts have also held that the adequate cause test merely aims to exclude liability for 
harm that falls beyond the expected course of things.32  
As discussed in chapter 4, the adequate cause theory came to be supplemented with 
the Schutzzwecklehre or “protective purpose of the norm” approach.33 This approach 
is premised on the idea that liability for damages 
“depends on the sense and scope of the contract, [and] what interests the creditor should 
have been warranted by the promise.”34 
When deciding on the limits of liability, courts therefore consider the appropriate scope 
(Schutzbereich) of a breached contractual term, determined with reference to the 
contract’s purpose (Normzweck).35  
The development of the adequate cause test and the subsequent adoption of the 
Schutzzweck approach both indicate an awareness of the idea that the limits of 
contractual liability should be determined with reference to what a defendant could 
have considered when entering into a contract.  
Over the course of this study, we have therefore seen how different theories converge 
around this central idea. Despite differences between the respective approaches, they 
all acknowledge the importance of considering what parties could have bargained for 
																																																						
30 BGHZ 3 (1951), 261, 267 as translated in Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 475.  
31 BGHZ 30, 154, 157; BGHZ 3, 261, 267 as translated in BS Markesinis A Comparative Introduction to 
the German Law of Tort 3 ed (1994) 101. 
32 BGH NJW 2001, 514 515 as cited in T Wagner "Limitations of Damages for Breach of Contract in 
German and Scots Law" (2014) 10 Hanse LR 73 83. 
33 H Beale, A Fauvarque-Cosson, J Rutgers, D Tallon & S Vogenauer Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 1011. 
34 E Rabel “A Draft of an International Law of Sales” (1938) 5 U Chi L Rev 543 555, (emphasis in 
original). 
35 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 476.  
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at contract conclusion. This is the premise of the foreseeability theory. The direct 
consequences theory was rejected for its inability to take this into account, and the 
adequate cause theory has developed and adopted the Schutzzwecklehre to be better 
able to take it into account.  
This rationale for the limitation of contractual damages has also been acknowledged 
by South African courts, especially in early case law. An example is provided in Stent 
v Gibson Brothers,36 where the court held that: 
“[t]he question seems to come to this: was the [damage] a matter of such ascertainable 
value [at the time of contract conclusion], as to have been capable of contemplation by both 
parties?”37 
In the light of the preceding discussion, it therefore appears that the preferable point 
of departure for any theory of remoteness in contract is to identify what parties could 
reasonably have taken into account at the time of conclusion of the contract.  
In this regard it seems that foreseeability is the best approach to assist in this 
determination.38 To determine what parties could have considered when contracting, 
the foreseeability approach asks simply what a defendant did, or could, foresee. This 
question can be answered with reference to a wide range of factors, as is suggested 
in this study. Such a flexible approach takes the entire contractual context and the 
parties' subjective positions into account.  
By contrast, the other approaches have a more limited focus. The adequate cause 
theory determines what parties could have considered with reference to the notion of 
a normal or expected course of events, and the Schutzzwecklehre examines the 
purpose of the contract. The direct consequences theory seeks to determine the 
strength of the causal relationship between breach and consequence. Although these 
considerations can in some cases indicate what parties could have considered, simply 
																																																						
36 1888-1889 5 HCG 148.  
37 151. 
38 Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 230; EA Farnsworth “Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract” 
(1970) 70 Columbia L Rev 1145 1208; D Saidov The Law of Damages in International Sales – the CISG 
and Other International Instruments (2008) 102. 
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asking which consequences were foreseeable allows courts to determine this with 
reference to these, and other factors.  
7 2 2  Economic efficiency 
It is widely accepted that rules on remoteness of contractual damages are necessary 
to prevent economic inefficiency.39 Without clearly defined rules governing the extent 
to which parties will be liable for the consequences of breach, the costs and risks 
involved in contracting increases.40 Parties will not be able to determine the extent of 
risk for liability that they are assuming in terms of the contract, and will therefore not 
be able to take efficient precautions to avoid losses caused by breach. They will also 
not be able to determine an optimal contract price that takes into account the costs of 
such precautions.41 Alleviating these inefficiencies will only be possible if parties can 
contract about all possible contingencies arising from breach – which is not always 
possible, and if possible, could be expensive.42 
It is therefore clear that any theory of remoteness must be able to address these 
inefficiencies effectively. In this regard, it has been argued that the foreseeability 
theory provides the most efficient solution.43 This is because the foreseeability theory 
ensures an economically efficient allocation of the costs and efforts involved in taking 
precautions against the consequences of breach. 
In terms of the foreseeability theory, the risk of all reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of breach will lie with the defendant (i.e. the party ultimately in breach). 
Reasonably able to know about these risks, he would be in a position to take optimal 
precautionary steps against these losses, and include the costs of such steps in the 
proposed contract price.44 However, and as a point of departure, the plaintiff will be 
																																																						
39 MG Bridge The Sale of Goods (1997) 541. 
40 RA Posner Economic Analysis of Law 6 ed (2003) 95. 
41 C Pazuic “Remoteness of Damage in Contract and its Functional Equivalents: A Critical Economic 
Approach” (2016) 5 UCLJLJ 87 89. 
42 JH Barton “The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract” (1972) 1 J Leg Stud 227 295; 
Posner Economic Analysis of Law 96. 
43 Barton 1972 J Leg Stud 295-296 
44 LA Bebchuck & S Shavell “Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of 
Hadley v Baxendale” (1991) 7 J L Econ & Org 284 286. 
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liable for all consequences of breach that are not foreseeable by the defendant. It is 
the plaintiff’s responsibility, therefore, to limit those losses.45 This avoids economically 
inefficient levels of reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant’s performance (in other 
words, it prevents the plaintiff from "over-relying" on the defendant's performance).46 
In cases where the defendant would be better placed to avoid such losses, the plaintiff 
is incentivised to disclose the risk of unusual losses to the defendant. 47 This disclosure 
renders these unusual losses reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, and he would 
therefore be liable also for those losses upon breach. Here too however, the prior 
disclosure of unusual losses allows the defendant to take increased precautions48 and 
to include the increased cost of those precautions in an increased contract price.49 
The foreseeability approach therefore promotes economically efficient contract prices 
and ensures economically optimal levels of precaution against the consequences of 
breach, by allocating the risk of future loss to the party best placed to take precautions 
and to cater for them accordingly. 
In the law and economics  literature, arguments have been made that the same 
efficiency gains could possibly also be obtained where no limits are placed on the 
recovery of contractual damages.50 Many of these arguments rely on stringent 
assumptions,51 and results about the "most" economically efficient approach to 
remoteness are often inconclusive.52 Regardless, it must be noted that the economic 
efficiencies ascribed to the foreseeability theory will not always materialise exactly as 
																																																						
45 Posner Economic Analysis of Law 122.  
46 127-128.  
47 J Cartwright “Remoteness of Damage in Contract and Tort: A Reconsideration” (1996) 55 Cambridge 
L J 488 491.  
48 Pazuic 2016 UCLJLJ 89. 
49 Barton 1972 J Leg Stud 296. 
50 EA Posner “Contract Remedies: Foreseeability, Precaution, Causation and Mitigation” in B Bouckaert 
& G De Gees (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics III (2010) 166; Bebchuck & Shavell 7 J L Econ 
& Org 308-309. 
51 For instance, about the risk aversion of parties to a contract: JM Perloff “Breach of Contract and the 
Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale” (1981) 39 J Leg Stud 39 62-63; the cost of 
communicating information: Posner "Contract Remedies" in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 167; 
and the distribution of parties that over- or undervalue performance: Bebchuck & Shavell 1991 J L Econ 
& Org 288.  
52 Posner “Contract Remedies" in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics III 166; Bebchuck & Shavell J 
L. Eco. & Org. 308-309; Perloff J Leg Stud 39 62-63. 
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predicted by theoretical studies. However, in light of the analysis above it is reasonable 
to conclude that the foreseeability theory provides an economically efficient (albeit at 
times imperfect), solution.  
7 2 3 The Constitutional values informing the South African law of contract 
The Constitution53 of South Africa embodies a value system that, ultimately, 
constitutes the supreme law of the land.54 The founding values of the Constitution 
include “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms”.55 Public policy in South Africa is rooted in these values,56 and it 
has been acknowledged by the Constitutional Court that “it is highly desirable and in 
fact necessary to infuse the law of contract with Constitutional values”.57 Accordingly, 
it is accepted that the Constitution obliges South African courts to  ensure conformity 
between fundamental human rights and constitutional values, and the law of 
contract.58 This suggests that it is necessary to consider to what extent the 
foreseeability theory, applied in the manner suggested by this study, would also  be 
able to give expression to these underlying values – in particular, the value of human 
dignity. 
Human dignity is, as is the case with most broad and abstract values, complex and its 
meaning often elusive.59 Broadly speaking the value of human dignity is taken to imply 
a respect for the inherent worth of every human being.60 It is often explained with 
reference to the Kantian argument that a human being should be treated as an end in 
itself, and not a means to an end.61 Human beings should be respected as 
																																																						
53 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
54 FDJ Brand "The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The 
Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution" (2009) 126 SALJ 71 71. 
55 Section 1(a) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
56 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 3 SA 323 (CC) para 28. 
57 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 71. 
58 GF Lubbe “Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously: The Bill of Rights and its Implications for the 
Development of Contract Law” (2004) 121 SALJ 395 407. 
59 Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421. 
60 O Schachter “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” (1983) 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 848 849.  
61 Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421; Schachter 1983 Am. J. Int’l L. 849; GP Fletcher “Human Dignity as a 
Constitutional Value” (1984) 22 U W Ontario L Rev 171 171.  
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autonomous individuals, and not treated as instruments of others’ wills.62 Two 
dimensions to this value can be identified. One relates to empowerment (individual 
autonomy and freedom) and the other to restriction (restraint of that freedom to protect 
others' dignity).63 In other words, the value of human dignity protects each person's 
inherent worth by requiring a respect for the autonomous choices and acts of that 
person. In this regard, it implies empowerment and individual freedom. On the other 
hand, it also requires that this person's actions do not infringe on the autonomy and 
inherent worth of other human beings. This dimension of human dignity implies 
restraint. 
The foreseeability theory of remoteness, particularly when applied in the manner 
suggested in this study, is in line with both these dimensions. On the one hand it 
honours autonomy and individual freedom, and on the other hand it limits that freedom 
by requiring a party to consider the interests of the other party to the extent that that 
is reasonable.  
With regards to the former dimension, the foreseeability theory holds a defendant 
liable for the consequences of his actions. Respect for his autonomy is manifested in 
the rule that he is only held liable for those consequences that he foresaw. This 
principle inherently respects his ability to make choices, and honours his autonomy by 
limiting the consequences of his choices to those for which he freely assumed risk. 
However, the foreseeability theory does not ask only what a defendant foresaw, but 
also what he reasonably could have foreseen. This gives effect to the second 
dimension of human dignity – it constrains the defendant’s autonomy by also requiring 
him to reasonably accommodate the interests of the other party. 
The foreseeability theory also gives effect to the value of dignity when considered from 
the perspective of the plaintiff. It requires a plaintiff to disclose knowledge that he might 
have about the possibility of unusual losses. If he does not share that information, he 
would bear the risk for the loss, where the defendant would not have reasonably been 
able to foresee the damage in question. A plaintiff will only be able to recover unusual 
losses where he disclosed the possibility or risk of such losses to the defendant, 
																																																						
62 Schachter 1983 Am J Int’l L 849. 
63 Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421. 
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thereby rendering them reasonably foreseeable to the latter. The result is that the 
foreseeability approach requires a plaintiff to consider and respect the defendant's 
position and knowledge when contracting. From the perspective of both the plaintiff 
and the defendant, therefore, the foreseeability theory requires an acknowledgement 
of the interests and inherent worth of the other party. 
This section has illustrated that any test of remoteness must, ultimately, be focussed 
on determining what parties could reasonably have taken into account when 
contracting. It has been argued that the foreseeability theory is best placed to 
determine this accurately, and that the foreseeability theory is also in line with the 
principle of economic efficiency and the constitutional value of human dignity.  
However, the traditional tests for foreseeability have not always been able to answer 
the core question – what could parties reasonably have taken into account when 
contracting – satisfactorily. As a consequence, these traditional tests have also not 
been able to ensure economic efficiency or give effect to constitutional values. This 
study has highlighted many aspects of traditional foreseeability tests such as those 
seen in England and South Africa that do not, in fact, allow courts to answer the core 
question at the heart of the foreseeability inquiry. The next section explores some of 
the lessons learnt with regards to application of the foreseeability theory.  
7 3 Conclusions on the application of the foreseeability theory 
7 3 1 The distinction between different types of damages 
Drawing a distinction between different types of damages and formulating rules as to 
requirements for each type's recovery does not necessarily contribute to the 
remoteness inquiry. This was seen in particular with reference to the discussion of 
remoteness in the English law of contract.64 This is because, in terms of the 
foreseeability theory, recovery of all types of losses is determined with reference to 
the same underlying principle. Developing separate tests for different types of losses 
has reduced the focus on this underlying principle, namely that parties must have been 
reasonably able to know what they were bargaining for upon contract conclusion. 
																																																						
64 Ch 5 (5 2 2). 
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In the works of Pothier we first encountered a distinction between damages that will 
be generally recoverable and damages that can only be recovered under certain 
circumstances.65 Pothier drew a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic damages. 
He described intrinsic damages as compensation for losses suffered “in respect to the 
thing which is the object of the obligation”.66 A defendant would be presumed to have 
foreseen such losses, and it would therefore be recoverable. All other losses were 
considered extrinsic. Extrinsic damages would only have been recoverable if the risk 
of those losses was expressed in the contract and therefore contemplated by the 
defendant. Then the defendant 
“shall be answerable even for the extrinsic damages… for by the clause in the agreement 
the risk of this damage was foreseen and expressed, and [the defendant] deemed to have 
taken it upon [himself].”67 
The operating principle behind the distinction is in line with the idea that a party should 
only be liable for what he could have taken into account at the conclusion of the 
contract. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic damages is based on a rule 
as to what a defendant can reasonably be expected to have taken into account. In 
Pothier’s work, a defendant can be expected to have taken into account losses 
suffered in respect of the thing that is the object of the obligation. 
As we have seen, it is problematic to formulate a single rule in the abstract that can 
reliably determine what a party could reasonably have taken into account in all cases. 
In many cases it might be less, or more, than the losses suffered in respect of the thing 
that is the object of the obligation. It might also be difficult to know exactly what 
constitutes “damage suffered in respect of the thing that is the object of the obligation”. 
The same shortcomings were observed in the context of the distinction between 
general and special damages. 
In the seminal case on the foreseeability theory in English law, Hadley v Baxendale 
(“Hadley”),68 the court drew a distinction between loss arising in the normal course of 
events (general damage) and that which does not (special damage). According to the 
																																																						
65 Ch 2 (2 3 1). 
66 Evans Pothier: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations para 161. 
67 Para 162. 
68 [1854] 9 Ex. 341. 
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court, the defendant is deemed to have foreseen the former, but not the latter.69 In 
other words, liability for general damages would be based on imputed knowledge, and 
liability for special damages on actual knowledge.  
The problem with this distinction is that it relies on a notion of a “normal course of 
events”, which, as we have seen, cannot be satisfactorily defined in the abstract 
without reference to the circumstances of a particular case. The same criticism is also 
raised in the context of the South African distinction between general and special 
damages, which has been described as artificial and theoretically impure.70 When 
determining whether or not losses suffered can be recovered as general damages, 
South African courts only refer to the content of the contract.71 The concept of a normal 
course of events, or of the natural consequence of a breach, is therefore determined 
largely in a vacuum and without reference to the subjective positions and knowledge 
of parties.  
As was seen in the preceding chapter on foreseeability under the model instruments, 
what would be considered “normal” or “usual” losses to a defendant upon contract 
conclusion is dependent on the particular circumstances of the case. A defendant’s 
expertise and knowledge, the commercial context of the contract, the scope and 
purpose of the contract, previous dealings between the parties – these and many other 
factors might influence what a defendant can be expected to have known and foreseen 
when contracting. All of this would influence the knowledge that can reasonably be 
imputed to the defendant. It seems that the distinction between general and special 
damages has created an artificial distinction between the tests for subjective (actual) 
and objective (imputed) knowledge. 
As was clarified in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) LD v Newman Industries LD (“Victoria 
Laundry”)72 the tests for subjective and objective knowledge are not analytically 
																																																						
69 354-355. 
70 De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 227. Durban Picture Frame Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Jeena 1976 1 SA 329 (D) 335-336 describes the approach as having “limited practical use”. 
71 SWJ Van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract - General Principles 
4 ed (2012) 370. 
72 [1949] 2 K.B. 528 540. 
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distinct. Rather, the one shades into the other as a defendant’s liability increases with 
his knowledge.73 
It seems that the capacity of a foreseeability test to determine accurately what parties 
could have foreseen at contract conclusion would benefit from the abandonment of 
the distinction between types of damages. A more sensible approach is simply to 
determine, with reference to the particular circumstances of each case, what a party 
can reasonably be expected to have foreseen. All such knowledge should be imputed 
to the party. All losses that were not reasonably foreseeable would only be recoverable 
if actual knowledge on the part of the defendant can be proven. There is no need to 
have a pre-formulated abstract rule to determine which losses fall under the former 
(reasonably foreseeable) and which under the latter (not reasonably foreseeable). 
7 3 2 The intentions of the parties 
A further conclusion to be drawn from the study is that it is ineffective, and arguably 
unfounded, to determine the limits of liability for contractual damages with reference 
to the parties’ intentions and their agreement on the issue. As discussed previously, 
early English case law interpreted Hadley as requiring an express or tacit agreement 
between the parties that the defendant would be liable for special damages before 
those losses would be recoverable.74 This interpretation had been completely rejected 
in England by the beginning of the twentieth century,75 since it was accepted that the 
foreseeability rule operates as a default rule where there has been no agreement 
between parties, rather than as a mechanism to discover their agreement. It was 
settled in English contract law, therefore, that there is no need for agreement between 
the parties for special damages to be recoverable. Rather, it was sufficient to prove 
that the parties could reasonably have foreseen unusual losses upon contract 
conclusion.76  
																																																						
73 E Peel The Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 1057. 
74 British Columbia and Vancouver’s Inland Spar, Lumber and Saw-Mill Co v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 
499; Horne v Midland Railway (1873) LR 7 CP 583. 
75 A Kramer “An Agreement-Centred Approach to Remoteness and Contract Damages” in N Cohen & 
E McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 250.   
76 HG Beale Chitty on Contracts I 31 ed (2012) 26-104; AL Corbin A Comprehensive Treatise on the 
Workings of Contract Law 5 (1964) 1014. 
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Despite the fact that the tacit agreement requirement had fallen into disfavour in 
English law, it was incorporated into South African law in the decision of Lazarus Bros 
v Davies & Kamann (“Lazarus Bros”).77 The court, relying on MacKeurtan’s discussion 
of the early English interpretation of the Hadley test,78 held that special damages will 
only be recoverable when there has been agreement to that effect.79 This was 
confirmed by the Appellate Division in Lavery and Co v Jungheinrich (“Lavery”),80 and 
is still a part of our law of remoteness in contract today.  
Apart from the reference to Lazarus Bros, the court in Lavery also relied on the works 
of Pothier as authority for the imposition of the convention or agreement requirement.81 
It has been argued that this is not a proper interpretation of Pothier.82 Our courts have 
also sometimes interpreted Pothier in a way that does not imply a convention 
requirement: 
“It appears from the way in which the doctrine is stated that neither actual foreseeing of the 
damages in question, nor express or conscious submission to an obligation to pay such 
damages is required.”83  
In addition to highlighting the dubious origins of the convention requirement, this study 
has also considered some of the problems with requiring agreement between the 
parties before losses can be recovered. This was done in the discussion of the English 
approach to foreseeability,84 particularly with reference to the adoption of the so-called 
“assumption of responsibility test” in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc, 
the Achilleas (“Achilleas”).85  
																																																						
77 1922 OPD 88.  
78 HG MacKeurtan Sale of Goods in South Africa (1921) 363-364.  
79 Lazarus Bros v Davies & Kamann 1922 OPD 88 91. 
80 1931 AD 156 169. 
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82 GA Mulligan “Damages for Breach: Quantum, Remoteness and Causality IV: Special Damages in 
South African Law” (1956) 73 SALJ 27 38. 
83 Bower v Sparks, Young and Farmers’ Meat Industries 1936 NPD 1 13. This interpretation was also 
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84 Ch 5. 
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It will be recalled that this case held that “liability for damages [is founded upon] the 
intention of the parties (objectively ascertained)”.86 Under this test, foreseeability is 
therefore no longer the primary limit on contractual damages, but rather a prima facie 
indication of the parties’ intentions regarding the risk allocation under the contract.87 
This view of the assumption of responsibility test has been confirmed by the Queen’s 
Bench.88  
Several points of criticism have been raised against this position. Determining 
remoteness of damages with reference to the parties' intentions runs contrary to the 
underlying premise of the inquiry identified in this study. Arguably, the foreseeability 
approach is fair and efficient because it imposes liability for all losses that could 
reasonably have been taken into consideration when contracting. In other words, its 
economic efficiency and fairness arises from the requirement that a defendant has to 
reasonably take into account the plaintiff's interests when contracting, and vice versa. 
Requiring agreement between parties implies the imposition of an additional 
requirement: that these consequences should actually have been considered by the 
parties and, furthermore, that the parties should have reached an agreement on their 
recoverability. The result is that losses which a defendant, had he been reasonable, 
could have considered when contracting, will still be carried by the plaintiff unless 
parties had reached agreement on the issue. This result inhibits the fairness, and the 
economic efficiency, of the foreseeability approach as identified above.  
Scholars have also pointed out that there will not always be reliable methods to discern 
parties’ intentions with regards to the consequences for breach of contract.89 Where a 
clear agreement about liability for such consequences can be discerned, that part of 
the contract will of course be enforced. The issue of remoteness, however, arises 
precisely where there has been no clear allocation of risk for consequences for breach. 
The remoteness inquiry as envisioned in the foreseeability approach functions as a 
																																																						
86 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc, the Achilleas [2009] 1 A.C. 61 68, (parenthesis in 
the original). 
87 A Kramer The Law of Contract Damages (2014) 290. 
88 Sylvia Shipping Co Ltd v Progress Bulk Carries Ltd [2010] C.L.C. 470. Most recently, this view was 
confirmed in Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP [2015] EWCA Civ 1146 para 74. 
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mechanism to distribute unallocated risks,90 in other words. This has also been 
acknowledged by South African courts: 
“In the absence of express provision a rule is needed to regulate the extent of liability which 
might be incurred by a seller, or carrier, who fails to fulfil his obligations under a contract, 
and the accepted rule regulates such liability by reference to the circumstances in relation 
to which both parties knew they were contracting. Under this rule, a seller is by reason of 
knowledge imparted to him by a purchaser prior to in and in connection with a sale deemed 
to have undertaken certain obligations which may not actually have been present to the 
mind of either party at the time when the transaction was entered into.”91 
As we have seen earlier, and as will be discussed below,92 the traditional application 
of the foreseeability test has been unable to provide fair results in all cases. This is 
arguably because of its lack of flexibility, and the fact that it does not take into account 
the wide range of factors that could contribute to the parties’ contemplation when 
concluding a contract. There are factors in addition to the objective notion of a “normal 
course of events” and parties’ particular knowledge of special circumstances 
surrounding the breach that should be taken into account. The rigid manner in which 
the foreseeability test has been applied is indeed problematic, and was arguably the 
reason for the adoption of the assumption of responsibility test in England. 
However, imposing a test aimed primarily at discovering parties’ intentions (where 
these are often absent) seems like an inappropriate solution to an overly restrictive 
foreseeability test. It is misplaced to introduce the fiction of an underlying risk allocation 
agreed upon by the parties where such an agreement might be (a) non-existent or (b) 
not always accurately discernable. 
As Farnsworth states, “such a patent fiction is… a poor device to use to gain 
flexibility”.93 We saw in Chapter 6, and it will be argued in further detail below, that a 
better solution would be a more flexible approach to foreseeability. Such an approach 
could, and should, take the underlying risk allocation of a contract into account – but 
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92 Ch 7 (7 3 6). 
93 Farnsworth 1970 Columbia L Rev 1209. 
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not to the exclusion of other important considerations and certainly not in cases where 
there clearly was no such allocation.  
7 3 3 The distinction between the nature and the extent of harm 
Another conclusion is that no rigid distinction can be drawn between the nature and 
the extent of harm suffered as a consequence of breach of contract. English law 
requires only the nature of a particular loss to have been foreseeable, and not its 
extent.94 This has led to cases where the traditional foreseeability test as applied in 
English law would lead to inequitable results. This was discussed specifically with 
reference to the Achilleas decision. There, the extent of the loss claimed was far in 
excess of what could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendant. In such cases, 
excluding the extent of the loss from the foreseeability inquiry would lead to the 
imposition of liability for losses that could not reasonably have been taken into account 
at contract conclusion. This seems contrary to the rationale underlying the 
foreseeability inquiry.  
In South African law there is no clear statement as to whether the extent of loss or 
only its nature has to be foreseeable. Upon turning to the model instruments discussed 
in Chapter 6, we saw that the PICC state that: 
“Foreseeability relates to the nature or type of harm but not to its extent unless the extent 
is such as to transform the harm into one of a different kind.”95 
This suggests that where the extent of a loss is significantly more than what could 
have been foreseen, a loss different to the one which was foreseeable has 
materialised.96 It seems obvious that the foreseeability requirement cannot expect 
foreseeability of an exact amount of damages – this is arguably why the extent of a 
loss has been excluded from the traditional English foreseeability test. However, to 
																																																						
94 Peel Law of Contract 1056. 
95 UNIDROIT “Official Comments on the UPICC” (2010) UNILEX 
<http://unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13637> (accessed 15-01-2016). 
96 J Gotanda “Article 74” in S Kröll, L Mistelis & PP Viscasillas (eds) UN Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) (2011) 745 766. 
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focus only on the nature of a loss when determining its foreseeability seems illogical if 
the purpose of the foreseeability enquiry is taken into account.97 
If we simply ask what a defendant could have reasonably taken into account when 
bargaining for a contract, that question considers not only the nature but also the 
extent of possible losses that could be suffered as a consequence of breach. As the 
PICC imply, this is because the nature of a loss is inextricably linked to its extent; for 
this reason, it is suggested that the foreseeability inquiry should take this into account. 
7 3 4 Foreseeability from the perspective of the defendant alone 
English and South African law determine the contemplation of losses from the 
perspective of both parties to a contract.  But an investigation of the foreseeability 
approach adopted in the model instruments in particular has revealed that it might not 
be necessary to base a test for foreseeability on the contemplation of both parties.98  
This logic is based on the notion that, if the loss was foreseeable to the plaintiff, he 
would be able to inform the defendant of the risk of such loss. If the plaintiff did inform 
the defendant, the loss would also be foreseeable to the defendant and therefore 
recoverable. If the plaintiff did not do so, the defendant would be protected. Ultimately, 
therefore, the enquiry need only focus on whether losses were foreseeable by the 
defendant.99 While the results may not be different if reasonable foreseeability is 
determined from both parties’ perspectives, formulating the foreseeability test  to focus 
only on reasonable foresight by the defendant simplifies its application.  
7 3 5 The level of probability with which harm has to be foreseeable 
Across different jurisdictions and theories of remoteness, we have seen how courts 
have grappled with the issue of defining the correct level of likelihood with which loss 
or harm caused by breach of contract ought to have been foreseeable. This study 
																																																						
97	See Ch 6 (6 3 2 2).	
98	Ch 6 (6 3 2 1)	
99 E McKendrick “Article 7.4.4” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2 ed (2015) 993. See also Corbin Contracts 1010, as cited 
in AG Murphey “Consequential Damages in Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the 
Legacy of Hadley” (1989) 23 Geo Wash J Int’l L & Econ 415 435. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 167	
suggests that it is convoluted and often unhelpful to try to hinge a test for foreseeability 
on a strictly delineated level of probability with which harm ought to have been 
foreseeable. In South Africa, early case law stated that harm had to be foreseeable as 
a likely consequence of breach.100 This was later changed to the arguably stricter 
requirement that harm should be foreseeable as a probable consequence of 
breach.101  
In Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse (“Thoroughbred Breeders’ 
Association”)102 Nienaber JA stated that the meaning of the term “probable” does not 
necessarily imply that harm needs to be more likely to occur than not,103 but merely 
that there needs to be a “realistic possibility of harm occurring” for those losses to be 
recoverable.104  
In English law there has also been debate around the degree of probability with which 
harm must be foreseeable. In Czarnikow v Koufos, The Heron II (“The Heron II”),105 
Lord Reid attacked the blanket use of the term “reasonable foreseeability” as unclear 
and confusing.106 In his decision, he formulated the required level of probability as “a 
serious possibility”,107 “a real danger”,108 “very substantial”,109 “not unlikely”110 or 
“easily foreseeable”.111 These terms have not made the inquiry easier or necessarily 
more precise.  
Similar uncertainty arose in the context of the adequate cause theory where scholars 
disagreed about the level of probability to be attached to a possible consequence 
																																																						
100 Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Company Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22.  
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103 580G. 
104 581G.  
105 [1969] 1 A.C. 350, see Ch 5 (5 2 2). 
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before its cause can be considered adequate.112 As we have seen in the discussion 
of the adequate cause theory, any answer to this question can be manipulated. 
Moreover, the emphasis on specific levels of probabilities loses sight of the normative 
nature of the remoteness inquiry. It may be noted that, where remoteness is to be 
decided on the facts of each case, any delineated level of foreseeability will have to 
be flexible enough to take the facts of a particular case into account.  
7 3 6 Flexible application of the foreseeability theory 
7 3 6 1 Rationale for a flexible approach to foreseeability 
A final, broad, conclusion that can be drawn from the research is that the remoteness 
inquiry is inevitably imprecise.  Therefore, the foreseeability theory can only lead to 
satisfactory results when it is approached and applied in a flexible manner that takes 
into account the facts and circumstances of a particular case. What can be considered 
usual and normal in a particular course of events, and what the actual knowledge of a 
defendant was, as well as what that implies for what he could have taken into account, 
cannot in all cases be determined with reference to a strictly defined set of 
determinants, or an abstract rule.113  
In English law, one of the points of criticism often raised against the traditional 
application of the foreseeability theory is that the test is imprecise and vague – 
arguably because it tries to encapsulate the remoteness inquiry into a single 
consideration. An example of this imprecision is the use of the phrase “damage which 
occurred in the usual course of things”.114 The test does not indicate to what extent a 
court may take into account the commercial context within which the contract was 
concluded when determining whether or not a specific course of events can be 
regarded as usual.115  
																																																						
112 Ch 4 (4 2 2), Hart & Honoré Causation in the Law 485.  
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The result is therefore that the traditional foreseeability test is restrictive due to its 
narrow focus on only the knowledge of parties and the likelihood of harm occurring. 
The test as it has been formulated and applied in both English and South African law 
does not take into account other, arguably important, factors. For example, the test 
does not take into account the proportionality between damage suffered and the 
breach committed, the nature of the particular contract in question, or public policy 
considerations.116 This criticism of the restricted manner in which the test has 
developed is summarised by Lord Hoffmann: 
“Hadley v Baxendale is a very good example of a tendency which is endemic in a system 
of precedent, namely, for judges to take the ground upon which a particular case was 
decided as the sole criterion upon which different cases should be decided. That leads to 
an impoverishment of reasoning in subsequent authorities.”117 
This has been recognised by courts and authors alike. Some authors argue that the 
reasonable foreseeability test is in fact merely a flexible policy tool, or a set of tests, 
that can be used by judges to secure just outcomes. For example, Fuller and Purdue 
argue that the traditional foreseeability test has developed to be less of a definite test 
in itself; rather, it represents an umbrella term for a developing set of tests.118  
The second source of criticism is therefore that the restrictive terminology within which 
remoteness inquiries have been conducted under the foreseeability theory has 
resulted in a test whose formulation and terminology do not accurately reflect its 
application. This is problematic, because:  
“[T]he practice of disguising substantive principles in another form should be avoided where 
possible. This kind of camouflage is a shortcoming, not a strength, of the rule as stated in 
Hadley and related cases. It militates against transparency in decision-making, and 
undermines certainty by not exposing the real reasons underpinning conclusions in the 
case law.”119 
This suggests that the foreseeability test has to be applied in a manner which takes 
cognisance of the wide variety of factors that might render a particular outcome 
reasonably foreseeable in a particular case. Furthermore, it should be formulated in a 
																																																						
116 127. 
117 L Hoffman “The Achilleas: Custom and Practice or Foreseeability?” (2010) 14 Edin. L.Rev. 47 53. 
118 Fuller & Purdue 1936-1937 Yale L.J. 85.  
119 Harris 2012 JCL 130. 
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way that allows courts to describe and acknowledge their consideration of these 
factors. Arguably, the foreseeability test as applied under the model instruments 
addresses both these aspects more satisfactorily than has been the case in the 
application of the traditional foreseeability tests in English and South African law. The 
model instruments determine foreseeability with reference to a variety of different 
factors depending on the facts of a case. Furthermore, courts seem to acknowledge 
the flexible and discretionary nature of the remoteness inquiry. The official comments 
to Article 7.4.4 PICC state: 
“Foreseeability is a flexible concept which leaves a wide measure of discretion to the 
judge.”120 
Under the model instruments, the foreseeability test is therefore applied with reference 
to a wide range of factors,121 including the scope and purpose of the contract in 
question,122 the allocation of risk in the contract,123 previous dealings between the 
parties,124 established practices between the parties,125 and common trade usage.126 
It appears as if South African courts may be prepared to adopt a more flexible 
approach to the remoteness inquiry in the future.  They have acknowledged the 
limitations of the current approach127 and it is expected that the convention principle 
will be rejected when the Supreme Court of Appeal has to decide the matter.128 This 
court has even suggested a possible way forward which is broadly reconcilable with 
the conclusions of this study. In Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price 
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Waterhouse129 Nienaber JA stated obiter that consideration should be given to the 
possible adoption of a flexible or supple approach to remoteness in contract law. In 
particular, he referred to the flexible test for legal causation that has been applied in 
criminal law and the law of delict.130 Quoting Corbett CJ, Nienaber JA described this 
test as 
“a flexible one in which factors such as reasonably foreseeability, directness, the absence 
or presence of a novus actus interveniens, legal policy, reasonability, fairness and justice 
all play their part.”131 
He suggested that the experience that had been obtained in this regard in criminal law 
and the law of delict might be fruitfully applied to the law of contract.132 
Nienaber JA describes the suggested approach as follows:  
“[T]he competence of parties to regulate, limit or expand by arrangement amongst 
themselves the consequences of any prospective breach … must of course be 
accommodated in any flexible test … Both limbs of the current conventional test can readily 
be blended and integrated as being relevant factors to be taken into account. The fact that 
both parties had particular consequences in mind when they concluded the contract will 
still be conclusive. There are many instances where the time of breach will be more 
appropriate than the time of contract. The circumstances of each case will determine where 
the emphasis belongs. Reasonable foreseeability, one imagines, will govern most but not 
all cases.”133  
It seems clear that our courts are therefore ready to move away from our current 
approach to remoteness in contract in favour of a more flexible approach. It is 
suggested that such a flexible approach would necessarily focus on a set of concrete 
considerations that could be used to determine what a defendant could have taken 
into account when entering into a contract. This is because the underlying premise of 
the foreseeability approach is to hold a defendant liable for only those consequences 
that he could have, had he been reasonable, bargained for at contract conclusion. It 
is therefore suggested that the time of contract conclusion will always be relevant. The 
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following section will make a few general observations on which considerations should 
be taken into account in such a flexible foreseeability inquiry. 
7 3 6 2 Factors to be considered in a flexible foreseeability enquiry 
One factor that is often considered by courts when deciding on remoteness in contract 
under the model instruments is a defendant’s experience and commercial expertise.134 
Where a defendant is a trader in a particular market, for example, courts tend to 
assume that the defendant has knowledge of prevailing prices or tendencies towards 
price volatility in that market.135  
In addition to commercial expertise, a defendant’s knowledge of a particular product 
or industry is also taken into consideration. Where a party knows a particular product 
well, he is assumed to have been able to foresee losses arising from defects specific 
to that product.136 
The particular relationship between the contracting parties, as well as previous 
dealings between them, have also been considered when determining what parties 
could reasonably have foreseen.137 Another important consideration is the scope and 
purpose of a contract. This consideration has been encountered in the context of the 
adequate cause theory as supplemented by the Schutzzwecklehre in Germany, as 
well as the assumption of responsibility test in English law. This is also acknowledged 
and has been applied in the context of the model instruments:  
“Normative considerations such as the allocation of risks according to the contract, the 
purpose of the contract, and the protection intended to be offered by particular contractual 
obligations should also be taken into account.”138 
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Often, the scope and purpose of a contract would be an indication of what a defendant 
took into account when bargaining for a contract. In such cases, “it is a matter of 
interpreting the contract and of determining the nature of the interest which the 
contractual duty that was infringed was designed to protect”.139 
This is a valuable consideration to take into account where such interests, scope or 
purpose of a contract is actually discernible. But, as we have seen in the context of 
German law, that it is not always the case.140  Where there is no defined scope, a test 
would have to rely on other factors to determine the foreseeability of losses. 
Another factor to consider could also be the commercial context of a contract. In other 
words, the court has “to understand not only circumstances of any immediate dispute 
but also the larger business and institutional context in which the contract was 
formed”.141 
In this regard, consideration of trade usages in an industry could provide guidance. In 
the discussion of the model instruments, we have seen how the CISG makes explicit 
mention of the fact that trade usage should be considered when determining 
reasonable foreseeability.142 It has been held that the foreseeability requirement “can 
conclusively be met by showing a trade custom”.143 This is also in line with the 
underlying rationale of the foreseeability theory – if a well-defined custom exists in a 
certain industry, parties to a contract will know or ought to know of the custom’s 
implications for the risk of liability that they are assuming in the contract. It will be 
reasonable to expect of parties to enter into contracts with those customs and the risks 
that they imply in mind. 
These are only some of the possible factors that could form part of a flexible approach 
to remoteness in contract. Arguably, courts would have to determine foreseeability on 
																																																						
139 Zimmermann 2014 Edin. L. R. 206. 
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the facts of a particular case, and often those facts will indicate which considerations 
should be decisive. 
7 4 Conclusion 
Over the course of the discussion of various theories of remoteness in contractual 
damages, this study has identified the common underlying principle that the limits of 
contractual damages should be determined with reference to what the party in breach 
could reasonably have taken into account when concluding a particular contract.  
We have seen that this idea is the underlying justification for the foreseeability theory. 
The idea also informed much of the criticism and ultimately the rejection of the direct 
consequences theory, and contributed to the development of the adequate cause 
theory. The principle that the party in breach should be liable for all losses that he 
reasonably could have contemplated when concluding a contract seems, therefore, 
like the appropriate point of departure for an inquiry into remoteness of contractual 
damages.  
The research suggests that the foreseeability theory is most suited to identify what 
could have been considered when contracting. Given the fact that it is in line with 
notions of fairness or equity and the constitutional value of human dignity and that the 
underlying rationale of the foreseeability theory – as well as the theory itself – has 
formed part of South African case law, it can be regarded as the most appropriate 
approach to remoteness of contractual damages in our law. 
This study has, however, also highlighted a number of limitations of the foreseeability 
theory as it is currently applied. In this regard, lessons can be drawn as to the desired 
future course of development of the foreseeability theory in our law.  
Firstly, it seems that a distinction between general and special damages does not add 
to the foreseeability test, but rather obscures the inquiry into what could have been 
considered when contracting. The study suggests that abandoning the distinction 
between types of damages could be beneficial. It removes an artificial distinction 
between two separate tests for recoverability of losses when in truth the underlying 
principle should be identical for all damages. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 175	
Secondly, the study suggests that a focus on the intentions of parties with regard to 
liability upon contract conclusion should not form part of a test for the recoverability of 
damage. Requiring agreement about the recoverability of damages would often 
amount to the imposition of a fiction. Where parties did have shared intentions with 
regards to liability for damages that should of course be enforced. However, a 
determination of remoteness should not require a determination of contractual 
intentions where often there were none. 
The third conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that it is not always possible 
to draw a strict distinction between the nature and the extent of losses. Additionally, 
requiring only the nature of damage to have been foreseeable at contract conclusion 
will often lead to inequitable results. A further suggestion is that it might be a welcome 
simplification to focus a foreseeability inquiry only on what the defendant could have 
reasonably foreseen, and not to take into account the perspective of both parties. The 
study also suggests that it is often unnecessary and unhelpful to fixate on an 
appropriately defined level of probability with which damage ought to have been 
foreseeable. 
Finally, the study suggests that the foreseeability theory should be applied in a flexible 
manner with reference to the facts of a particular case. The core question to be asked 
is simply whether a defendant reasonably could have taken the particular damage into 
account, or actually did foresee the damage, when he was concluding the contract. 
Such a question cannot be answered with reference to a strictly defined test which 
does not take into account the circumstances of the case. Rather, a variety of factors 
could contribute to the answer. These include the particular knowledge and expertise 
of the defendant; previous dealings between the parties; the commercial context and 
trade usages pertaining to the contract; the scope and purpose of the contract in 
question, as well as its underlying risk allocation.  
A test of foreseeability which allows for the flexible application of these and other 
considerations alleviates many of the problems and limitations of the traditional 
foreseeability test. It also grounds the remoteness inquiry in real-life, concrete 
considerations that might provide more guidance than the traditional test for 
foreseeability. As Thoroughbred Breeders indicates, there are promising signs that 
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